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Summary 
UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX 
ZOË GARRITY – PHD SOCIAL WORK AND SOCIAL CARE 
OLD AGE, CARING POLICIES AND GOVERNMENTALITY 
 
Through the theoretical lens of Foucault’s archaeological method, this thesis 
undertakes a discourse analysis to examine how old age and ageing are strategically 
positioned as forms of governmentality in New Labour social care policy documents. It 
is argued that these discourses are not directed purely at the older generation, but at 
everyone, at all stages of life, encompassing all aspects of everyday living. Old age thus 
becomes a strategy of governing the population through individual everyday lives. This 
hints at the way ageing is prefigured, anticipated and lived in advance.  
An analytical method is developed by weaving together Foucault’s notions of 
archaeology and governmentality; the latter is utilised both as an analytical 
perspective and to provide an understanding of how people primarily act and interact 
in contemporary Western societies. 
This analytical perspective is initially applied to an exploration of how the form 
and function of social policy enable ordinary practices of life to become targets of 
political government, making both possible and desirable the government of everyday 
living: governing how we ought to live in every aspect of life from work and finances to 
health, to personal relationships and leisure activities. The thesis progresses to explore 
this in more detail through a practical application of governmentality and focused 
discourse analysis of eight New Labour social care policy texts. The aim of the analysis 
is to explore what subjectivities and forms of life are possible within these discourses 
and therefore what these policies actually do, as distinguished from what they claim to 
be doing. 
It is argued that the discourses that emerge in these policies act to limit and 
subjectify, by attempting to contain and stabilise the multitude of possibilities for 
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practices of living. By ostensibly aiming to create social inclusion the policies make 
possible vast areas of exclusion that become prime spaces of government. Thus many 
ways of living, ageing, and being old become untenable due to their inherent 
contradiction with the social values and rationalities upon which these discourses are 
based.  
Whilst governmentality analyses have been brought to many other policy 
areas, this thesis makes an original contribution by: developing a governmental 
analysis of social policy as a form of biopolitics; by applying this analysis to the social 
care field; and by using policy discourses of old age and ageing to draw out significant 
aspects of a governmental society. In particular it explores the dispersion of many 
traditional boundaries, leading to the rearrangement of relations, responsibilities and 
subjectivities.     
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Introduction 
 Mapping the surface 
‘Everything that happens and everything that is said happens or is said at the surface. 
The surface is no less explorable and unknown than depth and height which are 
nonsense . . . The philosopher is no longer the being of the caves, not Plato’s soul or 
bird, but rather the animal which is on a level with the surface – a tick or louse.’ 
 (Deleuze, 1990, p.132-3) 
Beginnings 
To attempt to pin down where this thesis began suggests an ability to mark a 
moment or place of origin, a series of events that led to linear development. Rather it 
provides a justification for the work behind, already undertaken, so is perhaps more 
appropriately thought of not as a beginning, but an ending, acting not as an 
explanation for the developed, but as a marker of what is important for understanding 
the intention of the thesis: how can it and does it make sense? If this study can be 
thought of as having a beginning, a starting point, I would point to a rupture of 
thought: a confusion regarding old age. This rupture did not involve a dispute 
concerning whether people get old, or whether ageing happens. Or even whether one 
is actually aged, or instead whether ageing is something that one simply does. What I 
could not understand was why it seems necessary to speak it and organise structures, 
identities and everyday life, around it? Old age as an event that appears to shape not 
only institutions but people, relationships, possibilities, caused a discomfort, a fracture 
of understanding, which  highlights  a split in the lines within which this thesis, and 
therefore I, am enmeshed. Whilst normative discourses of old age and the social 
practices on which they are based, must inherently be rational: based upon values, 
sensibilities, knowledges that make sense to us, here at this time, in this place; to me it 
suggested a perverse irrationality. Irrationality- no less a form of visibility - providing a 
way of being able to see and so being able to speak, and to do - illuminates such a 
split: frayed ends that offer the possibility of travelling along other lines, in other 
directions, traversing alternative routes, revealing not only the potential for speaking 
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from other places but taking this dynamism as a way of seeing and speaking, a way of 
‘doing’ research. Of course I did not stand alone in discovering this irrationality; it was 
already spoken of, already being lived out. These frayed ends were there for me to 
look upon. Yet whilst able to move along them and investigate I am enmeshed, able to 
see (and to speak) only from these lines of visibility and the unconcealed. The 
beginning cannot therefore be finally found, and it is more complex still to map the 
terrain of this investigation. 
Initial questions that arose from recognising this irrationality given to forms of 
old age related to personal relationships. Viewed from a social care perspective I was 
struck by the effects categories of old age had on personal, especially intimate, 
relationships of care1. Whilst the aims and scope of the thesis moved on from this 
matter of concern the trace it left was an understanding of the impact mundane 
categories, such as old age, have on forming the very boundaries within which it is 
possible to be, at least in this time, at this moment, in this place. 
After this, or maybe before, I read Foucault (2002a, 2007a), which initially 
developed the way in which I was able to question these social realities and problems, 
and later (in conjunction with other important writings) developed the way in which I 
was able to question the process of research, a point I shall return to later. 
  Once investigation into the area deepened this initial interest in old age 
revealed the immense significance ageing holds for a contemporary analysis of 
governance. Not only does the category of old age as a description of the self retain a 
mostly unquestioned rationality, but ageing and old age are presented within social 
care policy as a defining feature of our society that bring a unique set of challenges for 
us as a modern population: requiring us to reconsider who we are, what we ought to 
do, how we should live, and how we ought to be governed.  Thus this thesis is 
distinctive in that it tries to understand old age both as a discursive object through 
                                                          
1
 Alongside old age, the emerging quasi-professional role of informal carers greatly interested me, 
particularly concerning how discourses legitimated within current carer’s legislation (C(EO)A 2004) 
turned personal intimate relations into  versions of social contribution and economic utility, seemingly 
based on a work/activity ethic rather than any notion of human care. An interest that lay outside the 
scope of this thesis are the affects these discourses have on couples or other family members, 
particularly relating to alienation (from services, from each other), and whether this causes any change 
in the dynamics of the relationship beyond the deterioration of health.   
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which we can claim to know (something, someone, ourselves), and also as a 
governmental technique: a reason why we should watch (ourselves and others) and be 
watched, why we should tend to our selves, alter our selves, and adhere to certain 
notions of the ‘social good’. Whilst my interest began with questions regarding how 
the category of old age, understood as a discursive object, affected old people - how 
they became defined and how this affected their personal relationships - this grew due 
to the recognition that discourses of old age and ageing extend beyond the lives and 
identities of old people to reach the lives of all of us: the embryo, the child, the 
working age adult, as well as the retiree.  
Focus on government policy 
Just simply starting from a focus on social care and social services there would 
be many ways in which to approach this set of problems, each of which would 
inevitably influence the scope of the thesis. For example, I considered widening my 
analysis to include policy and guidance literature from voluntary organisations 
concerned with issues relating to ageing. This could have led to an interesting analysis 
of whether discourses of old age were aligned with those found within New Labour 
policy documents, or whether competing discourses emerged to challenge these. 
Another consideration was to include documents such as assessment schedules, and 
casework formats for recording interventions to analyse how these discourses function 
as they become implemented in social work practice. However in order to set 
achievable boundaries and avoid a superficial analysis by trying to include too many 
different elements, I ultimately decided to focus on UK government social policy 
documents that either specifically dealt with old age or ageing, or were important to 
the governance of old age or more acutely governance through ageing. 
I decided upon government policy documents to explore the issues arising from 
the irrationality of forms of ageing, because policy points not only to some notion of 
the social good - who we ought to become, what we should aim to achieve, and for 
what reasons - but also points to a set of problems - what are individuals currently 
doing, who are they currently being, and why is this just not good enough? That is, why 
do certain phenomena become targets for policy strategies of intervention? Policies of 
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care aim to provide care, support or protection to individuals or families with 
perceived needs or risks that hinder them living an ‘independent’ life that the rest of 
the population would take for granted. Forms of support may include domiciliary care, 
community support and provision of community resources, and information, advice 
and advocacy services.  Adult social care policies - which currently overwhelmingly 
focus on promoting independence and social inclusion - contain an inherent tension 
regarding whether these policies function primarily for the good of the person 
requiring support, or for the security of society. This questions the extent to which 
caring policies are based upon an ethic of ‘care’ at all, or whether other alternative 
value bases take priority. 
 As noted by Dunne and colleagues (2005) social policy is a reaction to a 
perceived need or set of needs. By this I am not implying that everybody agrees, that 
we all recognise the same needs, aspire to the same ideals and buy in to the same 
versions of subjecthood that policies set out. If nothing else the existence of policy 
stands as a sign that people do not behave in line with forms of normative rationality: 
an aim of policy is to encourage people to behave in ways they either could not or 
would not otherwise have done (Schneider and Ingram, 1990). Whilst this thesis 
argues for policy as an example of governmentality (Chapter 3), it does not follow that 
the governmental strategies found within it are effective, and due to the dynamic, 
circular nature of governance2, they can never be total.   
I singled out eight UK based policy documents, all produced by the New Labour 
government between the years 2001 to 2010, to analyse as part of the thesis. These 
are not homogenous, differing in the institutional authority producing them, their scale 
of application, and the activity and audiences they address. The policy documents, 
carefully selected and analysed, are as follows: 
National service framework for Older People (Department of Health, 2001) (hereafter 
NSF)  
Opportunity age: Meeting the challenges of the 21st century, volume 1 and 
Opportunity age: A social portrait of ageing in the UK: A snapshot of key trends and 
                                                          
2
 This will be discussed in Chapter 2. 
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evidence, volume 2 (Department of Work and Pensions, 2005) (hereafter OA and OA 
vol.2) 
Our health, our care, our say: a new direction for community services (Department of 
Health, 2006) (hereafter OHOCOS) 
A sure start to later life: ending inequalities for older people (Office of the Deputy 
Prime Minister, 2006) (hereafter SS) 
Independence, choice and risk: a guide to best practice in supported decision making 
(Department of Health, 2007) (hereafter ICR) 
Shaping the future of care together (Department of Health, 2009) (hereafter SFC) 
Building a society for all ages (Department of Work and Pensions, 2009) (hereafter 
BSFA) 
Building the National Care Service (Department of Health, 2010) (hereafter BNCS)3 
These documents were chosen because they either focus on the issue of old age or 
ageing as an embedded social problem, or else, they are social care orientated and 
relevant both to how old people are governed and are expected to govern themselves. 
Appendix 1 outlines the aim and focus of each policy document, indicating ways in 
which they both differ and encompass similar rationalities and themes. 
Discourse analysis as a method 
I have used these policy documents to undertake a discourse analysis derived 
from The Archaeology of Knowledge (Foucault, 2002a). The values of this approach will 
be explored in detail in Chapter 1. However what is important to make clear from the 
start is that, in line with the archaeological approach, these documents will not be 
treated as a sign of something else. That is, I will not be trying to look underneath 
them, to find out what happened ‘behind the scenes’; nor will I treat them as creations 
of particular actors, or as unique expressions of the objects of politics. The discourses 
analysed in the policy texts will instead be treated as able to emerge only because of 
                                                          
3
 See Appendix 1 for a synopsis of each policy. 
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the already existent mesh that make up the various lines and flows of power4. It is 
these dynamic lines that are the focus of my analysis therefore, not the policy makers. 
The policy documents, as the data for discourse analysis, are used as a tool with which 
I can explore the surface, not to judge the worth or effectiveness of individual policy 
strategies, nor to level judgement of New Labour’s approach to ageing policy5. Whilst 
recognising the differences between the policies, as outlined above and in Appendix 1, 
I often refer to these policy documents throughout the thesis collectively as ‘the/these 
policies’ or ‘the policy documents’. This is mostly due to the need for a convenient 
shorthand for the collective data on which the analysis is based. But importantly, it 
also reflects how I have treated the various documents as constituting a similar surface 
upon which discourses of old age and ageing can emerge, and it is from this point that 
an analytics of governmentality can emerge. 
Throughout my analysis in Chapters 4 to 7, I have drawn directly on sections of 
text from the policies, clearly separating them from my own writing by using indented 
quotes, regardless of word length. This is to avoid the pitfalls of summarising the text, 
which is likely to lose detail and add nothing (Antaki et al., 2003), and also to set apart 
the ‘data’ being analysed from the literature drawn upon as part of the analysis. 
Furthermore, I have never allowed an excerpt from the policy texts to ‘stand alone’, as 
if it could speak for itself, or to assume that what it says is self-evident. Instead I have 
endeavoured to draw out the discourses, governmental rationalities and strategies 
they contain, as well as some of the consequences these may bring. The policies are 
treated not as the originators of these, but as one mode (among many) of their 
existence, a surface through which it is possible for them to emerge (this matter will be 
explored in Chapter 3). 
  A key decision to be made in any discourse analysis involves which texts, and 
which pieces of text, to include and analyse. According to Dunne and colleagues 
(2005): 
                                                          
4
 An understanding of Foucault’s notion of an apparatus (dispositif) as a tangle of lines will be discussed 
in Chapter 1.  
5
 I shall revisit my approach and set out my aims later (p.19). Here I want to focus on the ‘mechanics’ of 
discourse analysis. 
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all linguistically-based textual analysis faces issues in determining the 
boundaries of the text. Deciding where a text starts and finishes, in time 
and space, is already part of the analysis and the necessity of presenting 
fine-grained analysis means that inevitably boundaries have to be set 
(p.100) 
Some of the reasons for setting the boundaries around policy texts, and for choosing 
these specific policy materials, have already been discussed, as well as some 
suggestions regarding how choosing different texts to analyse would have changed the 
nature of this thesis. Once the texts have been decided upon, I – the analyst – still have 
to make decisions regarding which sections of text to draw attention to, which are 
most worthy of exploration? After a close reading of all of the policy documents, I 
began to map out prominent and recurring themes and issues within them. I paid close 
attention to how people were spoken about - as individuals, communities, 
neighbourhoods, retirees and so on - and what relationships these implied - with the 
state, society, each other, themselves. This of course did not happen in isolation, but 
alongside and within the context of reading many other sources6. Some overarching 
themes and consistent concepts emerged which became the focus of each of the 
analysis chapters in turn: old age and ageing as a discursive object and governmental 
tool (Chapter 4); self-management and identity as both a means and telos of 
government (Chapter 5); rationalities of risk and decision making (Chapter 6); and the 
discourse of community and participation (Chapter7). Other important governmental 
rationalities and technologies also emerged that fed into all the themes in some way: 
primarily the focus on the subject as active, participative and independent, and the 
relations between the collective and the individual. As such these will become 
recurrent foci of the analysis across the chapters.   
  I am aware that the methods may not adhere to other, more traditional, 
versions of discourse analysis which have drawn on Foucauldian theory, such as Critical 
Discourse Analysis (for example Fairclough, 2001), or Foucauldian Discourse Analysis 
(for example Willig, 2008). For this reason I refer to my approach as archaeological 
                                                          
6
 This will be explored later (p.22) 
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discourse analysis, rooted as it is in an understanding of discourse through a close 
reading of The Archaeology of Knowledge (Foucault, 2002a), as set out in Chapter 1.  
Governmentality: aims and approach 
The thesis takes a distinctive path by combining the use of archaeological 
discourse analysis as both a method and conceptual framework, with an analysis 
through the lens of Foucault’s important notion of governmentality. As will be 
demonstrated in Chapters 1 and 2, governmentality describes both a form of analytics, 
as well as a way of understanding power and relations of force within Western 
democratic societies: governmentality describes how power moves and functions, and 
how this in turn makes certain subjectifications possible.  Furthermore an 
understanding of governmentality moves the analysis beyond a discursive 
understanding of what is actual to include judgements of value: not merely a 
description of who we are, but who we ought to be. Hence strategies of 
governmentality aim to change behaviours, identities, expectations and aspirations. 
  As noted by McKee (2009), governmentality has gained increasing popularity 
within the studies of social policy in the last decade. It has been used in various ways, 
for different purposes of analysis across diverse policy fields including crime (see for 
example Garland, 1997; Stenson, 2005), education (for example Edwards, 2002; 
Morgan, 2005), housing (for example Flint, 2002, 2012), and social work (for example 
Parton, 1994, 1998; Villadsen, 2008). Within the field of old age/ageing there are a few 
examples of studies specifically from a governmentality perspective (see for example 
Conway and Crawshaw, 2009; Katz, 2000), and many more using diverse aspects of 
Foucauldian theory (see Rudman, 2006 for a focus on discourse, and Powell and 
Wahindin eds., 2006, which includes applications of various aspects of Foucauldian 
theory, including governmentality, to ageing). The analysis of the chosen policies in 
Chapters 4 to 7 inevitably builds upon, echoes, and engages with some of this salient 
literature. However it also draws upon a wide variety of non-Foucauldian based 
research and literature from a diverse range of sources. These include UK and 
international research, empirical and non-empirical, within and outside the field of 
social care. Among these, for example, are sociological and psychological examinations 
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of risk, medical and historical literature on ageing, and various philosophical 
treatments of self and identity. The use of these diverse inter-disciplinary sources acts 
to situate the rationalities and subjectivities identified in the policy documents within 
wider analytical and research contexts, as well as to hold them up to criticism.      
The conceptual approach to this thesis and the aims of the analysis are 
intimately connected. Governmentality has not been ‘applied to’ the analysis, as some 
kind of additional tool to add a further depth or perspective to my interpretation. 
Rather governmentality is central to how I have worked, the questions I have asked.  
As an implication it both explains and requires that the focus of analysis is on: 
processes of subjectification; function and not intention; and the explicit but complex 
links between what is spoken and what is done. Thus the main aim of this thesis is to 
deploy discourse analysis to explore the selected social policy documents from a 
governmentality perspective, to determine what they do: what subjectivities and ways 
of living do the discourses revealed within them make possible? These include the 
subjectivities considered desirable/ rational and therefore legitimised by the policy 
documents, but also those that are problematized. The latter are still possible forms of 
living but ones that come with consequences, attracting other, perhaps more 
authoritative forms of governance, where the relations of force can be seen to flow 
differently7. The importance of identifying what subjectivities are possible, and which 
of these are desirable is to ask: Why? What function do the proposed subjectivities 
have regarding what individuals are expected to do, and how they are supposed to 
live? What do they enable and what do they constrain? This is important because 
when I speak of ‘individuals’ I of course mean us – you and me. Whilst I have not made 
personal comments in the analysis, nor based it upon personal preferences for one 
subject position over another, the critical edge of the work is sharpened because it 
comes from asking personal questions: ‘Do I want to live in this way?’ ‘Why should I?’ 
‘How does it affect me?’  In order to achieve  this aim, I will also endeavour to set out 
the ways in which policy provides a space or surface upon which governmentality 
becomes possible and legitimate, and simultaneously a useful place from which to map 
out discourses and attempt to scaffold their boundaries (in Chapter 3).   
                                                          
7
 An example of this will be discussed in Chapter 6 in relation to ‘unwise’ decision making. 
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The thesis therefore aims to conduct a grounded application of an analytics of 
governmentality in order to explore and demonstrate the parameters within which 
certain lives are made possible. The value of this analysis lies in demonstrating how the 
rhetoric of inclusion used within these policy documents, specifically relating to 
statements of well-being, independence and self-management, act to close off vast 
spaces of living and tighten the boundaries of self formation. Furthermore, the analysis 
makes the innovative claim that the positioning of old age and ageing as a 
problematisation of social inclusion and social security in the policy documents, works 
to provide a rationalisation for strategies of governance throughout the life-course and 
across aspects of everyday life. This thesis therefore offers novel insight into the 
function of the discourses present in the policy documents – how they, not simply 
impact upon our lives, but make our lives actual. Alongside this it creates a space 
within which to think otherwise: to discover and imagine what is absent in these 
documents, and to think what might be possible by re-evaluating the worth of the 
neglected spaces outside of the rationalities and subjectivities legitimated within these 
policies.      
Writing as researching: the creative text 
As noted at the start of this chapter, I am not separated from the discourses 
that the thesis attempts to analyse. Indeed I am enmeshed: caught within the multiple 
lines and forces that I aim to explore. To enmesh is to entangle, not only to trap but to 
make thought complicated (Oxford English Dictionary), as such this analysis looks not 
from above but along the horizon, where the view is neither clear nor uninterrupted. 
Whilst accepting that it is therefore impossible to see everything, or to provide a fully 
comprehensive analysis, it is from this perspective that it may be possible to begin to 
mesh at all: to thread my way through, to be involved inextricably (Oxford English 
Dictionary). To be caught provides at the same time the potential for movement. This 
thesis is part of the discourses it discusses: lines feed into it, cross over it, break out of 
it. 
I do not, then, claim the analysis can present the Truth regarding the 
problematizations it explores, although it is truthful: a truthful mapping of the current 
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terrain, fraught with the problems that arise when mapping the surface underfoot. 
Whilst attempting to explore, understand and make claims to knowledge in this area, 
the analysis does not attempt to close, shut off, or find completion. Thus as this 
introduction marks in many ways the end of this thesis, so the conclusion will, at least 
in part, signify a beginning. Neither though is the analysis an interpretation or 
expression of my ‘self’. Guttorm (2012) describes Deleuze’s conceptualisation of the 
subject as, in distinction from a singular unit, a series of processes or place where 
thought can emerge. She explains: 
So the ‘I’ who writes here is not an isolated object with a specific 
identity to reveal, but just a place in which the writing can emerge 
through and in the thoughts (books) ‘I’ have been reading. 
(Guttorm, 2012, p.601) 
This is not an attempt to remove my self from the text, but to understand my self in 
the text not as a singular voice, but as a place where ideas can be put to work. 
This thesis is therefore no more than the writing. The research did not occur 
outside of what is written here: writing is the process as well as the product. Dunne 
and colleagues (2005, p.135) note that in the realist methodology paradigm the 
integrity of the research is thought to lie in its methodological underpinning rather 
than the actual text itself. However, the writing is not merely an explanation of the 
research, but is the place the analysis occurs or happens. Furthermore, whilst the 
methodology and conceptual framework of this thesis (Chapters 1, 2 and 3) are placed 
before the analysis chapters (Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7) the former did not simply lead to 
the latter: writing the analysis impacted upon my understanding of the methodology 
as much as the methodology informed the development of the policy analysis. 
   Writing is not therefore a response to thought: writing and thinking are 
inseparable (McNiff, 1998; Richardson and St. Pierre, 2005). McNiff (1998) claims that 
the research model that requires a researcher to establish what they will do before 
they do it is just not possible or even desirable for some forms of research, as creative 
processes are often a step ahead of the reflective mind: research results often just 
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‘happen’ no matter how systematic the enquiries. From this point of view research is 
not a logical or linear activity but a playful or experimental process, where moments of 
serendipity and spontaneity are expected. Writing has nothing to do with signifying, 
but with mapping and surveying ‘even realms that are yet to come’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1988, p.5). Thus, recognising the primacy of writing, not just for the 
production of this research but as intrinsic to its process, positions research as 
creative: as creating.  
This thesis does not intend to contain the social world, it instead aims to do the 
opposite: to create by recognising limitations and absences. In the words of Foucault 
(1989, quoted in Sluga, 2010), ‘the work of the intellect is to show that what is, does 
not have to be, what it is’ (p.42). The work of the thesis then, is to question the 
rationalities upon which the discourses of old age and the governance of ageing rest. 
To at times discredit them, to reveal the disharmony between their function and the 
stated intention, to expose that which is claimed to be natural and enduring as 
arbitrary and contingent. Whilst a purpose such as this will frustrate some, leaving as it 
must inevitably do, loose ends, its strength lies in its potential to create spaces for 
other (legitimate) subjectivities and ways of living to emerge, to assert themselves. A 
focus on function: what something is actually doing rather than claiming to do, 
combined with the removal of any solid ground on which to pin rationalities, demands 
these forms of government and processes of subjectification to be justified without 
recourse to naturalness or normalities dressed as common sense if they are to remain 
valid. Mapping the surface forces these important questions, often overlooked as too 
obvious, too ordinary, or unimportant, into the open: 
These are questions not just about what we do but about who we will 
be, what sort of lives we will lead and will allow those around us to lead, 
and what these lives will mean. These are truly ethical questions, 
questions of ethos. 
(McWhorter, 2009, p.432)   
The questions at the core of this thesis: why speak about old age? why organise 
people, institutions and everyday lives around ageing? and what are the consequences 
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of doing this? are exactly such questions that have a prominent significance for 
understanding contemporary governmental practices and the parameters of 
legitimated life, lived as an active citizen and member of a population.   
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Chapter 1 
Archaeology and governmentality: mapping the surface 
Introduction 
Foucault’s work has been accused of lacking consistency and unity, as it 
contains many conceptual shifts and changes with the result that earlier and later 
stages of his thought cannot be used in conjunction with each other unproblematically. 
Deleuze (1995), however, challenges the argument that the various phases of 
Foucault’s work lack any coherency, by attempting to show the logic behind the 
movement from knowledge to power, to modes of subjectification. He argued that 
Foucault’s thought did not evolve, ‘but went from one crisis to another’ (1995, p.104), 
suggesting that the movement from one topic to the next was due to the need to 
overcome a block or obstacle that his previous discussions had led to or come across.  
Therefore it is precisely this movement that draws Foucault’s work together: ‘this 
ability to break the line of thought, to change direction, to find themselves on the open 
sea, and so discover, invent, is what give thinkers a deeper coherency’ (Deleuze, 1995, 
p.104). 
It remains important, however, to acknowledge and respect the specific sense 
and technical application of certain terms employed by Foucault: different terms bring 
with them different phases or processes of subjectification for example, and therefore 
do not speak of the same subject, society or state. Holding onto Deleuze’s claim that 
sense can be made of Foucault’s breaks and changes of direction as responses or 
reactions to his own work, makes it possible to see how two notions that appear in 
separate phases of Foucault’s work – in this case an archaeological understanding of 
discourse and governmentality – can be used together. Both of these concepts were 
developed by Foucault as ways for understanding what is possible, and therefore what 
is actual, at a particular point in time. An understanding of Foucault’s use of the term 
‘apparatus’ will be discussed later to further clarify this important point. 
The policy analysis at the core of this thesis (Chapters 4 to 7) is undertaken 
using the method of archaeological discourse analysis as described in The Archaeology 
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of Knowledge (Foucault, 2002a). This chapter begins with a detailed exploration of 
what discourse and discourse analysis are from a Foucauldian archaeological 
viewpoint, thus setting out the methodological foundation upon which the analysis 
rests. From this follows a discussion of what is meant by Foucault’s use of the term 
apparatus (dispositif): how it conjoins lines and relations of force with discourse and by 
doing so frames the issue of governance. Whilst governmentality as describing a 
particular type of society and a specific understanding of force relations, will be 
discussed in the next chapter, in the present one I will explore the significance of 
governmentality as an analytical perspective. Thus the following discussion detailing 
and combining the method of archaeological discourse analysis with an analysis 
through the lens of governmentality aims to make my methodological position explicit, 
setting out the position I assume myself to have taken as researcher, how I have 
approached and treated the policy documents considered, and the types of questions 
that will be most pertinent to the analysis.       
Foucault, discourse, and The Archaeology of Knowledge 
 
The Archaeology of Knowledge is described by Cousins and Hussain (1984, p.77) 
as a retrospective reflection and methodological synthesis by Foucault on earlier texts, 
and an attempt to produce a conceptual framework for analysing knowledges. It is 
seen as a methodological explanation or defence of, in particular, The Order of Things 
(Foucault, 2002c), by questioning the ‘natural’ categories, such as origins and 
progression, set out by total history, in order to analyse the constitution and 
transformation of knowledges in terms of discursive formations. Mills (2004) describes 
Foucault’s notion of discourse as: 
something which produces something else (an utterance, a concept, an 
effect), rather than something which exists in and of itself and which 
can be analysed in isolation. A discursive structure can be detected 
because of the systematicity of the ideas, opinions, concepts, ways of 
thinking and behaving which are formed within a particular context, and 
because of the effects of those ways of thinking and behaving. 
(p.15) 
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This explanation highlights two separate and key questions: what is discourse, and how 
can it be studied?  
 
Archaeology 
Analytically it is helpful to begin with the second question. Foucault presented 
archaeology as the analysis of discourse. Archaeology is the description of discourse, it 
aims to describe discursive formations rather than interpret them or look for a 
meaning beyond them. Archaeology ‘does not treat discourse as document, as a sign of 
something else . . . it is concerned with discourse in its own volume, as a monument. It 
is not an interpretative discipline: it does not seek another, better-hidden discourse’ 
(Foucault, 2002a, p.155). Through this, Foucault saw the archaeologist as studying 
existence: studying what is actual rather than what is possible (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 
1982, p.56). 
 
He asks crucially, how a discourse is formed and gives definition to a particular 
historical moment or episteme. A discursive formation is formed by a group of 
statements (Brown and Cousins, 1986, p.33), and it is the aim of archaeology to 
describe the relations between these statements (Foucault, 2002a, p.34). The 
Archaeology of Knowledge grants to the statement the position of, what Deleuze 
(1988) described as, a ‘radical primacy’ (p.49). Yet what a statement is, and what it is 
not, proves to be a complex matter that has been greatly questioned and criticised.  As 
explained by Cousins and Hussain (1984) a common usage for the word ‘statement’ is 
language. However, Foucault (2002a, p.122) claimed that in archaeology a statement is 
neither a sentence nor a proposition, it cannot therefore be reduced to language or 
logic: ‘a statement is always an event that neither language (langue) nor the meaning 
can quite exhaust’ (p.31). As an event, a statement has both a beginning and an end, 
and is thus denied an association with some kind of on-going essence. Through this 
Foucault is avoiding the unities and totalities associated with grammar and logic to 
demonstrate that instead discursive formations are ‘the principle of dispersion and 
redistribution, not of formulations, not of sentences, not of propositions, but of 
statements’ (p.121). Foucault therefore claimed that there is no structural unity of the 
statement because the statement is not a unit but a function – the enunciative 
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function (p.98). Most explicitly, he refers to the statement as a ‘function of existence 
that properly belongs to signs’ (p.87). A statement can therefore take the form of a 
sentence or proposition, although it can also take on other forms – a list or table – but 
it cannot be reduced to these. This therefore extends the scope of what might be 
analysed as statements to include, for example, computer software packages or door 
signs; not just the content of case notes, but also (and perhaps more importantly) their 
format, layout and structure; even the built environment in terms of how space is 
divided, charted and mapped out.   
 
Discourse, as the formation of statements, can therefore be thought of as a 
practice; discourse crosses the theory-praxis divide since (discursive) knowledge is 
understood as a social practice – as doing something. Archaeology is ‘an attempt to 
reveal discursive practices in their complexity and density; to show that to speak is to 
do something – something other than to express what one thinks ’ (Foucault, 2002a, 
p.230). This highlights two further points important to understanding statements: they 
are linked to a subject (the statement must have a material existence – it must be 
spoken or written for example (Foucault, 2002a, p.112), but that subject is not the 
origin of the statement. The relation between the statement and the subject is not one 
of authorship, instead the statement determines what position the subject must 
occupy to be its enunciator (or audience)8. Using discourse analysis can therefore 
demonstrate how certain social behaviours and practices construct and effect 
particular individuals and groups. Due to this discourses that emerge from the policy 
documents considered in this thesis are not treated as political rhetoric, or examples 
of a particular political party’s social ideals, but instead as the space or surface through 
which certain ways of being are enabled and others made either impossible or 
somehow unattractive.  
 
According to Foucault, these groups of statements (which he termed 
positivities) that comprise discursive practice are not unities or totalities, but systems 
of dispersion (Foucault, 2002a, p.41). Statements cannot, therefore, be reduced to 
                                                          
8
 The place of the subject in discursive formations and the issue of agency will be discussed on pp.33-35.  
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grammatical sentences or logical propositions. Brown and Cousins (1986, p.34) argue, 
however, that Foucault’s definition of the statement is not differentiated enough from 
categories of language, and therefore his concepts remain ambiguous. Likewise 
Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982, p.70) suggest that Foucault is much clearer regarding the 
traditional methods he rejects than the principles he is trying to introduce.9 Typically, 
he is better at saying what something is not, than what it is. This ambiguity poses a 
problem when justifying that something is (or is not) a statement and so can be used 
as data within the analysis of a discourse. It can potentially leave the concept 
boundary-less, causing the problem of where to begin and where to finish the search 
for statements. This problem is exacerbated through Foucault’s (2002a) claim that 
although statements are not hidden neither are they immediately visible: 
It requires a certain change of viewpoint and attitude to be recognised 
and examined in itself. Perhaps it is like the over-familiar that constantly 
eludes one; those familiar transparencies, which, although they conceal 
nothing in their density, are nevertheless not entirely clear. 
(p.124)  
This suggests that a thorough search is required to ensure that statements are not 
overlooked through being either too obvious or too obscure. 
 
These apparent difficulties in recognising a statement may conflict with the 
definition of archaeology as a pure description. Foucault’s insistent claim that 
archaeology merely describes discourse is to distinguish it from involving any form of 
interpretation. This in turn is partly due to his move away from the subject as the 
originator of ideas and source of meaning, as well as his commitment to discourse 
being understood as only surface with no hidden depth. Thus for Foucault statements 
must be taken at ‘face value’ (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982, p.46), there is no need to 
search for something beyond them. This means that in the analysis of statements no 
interpretation takes place, only the description of the surface. However as statements 
are not entirely obvious, and the limits of what is or is not a statement can be 
                                                          
9
 The issue of how well Foucault has distinguished the notion of the statement from linguistics is not 
something that I intend to explore, as I will be focusing on how the archaeology can be used. However it 
is important to point out the ambiguity of this concept as statements are the basic data of discourse 
analysis. 
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contested, there must be an element of choice involved in discourse analysis. Even if 
the statements chosen are treated as having nothing but face-value meaning, the 
choice of these statements and the exclusion of others is itself a level of interpretation 
– an interpretation of what counts, of what is important in understanding this 
discursive formation. This understanding of archaeology as description, based as it is 
on the denial of deeper meanings, also suggests that describing the surface, which is 
describing existence, is obvious and incontestable. Although this avoids the 
subjectivities of hermeneutics, it appears to be in contradiction to the idea of 
discourse as something that has no stability, no structure, and no overriding theories. 
Thus Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982) ask: ‘Must we not be able to ask: Are these 
descriptions accurate or distorted? But doesn’t this re-introduce truth?’ (p.85). Yet 
Foucault denies the possibility that discourse rests on a transcendental a priori. That is, 
discourse is historical, contradictory and contingent, and within this truth must be 
equally so. 
 
The idea that an archaeologist can merely describe statements suggests that 
the researcher plays the role of a detached spectator. However as the subject is 
positioned through, and as an effect of, discourse, there appears to be no room 
outside of discourse from which the archaeologist can observe. The archaeologist, as a 
subject positioned by discourse, cannot help but be involved in and part of the 
discourse that she or he is analysing. Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982) present the 
problem: 
the archaeologist, like Husserl’s transcendental phenomenologist, must 
perform an ‘ego-split’ in order to look on as a detached spectator at the 
very phenomena in which, as an empirical interested ego (or in 
Foucault’s case speaker), one can’t help being involved. 
(p.87) 
It would therefore be misleading to present the analysis of discourse as the pure 
description of a pre-existent objective reality. However, if the inability of the 
archaeologist to remain detached from the discourse that she or he is studying, due to 
discourse positioning the subject, weakens the notion of archaeology as description, it 
also demonstrates why archaeology is not interpretation – we cannot speak outside of 
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discourse. To be understood  within society, or the domain to which the speech is 
addressing, the archaeologist must remain within the rules of the discourse: ‘one is ‘in 
the true’ only by obeying the rules of a discursive ‘policing’ which one has to reactivate 
in each of one’s own discourses’ (Foucault, 1981, p.61). Therefore Foucault (1984) 
claimed that we need to stop asking ‘How can a free subject penetrate the substance 
of things and give it meaning?’, and instead focus on the question, ‘How, under what 
conditions, and in what forms can something like a subject appear in the order of 
discourse?’ (p.118). It is for this reason that Foucault wanted to avoid archaeology 
being associated with interpretation. Yet when using the term description it must be 
remembered that the archaeologist is describing a moving, dynamic discourse that she 
or he is actively constituted by, contributing to, and perpetuating.    
 
Discursive formations 
Foucault (2002a) posits four categories for the identification and analysis of 
discursive formations: (i) objects; (ii) enunciative modalities; (iii) concepts; and (iv) 
strategies. I shall deal with each of these key terms in turn as a way of showing their 
significance and the complicated relation between them.  It was through an 
exploration of these categories in earlier texts that Foucault came to understand 
discursive formations as systems of dispersion. Brown and Cousins (1986) demonstrate 
that Foucault’s previous studies had shown that objects of discourse are not singular, 
concepts proved to form neither a coherent nor permanent system, that ‘Where a 
principle of unity had been sought only the fact of dispersion had been found’ (p.38). 
The study of discourse then, does not look for coherent unities, but neither does it 
accept total randomness. 
 
Writing on the object of madness, Foucault realised that a discursive formation 
does not refer to a single object. He used the example of psychopathology to 
demonstrate that the object of madness does not remain constant throughout space 
and time, noting that statements from different times and different institutions do not 
refer to the same object: ‘we are not dealing with the same madmen’ (Foucault, 
2002a, p.35.) Through this Foucault (p.36) claimed that the unity of a discourse is not 
based on the object itself but on the ‘space’ in which the objects emerge and are 
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transformed. The discourse is not formed around a stable object as the object is part 
of the discourse, which in fact forms the object of which it speaks (p.54): it is through 
discourse that the object becomes nameable, describable and manifest. It is this that 
archaeology aims to analyse through mapping the ‘surfaces of emergence’ of the 
object(s) (p.45), that is, through what the object appears, what categories are used to 
describe it, what status it has; which  authorities, such as medicine or law, can 
designate it as an object,  and how the object is specified, divided and classified. 
However, all of these elements change from period to period, therefore:  
it is not the objects that remain constant, nor the domain that they 
form; it is not even their point of emergence or their mode of 
characterisation; but the relation between the surfaces on which they 
appear, on which they can be delimited, on which they can be analysed 
and specified. 
(Foucault, 2002a, p.52) 
 
  This is suggestive of the way the archaeologist of discourse is very much at 
home with inconsistences, discontinuities and ruptures in history. Not only do objects 
within a discursive formation change from period to period, ‘even within a given 
period the objects of a science are constantly undergoing shifts, transformations, 
substitutions’ (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982, p.59). Thus, contradictory objects can exist 
within the same discursive formation at the same time10. Foucault (2002a, p.168) 
criticised the ‘history of ideas’ for understanding these contradictions as the basis on 
which discourse emerges – that is, the aim of the ‘history of ideas’ is to recreate a 
coherency. Instead for archaeology, ‘contradictions are neither appearances to be 
overcome, nor secret principles to be uncovered. They are objects to be described for 
themselves, without any attempt being made to discover from what point of view they 
can be dissipated’ (Foucault, 2002a, p.169). Of particular interest to archaeological 
analysis are intrinsic oppositions, which are not contradictory statements about the 
same object in the sense that they cancel each other out, but rather constitute 
                                                          
10
 An example of this may be the constant tension of ‘care’ and ‘control’ in social work practices, or 
within the topic of this thesis the need for an individual to be both a careful manager of risk and able to 
maximise the speculative capacity of the inherent uncertainties of life, as discussed in Chapter 6. 
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different ways of forming statements regarding the same object.  Foucault (2002a) 
understood these oppositions as having multiple functions within a discourse: ‘they 
make possible the determination of new objects, they arouse new enunciative 
modalities, they define new concepts . . . but without anything being modified in the 
system of positivity of the discourse’ (p.172). Various ways of understanding old age as 
a discursive object will be discussed in the analysis of the policy documents (primarily 
in Chapter 4). It will be demonstrated how multiple objects of old age exist within the 
same space, often jarring with each other as they require different constitutive notions 
of self. These contradictions also suggest the possibility of resistance within a 
discursive formation: the possibility of doing otherwise, and thereby changing what is 
able to emerge within a formation. Such points of resistance and oppositions will be 
drawn out through the policy analysis within Chapters 4 to 7 by highlighting both 
inconsistencies within the policy documents, as well as through the literature used in 
their critique.  
 
The second category referred to by Foucault is the formation of enunciative 
modalities, which concerns how statements referring to objects are made. If 
discourses were thought of as a theoretical architecture or super structure, the 
question ‘how are statements made?’ could be answered: ‘with signs’ (Cousins and 
Hussain, 1984, p.88). However, as discourse is a practice and statements are functions, 
for Foucault the form or way of stating is just as important as the content. In this sense 
the enunciative modality can be understood in terms of three questions: Who is 
speaking? Where is it being spoken from? What is the relation between the speaker 
and what is being spoken of? (Brown and Cousins, 1986, p.51). This gives importance 
to authority and power: that a proposition may be considered as true from one 
speaker, in a particular context, but may be seen as inconsequential or even ramblings 
from another (the authority of a Psychiatrist or a Priest to treat a mental health patient 
for example). Hence a subject must take up a particular position in order to make a 
particular statement, or to be the one addressed by a statement. This implies that only 
certain subjects can make certain statements. Foucault (2002a, p.56) used the example 
that only doctors can make medical statements: it is not a matter of who can utter a 
sentence, but who is sanctioned to be taken seriously, to be thought of as knowing the 
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truth.  Whilst enabling a truth statement in some circumstances, this also points to 
situations where knowledge is refused, excluded or denied. Allen (2010) sets out two 
forms of exclusion from knowledge: firstly subjugated knowledge, which is knowledge 
without authority (medical diagnosis from a nurse or patient for example); secondly 
lost knowledge, which is knowledge that can no longer be known due to a historical 
change in the syntax of knowledge (medieval knowledge of witchcraft for example). 
The second of these exclusions must necessarily remain as an historical curio. But the 
first indicates the analytical utility of an understanding of the subject as an 
‘enunciative function’ (Foucault 2002a, p.56) of discourse, where questions of who are 
given authority to speak or to know, in what situations can expose not only the 
identities and lifestyles legitimised, and those which policy acts to delegitimise (risky 
individuals or passive citizens for example), but moreover how and for what purpose?11 
 
For the archaeologist, this does not, of course, assume some individuals to have 
a greater understanding of reality than others. The ability to utter a statement is 
dependent on being able to ‘take up’ the necessary position: ‘statements position 
subjects – those who produce them, but also those they are addressed to’ (Fairclough, 
1994, p.43). Thus the subject is not the creator of statements, but is itself the creation 
or the effect; Deleuze (1988) describes the subject of The Archaeology of Knowledge as 
a place or position, in this sense it ‘is a variable, or rather a set of variables of the 
statement. It is a function’ (p.55). 
 
The denial of what is called the ‘sovereign subject’, replacing it with a notion of 
the subject as a function of discourse, seems to deplete the subject of any form of 
agency. Fairclough (1994) argues that ‘Foucault’s insistence upon the subject as an 
effect of discursive formations has a heavily structuralist flavour which excludes active 
social agency in any meaningful sense’ (p.45). The move away from the subject as 
creator and originator does bring ambiguity into the question of agency. However, 
contra Fairclough, this is not best understood as a clear cut option between an agent 
                                                          
11
 An example of subjugated knowledge discussed in the analysis can be found in Chapter 6 regarding 
expert knowledge and risk assessment. 
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free from discursive constraints, or a subject positioned by discourse and therefore 
completely determined. Foucault (2002a) stated that: 
The positivities that I have tried to establish must not be understood as 
a set of determinations imposed from the outside on the thought of 
individuals, or inhabiting it from the inside, in advance as it were; they 
constitute rather the set of conditions in accordance with which a 
practice is exercised, in accordance with which that practice gives rise to 
partially or totally new statements, and in accordance with which it can 
be modified. 
(p.230)        
This suggests that Foucault’s intention was not to remove the ability of the subject to 
act within discursive formations, but to highlight how the construction of knowledges, 
along with the recognition of discursive knowledge as social practice, situates a 
subject: ‘I wanted not to exclude the problem of the subject, but to define the 
positions and functions that the subject could occupy in the diversity of discourse’ 
(Foucault, 2002a, p.221.) Rather than limiting and determining individuals, an 
archaeology of discursive formations is instead intended to demonstrate the diversity 
and multiplicities of positions and functions that subjects can take up simultaneously. 
Therefore as Paras summarises: 
The archaeological description of discursive formations was not to be 
understood as a set of constraints operating upon an otherwise-free 
speaker. These formations were a literal positivity: the site, the rules, 
and the relations that made meaningful speech possible in the first 
place. 
(Paras, 2006, p.40) 
 
The last two categories that constitute a discursive formation are those of 
concepts and strategies. A discursive formation can be thought to exist if there is a 
constancy of concepts employed within the statements (Cousins and Hussain, 1986, 
p.85). This constancy is not static, however. Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982) highlight how 
in The Order of Things (Foucault, 2002c) Foucault showed that, ‘concepts shift, 
incompatible concepts overlap, and all are subject to conceptual revolutions’ (Dreyfus 
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and Rabinow, 1982, p.59). Foucault (2002a) argued that the formation of concepts 
cannot be attributed to ‘the horizon of ideality, nor to the empirical progress of ideas’ 
(p.70). In line with how the formation of objects and enunciative modalities must be 
understood, the formation of concepts cannot be treated as a transcendent rationality, 
but neither can it be considered part of a social evolution brought on by a progression 
of ideas. There appears again to be a circularity concerning the formation of concepts, 
where they cannot be attributed to the intelligibility or consciousness of a subject, yet 
the subject is somehow more than a robotic function performing preordained roles – 
that is, there is no super-structure above discourse that guides its direction. This has 
the tone of setting up discourse up as a kind of mysterious life force in itself. However, 
Foucault (2002a) appears to have been motivated by what is being rejected: ‘I have 
not denied – far from it- the possibility of changing discourse: I have deprived the 
sovereignty of the subject of the exclusive and instantaneous right to it’ (p.230).   
 
Regarding the final important term, the formation of strategies, Foucault 
claimed that discursive formations can be recognised through statements supporting a 
common theme, suggesting that discourses have ‘theoretical preferences for an 
emphasis upon some issue’ (Cousins and Hussain, 1984, p.89). Two points that 
Foucault makes concerning the theme of a discourse are that, firstly: ‘The discourse 
under study may also be in a relation of analogy, opposition or complementarity with 
certain other discourses’ (Foucault, 2002a, p.74). An example within the scope of this 
thesis is the prominence of concepts such as activity, participation and independence 
found within discourses of old age and ageing. Populations of older people are 
strategically framed through this combination of concepts. These concepts are also 
common across other discourses, such as disability, education, and those that 
surround finances and economy. Indeed the discourses of old age discussed in 
Chapters 4 to 7 at times cross over into these other areas as concepts such as activity 
and independence make them relevant to how old age/ ageing is to be governed.  This 
suggests that discourses are not necessarily mutually exclusive and can share 
similarities with other discourses. As explained by Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982), this 
means: ‘The same theme, such as evolution, can be articulated in two different fields 
of objects and concepts . . . A single theme, but two types of discourse’ (p.71). 
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Secondly, these themes or theoretical choices are determined by, ‘the function that 
the discourse under study must carry out in a field of non-discursive practice’ 
(Foucault, 2002a, p.75). This again strengthens the link between discourse and social 
practice, and the notion that knowledge is practice. 
 
Despite this clear link between discourse and social practice, the avoidance of 
seeking value and truth by archaeology has led to the accusation that it must therefore 
also be devoid of meaning and purpose: 
Freeing oneself from the bureaucrats and the discursive police is surely 
exhilarating, but until one finds a new position from which to speak, and 
a new seriousness for one’s words, there is no place in archaeology for a 
discourse with social significance, no reason anyone should listen . . . no 
reason anyone should write. 
(Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982, p.89) 
This is a troubling claim as it seems true that there are limits to archaeology and it will 
frustrate those arguing for a particular ‘superior’ society. Indeed archaeology cannot 
have social significance if by that it is meant an aim for an enlightened or even more 
just society. However archaeology can aid social knowledge by exposing universals and 
natural essences as contingent (although no less real), and demonstrating how these 
knowledges create social practices and define what is and what is not possible within a 
particular context. As indicated in the Introduction, it is this that the analysis of the 
chosen policy documents undertaken here aims for, by questioning the reality/ies the 
policies take for granted, asking what it is they deny and disallow, and demonstrating 
what they do: what are the consequences of the subjectifications and rationalities 
legitimised in them? Archaeology cannot therefore call for revolution by replacing one 
set of truth claims with another, but it is part of an agonistic social practice (not least 
by being part of discourse itself) by probing and questioning what status social realities 
have and what practices these lead to. 
 
Archaeology is therefore far from an objective practice. Despite the claim that 
it merely describes statements, the ambiguity of statements and the practicalities of 
having to start and stop somewhere perhaps suggest that archaeology as description 
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better defines what it is avoiding – the search for a deeper meaning beyond the 
surface of discourse. This ambiguity is carried into the description of a discursive 
formation as comprised of the formation of objects, enunciative modalities, concepts 
and strategies, where Foucault has greater clarity over how they are not formed rather 
than how they are. Archaeology is therefore clearly not a systematic methodology. As 
has been demonstrated, it is far from a ready-made model that may be applied, and its 
use will require thought and consideration concerning, for example, how statements 
are to be selected12. Perhaps it better represents a way of working that is not 
dominated by the supremacy of the subject, or ideals of unities, coherencies and 
progression, as a way of understanding knowledge by deconstructing hierarchies: 
‘where a literary form, a scientific proposition, a common phrase, a schizophrenic 
piece of non-sense and so on are also statements . . . This is what had never before 
been attained by logicians, formalists or interpreters, science and poetry are equal 
forms of knowledge’ (Deleuze, 1988, p.20). These concerns should not, however, cause 
it to be overlooked, nor thought of as invalid. Instead, they encourage an added 
engagement with methodology, ensuring that the researcher is constantly immersed in 
the research process.  It is through this rigorous and critical engagement with 
discourse that dynamic and stimulating discussions will enliven social policy and social 
work research and practice.     
 
Apparatuses and analytics of government 
 
In The Archaeology of Knowledge Foucault (2002a) spoke of the dispersion of 
statements (what can be said, what can be seen) as ‘positivities’, explaining, the 
‘positivity of a discourse . . . characterizes its unity through time’ by defining ‘a limited 
space of communication’ (Foucault, 2002a, p.142). From the mid-1970s however, the 
time when he began to concern himself much more explicitly with relations of power 
and with governmentality, instead of ‘positivity’ Foucault used the term dispositif, 
generally translated as apparatus (Agamben, 2009) to refer to ‘the said as much as the 
                                                          
12
 Some of these were raised, and my decisions set out concerning the choice of texts, in the 
Introduction. 
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unsaid’ (Foucault, 1980, cited in Agamben, 2009, p.2), or moreover the ‘network’ that 
exists between various elements such as discourses, institutions, languages and so on. 
Similarly, Deleuze (1992) describes apparatuses as machines that make one see and 
speak, that are comprised of lines of visibility and lines of enunciation. His description 
therefore fits closely with the above description of discourse: 
Each apparatus has its way of structuring light, the way in which it falls, 
blurs and disperses, distributing the visible and the invisible, giving birth 
to objects which are dependent on it for their existence, and causing 
them to disappear. 
(Deleuze, 1992, p.160) 
These lines of visibility and enunciation, along with the lines of force and 
subjectification that, Deleuze (1992) claims, are also elements of an apparatus, create 
a ‘tangle’ of both the actual (historical) and the possible (new).  
 Whilst the term ‘positivity’ was used within the context of discourse, Foucault 
is clear that an apparatus concerns both discursive and non-discursive formations 
(Agamben, 2009). Despite this distinction between positivity and apparatus, Agamben 
(2009) demonstrates how the two terms hold the same function for Foucault: that is 
allowing an understanding of ‘the relation between individuals as living beings and the 
historical element’ (Agamben, 2009, p.6). He clarifies that the historical element is the 
set of institutions, processes of subjectification, and/or rules of power relations, thus: 
For Foucault, what is at stake is . . . the investigation of concrete modes 
in which the positivities (or the apparatuses) act within the relations, 
mechanisms, and ‘plays’ of power. 
(Agamben, 2009, p.6) 
Whilst Foucault did not focus on relations of force in The Archaeology of Knowledge, 
he did elsewhere make the connection explicit. In History of Sexuality: Introduction 
Volume 1 (1990a) he claimed, ‘Discourses are tactical elements or blocks operating in 
the field of force relations’ (p.101). Therefore: 
discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a 
hindrance, a stumbling block, a point of resistance and a starting point 
for an opposing strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power; it 
reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it. 
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(Foucault, 1990a, p.101) 
Whilst discourse does not create force relations it sets out the field within which they 
become possible, and in turn is affected and shaped by these lines of force. 
  Lines of visibility and enunciation are discussed in The Archaeology of 
Knowledge as those that constitute the surfaces through which objects, subjects, 
concepts and strategies can emerge. However, it is the lines of force and 
subjectification that enable an apparatus to be understood as a mode of governance. 
Foucault (1980, cited in Agamben, 2009) set out the strategic function of an apparatus 
that necessarily locates it in power relations: 
the nature of an apparatus is essentially strategic, which means that we 
are speaking about a certain manipulation of the relations of forces, of a 
rational and concrete intervention in the relations of forces, either so as 
to develop them in a particular direction, or to block them, to stabilize 
them, and to utilize them. The apparatus is thus always inscribed into a 
play of power, but it is also always linked to certain limits of knowledge 
that arise from it and, to an equal degree, condition it. The apparatus is 
precisely this: a set of strategies of the relations of forces supporting, 
and supported by, certain types of knowledge. 
(p.2)  
Thus for Agamben (2009), an apparatus designates a ‘pure activity of governance 
devoid of any foundation in being’ (p.11), meaning that an apparatus acts to model, 
control, and secure, behaviours, opinions and discourses (Agamben, 2009, p.14). 
Therefore Agamben (2009) argues that an apparatus has a regulatory function that 
must necessarily imply a process of subjectification. Here, in the entanglement of lines 
of visibility, enunciation, force and subjectification, an understanding of 
governmentality emerges, where strategic force relations collide with what it is 
possible to say, to know, and to do, and therefore who it is possible to be. For Deleuze 
(1992) this calls for a creative process to untangle these lines, ‘to distinguish what we 
are (what we are already no longer), and what we are in the process of becoming’ 
(p.164)1314. 
                                                          
13
 An approach to research as creative was discussed in the Introduction. 
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  Governmentality can therefore be understood as both an element and 
function of an apparatus so far as an apparatus is a network or collection of elements 
that both act to regulate through practices of subjectification, and also provide the 
points of resistance from which lines can break out. Alongside describing a form of 
social organisation and specific power relations15, Foucault’s notion of governmentality 
has been developed as a tool for the critical analysis of political technologies and 
governmental rationalities in contemporary society (Lemke, 2007). These two aspects 
of governmentality are interrelated, as the specific characteristics and aims of an 
analytics of government are derived from an understanding of this particular style and 
tactic of organising and conducting society. However, an analytical perspective of 
governmentality is not a theory of power, but rather asks a particular set of questions 
(Rose et al., 2006). Whilst there is no one governmentality paradigm, an analytics of 
government tends to start from questions concerning conduct and the subject, with a 
focus on the relations between subjects. Dean (2010) posits four questions an analytics 
of government might ask of a subject: What is being acted upon? How is this substance 
being governed? Who are we when we govern? Why do we govern and why are we 
governed? Rose and colleagues (2006) add to this list, Who governs what? According 
to what logics? With what techniques? (p.85). These questions all focus on the 
constitution of the subject: Who are we? Who ought we to be? Therefore, what needs 
to be done? According to what criteria, what end? It is with questions such as these in 
mind, regarding who the subject is required to be and for what purpose, that I 
approach the policy documents analysed in the subsequent chapters. My approach of 
an analytics of government is therefore an analysis of relations, and the effects of 
these relations: 
Foucault’s general principal is that every form is a compound of 
relations between forces. Given these forces, our first question is with 
                                                                                                                                                                          
14
 Legg (2011) discusses the difference between, but compatibility of Deleuzian assemblage and 
apparatus (dispositif). He claims that Deleuze’s (1992) description of an apparatus is very ‘assemblage-
like’, thus putting particular emphasis on its ability to disassemble and open new lines of flight, 
alongside its function of regulation. 
15
 A full discussion of society as an ‘era of governmentality’, including an exploration of how, why, and 
through what means society is organised and governed, is presented in Chapter 2. 
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what forces from the outside they enter into a relation, and then what 
form is created as a result. 
(Deleuze, 1988, p.102)   
An example of this approach within this thesis is the analysis of how discursive 
formations set out certain expectations of social action and care of the self that lead to 
certain personal identifications: how people subjectify themselves. Chapter 5 
highlights this in terms of the notions of the ‘individual’ and the ‘reflexive self’: both 
notions stem from how people ought to behave within and because of the collective 
(relations within the population, the community, the family), and have the effect of 
producing a certain subject-hood that naturalises these relations. Of particular interest 
to an analytics of government then, are current social practices and how these are 
acted out by individual members of society, coupled with an exploration of the 
rationalities through which these practices are justified and normalised, or 
problematized and positioned as in need of some form of intervention. Conducting an 
analytics of government therefore sees every-day but often overlooked subjects and 
objects, habits and routines, as ripe for investigation. Through this the approach has 
the capacity to demonstrate how practices that are often treated as private and 
singular are instead enabled by, and contribute to, wider rationalities16. Thus whilst 
one aim is to highlight heterogeneity of social practices rather than discover a hidden 
unity behind complex diversity (Rose, 1999b), an analytics of government also provides 
the potential for demonstrating that seemingly disparate practices are connected 
through one (or more) governmental rationality. In reaction to the accusation that an 
analytics of governmentality leads to no more than creating abstract ideal types and 
generalized descriptions,  Rose and colleagues (2006) argue that it in fact involves an 
empirical mapping of governmental techniques and rationalities. Therefore far from 
aspiring to ideal types this form of analytics aims to emphasise the empirical, 
contingent and invented, and so also transitory nature of governmental thought (Rose 
et al., 2006). 
 
                                                          
16
 Self-care and personal development are prime examples of this, as will be discussed in Chapter 5 and 
Chapter 7. 
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 The point and focus of an analytics of government is not to distinguish ‘good’ 
from ‘bad’ forms of government (Dean, 2010). Since any value judgements such as 
these can only be understood within current governmental rationalities, we must 
agree with Deleuze and Guattari (1988) that ‘Good and bad are only the products of an 
active and temporary selection, which must be renewed’ (p.10). Instead, as noted by 
Dean (2010), such an analysis marks out a space to raise questions regarding 
government and authority without trying to formulate principles for reform. He argues 
this does not make an analytics of government a value neutral science, but a form of 
criticism. In keeping with this, Rose (1999b) presents the purpose of analysis as a way 
of disturbing and destabilizing current regimes, as well as making it more difficult for 
us to think in accustomed ways, thereby clearing a space for the possibility of thinking 
otherwise. The approach therefore provides not a method to follow, but an ethos of 
investigation and a certain way of asking questions (Rose et al., 2006). Government is 
an inventive activity (Rose et al., 2006), and likewise an analytics of governmentality 
must be recognised as a creative process: 
Human powers of creativity are centred rather than marginalised, even 
though such creation takes place within certain styles of thought and 
must . . . make use of available resources, techniques, and so on. 
(Rose et al., 2006, p.99) 
 As a form of analytics, governmentality can therefore be the untangling of these 
multiple lines, and so provide an understanding of the splits, breaks, and merges that 
make up an apparatus. We can remind ourselves here of the definition of an apparatus 
as the network or relations between almost anything: discourses, institutions, the 
environment and so on (Agamben 2009).  
The following chapter will provide an in-depth discussion of governmentality as 
it has been understood as a form of social organisation and political power. The 
foundation work undertaken in this and the following chapter will then be 
implemented in the succeeding five chapters, firstly to undertake an investigation of 
policy as a function of governmentality (Chapter 3), and afterwards through a 
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discourse analysis of the chosen policy documents conducted through this lens of 
governmentality (Chapters 4-7). 
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Chapter 2 
Governmentality: governing individuals and populations 
 
Introduction  
Governmentality is a term coined by Michel Foucault in the latter stages of his 
work, most notably in the 1977-1978 lectures ‘Security, Territory, Population’ 
(Foucault, 2007a). Its significance lies partly in the fact that it provides a semantic 
linking of governing (gouverner) with thought (mentalité) (Lemke, 2001). This suggests 
that Foucault’s concern when developing the concept was to combine an 
understanding of the technologies of government with the rationalities that underpin 
them. This relationship between the institutional social practices and rationalities of 
government is, perhaps, the constant within a term that has multiple usages: when 
using the term ‘governmentality’ Foucault spoke both of what our society is, claiming 
that we live in an ‘era of governmentality’ and have done since the eighteenth century 
(Foucault, 2007a, p.109), and also of a form of analysis – an approach to questioning 
and understanding this era of governmentality17.  The first usage is historical or 
developmental, the second methodological. To further complicate the issue Foucault 
never fully explored this area, however what has been published by Foucault on the 
subject has been taken up and developed by various contemporary theorists who have 
engaged with Foucault’s writings in order to develop analyses of social and political 
relations, practices and subjectivities for example, as well as to create analytical tools 
capable of critiquing specific governmental techniques and practices. These 
multifarious aims and approaches, as well as the systematic manner in which they 
have been scrutinised have therefore acted to further widen the scope of 
‘governmentality’. 
I attempt in this chapter to draw together some of the fundamental aspects of 
governmentality that my analyses will draw upon in the following chapters. The 
discussion is based on Foucault’s own description of governmentality as set out in the 
                                                          
17
 This was discussed in Chapter 1. 
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1977-1978 lecture series, but also moves beyond this to include how more recent 
studies in governmentality have developed and been applied to analyses of 
contemporary society and political life. This will include some areas of criticism and 
tension that have been brought to the fore by its use as a social analysis and criticism. 
Whilst recognising particular theorists use governmentality in different ways and for 
different purposes, and have extended its use beyond Foucault’s writings, I do not 
intend to distinguish a ‘pure’ understanding of governmentality from how it has been 
variously interpreted and taken up. This is mainly due to the inability to discuss 
Foucault’s work in isolation from post-Foucauldian thinkers, particularly in an area 
such as governmentality that was never formally set out by Foucault. In this sense, 
certain post-Foucauldian thinkers have become an essential part of the 
governmentality discourse and literature. However it is also because I have focused 
the discussion on areas that have a particular significance for the policy analysis that is 
developed later.  
The chapter begins by introducing Foucault’s discussion of governmentality and 
how it is distinct from other rationalities of power, in particular detailing pastoral 
power and the apparatus of police. From this follows a discussion of how 
governmentality has become manifest in contemporary society focusing on some of 
the specific strategies, rationalities, technologies and subjectivities that it both 
requires and enables, including: the formation of population as an object of 
government, the requirement of individual freedom for social governance, the ‘new’ 
technologies that enable these, such as statistics, and the specific social relations that 
develop. Finally some criticisms and areas of tension are explored including the 
‘overuse’ of governmentality as an analysis with which to explore contemporary 
society, and the room governmentality leaves for resistance and autonomous action.    
Governing societies 
 Foucault (2007a) was careful to not overemphasise the distinction between the 
three main forms of governance that he discussed throughout his work: sovereignty, 
discipline and governmentality. However an understanding of the differences between 
these rationalities, and hence the technologies possible within them, will help to clarify 
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what governmentality is: what subjectivities are possible within a governmental 
society, what relationships look like, and what forms of social and personal action are 
desirable or rational. 
 Foucault (2007a) was clear that these three forms of government are not to be 
thought of as a series or succession. Society is not ruled through one form of 
government alone at any one time, rather it is the dominant characteristic within 
which different forms of government are exercised that determines whether a society 
might be defined as sovereign, disciplinary or governmental. Therefore forms of 
sovereignty may be practised within a governmental society, but sovereignty as a 
dominant characteristic of how society is ordered and governed represents, according 
to Foucault, the era ranging from the Middle Ages to the sixteenth century. To 
emphasise this point Foucault (2007a) claimed: 
we should not see things as the replacement of a society of sovereignty 
by a society of discipline, and then a society of discipline by a society, 
say, of government. In fact we have a triangle: sovereignty, discipline 
and governmental management, which has population as its target 
(p.107-8) 
Sovereign and disciplinary powers are characterised by the exertion of one will, 
or a centralised will, over others. In this sense the sovereign exerts will over subjects, 
not for the good of the subjects but for the good of the sovereign (Dean, 2010). 
Disciplinary power may likewise be described as the exertion of a centralised will over 
individuals, but may come from various authorities (legal or medical for example). 
Foucault (2007a) saw a shift in the way society was governed in the eighteenth 
century: the concern was no longer one of governing individuals via a centralised 
apparatus that exerts its influence over a separate entity of ‘the governed’. Rather 
government became a dispersed and circular process. Dispersed because a single will 
or central authority could no longer be located – it no longer made sense to 
understand government as emanating from a central source as there is no point of 
origin to which all practices can be traced back. Circular because unlike the 
unidirectional status of sovereign power, where power moves from the sovereign to 
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the subject(s) and never in reverse, governmental power is multidirectional. This 
implies firstly that governance is relational – it dismisses the traditional notion of 
power as connected to authority and dominance and instead sees power as existing 
through the relations between individuals or groups. In this sense Foucault (2007a, 
p.122) described governmental power as an intercourse – a process of exchange 
between two or more individuals. Secondly, it points to a complex understanding of 
the relations between subjects, and between subjects and the state, where relations of 
force are unstable and inconsistent. It is this that led Foucault (2007a) to claim 
‘government is basically much more than sovereignty, much more than reigning or 
ruling’ (p.76).     
Whilst the contemporary act of governing tends to have taken on a solely 
political meaning often related to central government, Foucault (2007a) demonstrated 
that before the sixteenth century the concept of governing had a much broader 
meaning that included anything related to the control one has over oneself, as well as 
the control one has over others.  An art of government therefore emerged, according 
to Foucault (2007a), in answer to the question of the proper way of managing 
individuals, goods and wealth for example. To highlight the inclusive nature of this 
form of government Foucault (2007a) likened the management of the population to 
the management of the family by the father – interested and involved in all aspects of 
life. To govern does not then have the narrow meaning of ‘ruling’, but involves a much 
wider interest in the population: ‘to govern’ may mean to lead, but also to follow (a 
path, a direction or a journey), to support, to provide for, even to care for in terms of 
governing a soul or relating to health. 
Governing is therefore primarily concerned with codes of living conduct, and 
Foucault (2007a) referred to this form of government as ‘the conduct of conduct’. 
Understanding government as conducting conduct, as opposed for example to ruling 
subjects, demonstrates the main focus of government is people’s actions and how they 
are orchestrated. It also emphasises the dispersed character of government – we all in 
different ways and for a variety of reasons govern behaviour, both our own and others, 
there is no definitive list of the governors nor the governed:  
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Conduct is the activity of conducting, of conduction if you like, but it is 
equally the way in which one conducts oneself, lets oneself be 
conducted, is conducted, and finally, in which one behaves as an effect 
of a form of conduct as the action of conducting or of conduction. 
(Foucault, 2007a, p.193) 
Government is therefore a continuum ranging from the political government of the 
self and life itself, to the self-government of one’s life.  
 According to Lemke (2002), governmentality is introduced by Foucault in order 
to study the autonomous individual’s capacity for self-control, and how this is related 
to political rule. He understands Foucault’s work on governmentality as a ‘correction’ 
of his earlier studies where subjectivity was primarily understood in terms of docility 
and connected to the process of discipline. Therefore, ‘the notion of government is 
used to investigate the relations between technologies of the self and technologies of 
domination’ (Lemke, 2002, p.52). The involvement of the individual in the reflective 
governing process is therefore crucial as the subject must be an agent and as such able 
to take up the role of conductor (of oneself, of others), and the equally active role of 
being conducted. Unlike the docile subject that merely submits to the will of another, a 
governmental society assumes subjects have the ability to actively partake in their own 
government. The active role of the subject is considered in a governmental society to 
be both possible and essential, as a primary governmental function looks to the 
common good of the population through maximising the potential of each individual. 
As will be discussed in greater detail later18, Foucault (2007a) discussed how 
‘population’ became a distinct political reality in the eighteenth century, one 
important consequence of its emergence was a change in the justification of 
government: subjects are no longer treated as property of the sovereign or state that 
can be used in any way that may be advantageous to that sovereign or state. Instead 
subjects are expected to govern themselves and allow themselves to be governed by 
others for the good of the population, and therefore as members of that population, 
for their own good. 
                                                          
18
 P. 58 
50 
 
Foucault detailed the emergence of two separate forms of power that he 
names as giving rise to the current art of government and governmentality. Firstly, 
pastoral power whose origin lies in Christianity and Christian theology, and secondly 
the apparatus of police as the term was understood prior to the eighteenth century. 
Pastoral power 
Pastoral power originated in the early Christian tradition. Foucault (2007a) 
spoke of the Christian pastorate as ‘an absolutely new form of power’ (p.183), as it 
enabled ways of understanding and governing the subject that had not been possible 
prior to its emergence. It is due to this that Foucault refers to pastoral power as the 
prelude to governmentality. 
Pastoral power is responsible, according to Foucault (2007a), for creating the 
art of conducting subjects, both individually and collectively. He stressed that this art 
of conducting should not be confused with the methods used by the sovereign or law 
to rule: 
In short, the pastorate does not coincide with politics, pedagogy, or 
rhetoric. It is something entirely different. It is an art of ‘governing men’  
(Foucault, 2007a, p.165) 
An understanding of how pastoral power is fundamentally different from juridical-legal 
and sovereign power can be gained through studying the role of the pastor and their 
relationship to the congregation.  
Unlike sovereign rule, the pastor is not concerned with or attempting to govern 
a territory, but rather a community, and as with the Christian analogy of a shepherd 
and his flock, this is not a static but a mobile community. The reach of the pastor is not 
therefore concerned with or limited by borders, it is focused on a collective of human 
beings. The role of the pastor may also be seen as distinct from that of the sovereign: 
pastoral power is a power of care (Foucault, 2007a) - its purpose is to look after the 
flock for the sake of the flock rather than for the sake of the pastor. Due to this and in 
opposition to sovereign power, which may require the sacrifice of its subjects, pastoral 
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power may involve the sacrifice of the pastor for the sake of flock (Foucault, 1982, 
p.214). 
As a power of care, pastoral power must concern itself with the welfare of each 
individual, as well as that of the community as a whole. Despite originating in 
Christianity, Foucault (2007a, p.154) demonstrated that pastoral power does not limit 
itself to spiritual concerns, in fact it is only concerned with spiritual matters to the 
extent that they impact upon political, economic and social issues such as the 
management of lives and households, of wealth and goods. Thus this relation of 
personal and spiritual matters with wider social and political issues enables concern for 
the individual to spread into a concern for the community as a whole, and vice versa.  
Pastoral power, especially when focusing on the economy of the household, therefore 
begins to transgress, or even dissolve the distinction between public and private 
spheres, legitimating the advancement of government into new areas of personal life. 
Donzelot (1979) presents an example of this through his discussion of the policing of 
families, depicting a transition from a government of families in the eighteenth century 
to a government through families in the twentieth century. He demonstrates how this 
combined the removal of the sovereignty of the family over their children, and the 
implementation of new ways to penetrate families resistant to outside intervention19. 
These altered relations within families, as well as those between family and state, 
characterise the modern family, Donzelot claims, as not so much an institution but 
rather a mechanism: 
A wonderful mechanism, since it enables the social body to deal with 
marginality through a near-total dispossession of private rights, and to 
encourage positive integration, the renunciation of the question of 
political right, through the private pursuit of well-being. 
(Donzelot, 1979, p.94) 
                                                          
19
 Similarly Webb (2007) highlights the governance of families through home visits in late Victorian 
England. 
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Thus a domain previously private and expected to govern itself, save for the political 
effects of social status, has become not merely more susceptible to state intervention, 
but turned into an instrument or mechanism of political governance. 
The movement of government into the private sphere became possible, 
according to Foucault (2007a, p.184), by the constitution of the specific subject: by 
individualisation. Foucault (2007a, p.183-4) claimed that the Christian pastorate 
constituted ‘specific modes of individualization’ through which it governed subjects. 
This individualisation is not related to status or birth, instead Foucault (2007a, p. 184) 
mapped out three modes through which it occurs:  the analytical identification of 
merits and faults, subjection through being subjected to continuous networks of 
obedience, and subjectification -the production (and extraction) of an inner, hidden 
truth. These three modes of individualisation become the techniques used in pastoral 
power to govern the conduct of the community. However, in order to govern conduct 
through these modes, particularly in relation to the technique of subjectification, it is 
necessary to gain a particular form of knowledge: 
this form of power cannot be exercised without knowing the inside of 
people’s minds, without exploring their souls, without making them 
reveal their innermost secrets. It implies a knowledge of the conscience 
and an ability to direct it. 
(Foucault, 1982, p.214) 
The art of government that emerged out of pastoral power is therefore linked to the 
knowledge of the ‘truth’ of an individual, presupposing or requiring the subject to be 
composed of a reflective narrativity.  
Foucault (1982, p.214) firmly based the emergence and practice of pastoral 
power within the historical period of the early Christian Church. However he argued 
that we need to differentiate between pastoral power as an ecclesiastical institution – 
which ceased to exist in the eighteenth century – and pastoral power as a function, 
which he claimed has moved beyond this institution (Foucault, 1982, p.214). The 
functions of pastoral power: the constitution of the specific subject, the techniques of 
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government through modes of individualisation that bring further areas of life into the 
scope of government and cause the boundary between the public and private spheres 
of life to be at best ambiguous, and the changed relationship between those that 
govern and those who are governed, are still apparent in (post-eighteenth century) 
modern society albeit with a change in its expression and objective. Specifically, 
Foucault (1982, p.215) outlined three variations of this ‘new’ pastoral power: firstly 
there is a change in its objective – salvation is to be sought in this world rather than 
through an afterlife; secondly there has been an increase, and also greater diversity, of 
the officials of pastoral power, for example, along with state officials such as police, 
officials of pastoral power may now also include welfare societies, institutions such as 
the family, and new authorities of medicine and economy. Lastly, the development of 
knowledge of subjects around two poles: a quantitative knowledge of the population, 
and an analytical knowledge of the individual. These movements demonstrated for 
Foucault (1982) that pastoral power, ‘Which had been linked to a defined religious 
institution, suddenly spread out into the whole social body; it found support in a 
multitude of institutions’ (p.215). 
Apparatus of police 
Alongside pastoral power Foucault discussed the apparatus of police, as it has 
emerged and changed since the fifteenth century, as integral to how society is 
governed today. In contrast to the contemporary use of the term, Foucault (2007a, 
p.312-313) noted that in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries ‘police’ referred to a 
community governed by a public authority as well as the set of actions that directed 
these communities. Therefore ‘police’ had a much broader, more general meaning 
relating to the governance of a community. 
From the seventeenth century the meaning of police became aligned with the 
strength and forces of the state (Foucault, 2007a, p.313), albeit in relation to the 
direction of the community. Foucault (2007a, p.322) claimed that police in this era is 
primarily concerned with the activities of people, but only insofar as they relate to the 
force and strength of the state.  Therefore, ‘What is characteristic of a police state is its 
interest in what men do; it is interested in their activity, their ‘occupation’’ (Foucault, 
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2007a, p.322). From this Foucault (2007a, p.323-5) derived five matters of concern or 
objectives of police including: the number of citizens, the necessities of life (food, 
water), health, activities of citizens (for preventing idleness and mendacity), and 
circulation (of goods). These objectives can be summed up within the overriding 
concern of police: the coexistence of citizens insofar as this coexistence affects the 
state’s strength. Therefore police can be described as ‘the set of techniques that 
ensure that living, doing better than just living, coexisting and communicating can in 
fact be converted into forces of the state’ (Foucault, 2007a, p.327). Foucault (2007a, 
p.327) claimed this suggests a circular process of the state, where state intervention 
on individual lives circles back to the state as a set of forces that it can use to increase 
its strength which can be used to ensure the collective well-being of its citizens. 
Everything from being to well-being becomes a concern of the state, with the effect of 
creating a significant link between the strength of the state and the happiness of 
individuals: 
This circle will pass through the life of individuals, but it will also pass 
through their more than just living, that is to say, through what at the 
time was called men’s convenience . . . their amenity, or even felicity. 
That is to say, this circle, with all that this implies, means that police 
must succeed in linking together the state’s strength and individual 
felicity. This felicity, as the individual’s better than just living, must in 
some way be drawn on and constituted into state utility: making man’s 
happiness the state’s utility, making men’s happiness the very strength 
of the state. 
(Foucault, 2007a, p.327, emphasis added) 
As with pastoral power, the apparatus of police legitimates the extension of 
governance and intervention into the personal and daily concerns of individuals. It 
also, however, politicises these private and personal activities – not only the practices 
themselves but their affective qualities – thus happiness and contentment, or lack of it, 
take on a political interest and thus becomes open to the investigation, regulation and 
intervention of the state. 
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This vested interest in the happiness and well-being of the population is 
necessarily combined with knowledge of the population. Pasquino ( 1991, p.113)  
discussing Obrecht – who he claims is the first writer in the seventeenth century to 
speak in the political language of the population as opposed to that of the prince – 
highlights the crucial role of information gathering and monitoring in order to 
elucidate the capacities and resources of the population and the territory. He notes 
this information on the population was collected on a daily basis through the 
registering of births and deaths, but there also existed a requirement for ‘each person 
to render his or her life into discourse, in order that each person can then be advised 
how to live a ‘Christian life’’ (1991, p.113). Thus the collection of information became a 
task that everyone had to participate in for the security and collective happiness of the 
state: ‘the security and happiness of the state . . . is transformed into a great general 
and uninterrupted confession’ (Pasquino, 1991, p.113). Due to the circular nature of 
the state of police, the security and strength of the state reflects directly onto the 
potential happiness of individual citizens, therefore, as Pasquino ( 1991) notes, 
individual happiness, being dependent on the protection and assistance of the state is 
also dependent on the citizens’ ‘confession’ of their life story. 
The governmental reason of the eighteenth century brought challenges to this 
form of intervention through the state of police. Foucault (2007a, p.348) 
demonstrated that a ‘new governmentality’ emerges with the economists in the 
eighteenth century that laid down the foundations of both modern and contemporary 
governmentality. The principle change or challenge by the economists regarded the 
role and purpose of the state: specifically the state is no longer seen as responsible for 
utilising and distributing well-being to the population, instead it should only intervene 
to regulate and facilitate well-being, ‘The state is envisioned as the regulator of 
interests and no longer as the transcendent and synthetic principle of the 
transformation of the happiness of each into the happiness of all’ (Foucault, 2007a, 
p.346).  
This movement towards a laissez-faire approach of state governance arose 
from a belief in a naturalness regarding society and the population. Foucault (2007a, 
p.351-2) described this as population being subject to its own laws of transformation 
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and movement that is neither willed nor caused by the state. It is through this belief in 
population as a set of natural processes that population becomes an objective reality 
in itself, rather than a collective term for the subjects within a sovereignty or territory. 
Understanding population as a natural object changes how the state can intervene 
within it, and so also changes the role of the state. Foucault (2007a) stated within this 
model, ‘not only will there be no justification, but also quite simply there will be no 
interest in trying to impose regulatory systems of injunctions, imperatives, and 
interdictions on these processes’ (p.352), as such the proper way to govern must 
respect this naturalness which means no longer to control, but to regulate the 
population. 
For Foucault (2007a, p.353-4) this ‘new’ governmentality led to a dismantling of 
the police state, dividing the apparatus of police into two: on one side the 
contemporary apparatus of police, with the mainly negative function of preventing 
disorder; on the other side is what Foucault (2007a) refers to as ‘incentive regulation’,  
including the economy and various forms of population management. However, what 
remains in this new form of governmentality is a link between individual being and 
well-being, and the strength of the state, or perhaps more specifically the collective 
strength of the population. Secondly, and related to this integral link, is the continued 
interest in the daily and personal lives of citizens: the activities that make up, what 
Foucault termed, the more than just living.  
Therefore although many aspects of pastoral power and the apparatus of 
police are confined to their historical context, some functions that emerged through 
the development of these forms of power have been instrumental in creating what 
Foucault termed the ‘era of governmentality’. In particular these functions include the 
emergence of an understanding of the specific subject that enabled new forms of 
government to be practised upon it, requiring the development of certain knowledges, 
and the establishment of a different20 relationship between those governing and those 
governed; new areas of life falling within the scope of legitimate government; and the 
                                                          
20
 Different, that is, from the relationship between the sovereign and his/her subjects, or master and 
servant. 
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establishment of a direct link between individual happiness/ well-being and the 
strength of the collective. 
Governmental society 
Rose (1999b) points out that no universal object of ‘the governed’ exists, 
instead there exists ‘only multiple objectifications of those over whom government is 
to be exercised, and whose characteristics government must harness and 
instrumentalize’ (p.40). He continues that governmental practices are not therefore 
determined by the ‘nature’ of those being governed, that is, by their character, their 
passions and interests, but is instead related to how ‘the governed’ are politically 
objectified at any particular moment: for example as citizens, royal subjects, the 
public, or population. The notion of population has become significant to 
governmentality precisely due to its manifestation as a real and political object. 
Foucault (2007a, p.67) noted that the word ‘population’ existed prior to the eighteenth 
century only in the sense of to populate or depopulate an area, rather than as 
describing a specific social and political reality as it is used today. It is in the eighteenth 
century, Foucault (2007a) argued, that the meaning of population changed: 
with the eighteenth century economists, I think the population no 
longer appears as a collection of subjects of right . . . It will be 
considered as a set of processes to be managed at the level and on the 
basis of what is natural in these processes.   
(p.70, emphasis added) 
It is therefore important to draw out what these processes and characteristics might 
be, or more appropriately to determine what processes become attributed to 
population through the techniques of government. 
Foucault (2007a, p.70) set out three modes through which the naturalness of 
the population became manifest. Firstly he claimed that population is not understood 
as a collection of subjects, but rather as dependent on a set of complex and modifiable 
variables, these variables or factors may include the systems of wealth and the law, 
but also customs and values. The second natural phenomenon of population is the 
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universal benefit of desire: Foucault (2007a, p.72) highlighted that although the 
population is made up of people very different to each other who therefore do not 
behave in a unified manner, according to the eighteenth century theorists who first 
wrote of the population, such as Mirabeau, Pierre Jaubert and Quesnay, the 
population as a whole was guided by one main action: desire (to pursue individual 
interest). The uninterrupted free-play of the desire of individuals was thought to 
produce the general interest of the population. Foucault (2007a, p.73) emphasised 
that this management of the population on the basis of the naturalness of individual 
desire and its link to the production of the general good, is the exact opposite to the 
exercise of sovereignty and the ethical-juridical conception of government. Lastly, the 
naturalness of the population is found through the constancy of phenomena that 
might be expected to be variable due to their nature being based on chance or 
accidents, for example the constancy in morbidity numbers, suicide rates and so on.  
Despite this new meaning of population as a set of natural processes or phenomena, 
Foucault (2007a) argued this does not exempt it from forms of intervention and 
regulation: ‘the naturalness identified in the fact of population is constantly accessible 
to agents and techniques of transformation, on the condition that these agents and 
techniques are at once enlightened, reflected, analytical, calculated and calculating’ (p. 
71). 
The population, as it came to be understood in the eighteenth century and 
arguably is still recognised today, includes and combines both an understanding of the 
‘human species’ and ‘the public’. That is it became understood both biologically and 
politically. Population is therefore not a reference to a collection of subjects within a 
specified area, but a set of biological and cultural processes and phenomena that 
‘make up’ knowledges of population as object, through which it can be governed: 
The population is therefore everything that extends from the biological 
rootedness through the species up to the surface that gives one a hold 
provided by the public. From the species to the public; we have here a 
whole field of new realities in the sense that they are the pertinent 
elements for mechanisms of power, the pertinent space within which 
and regarding which one must act. 
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(Foucault, 2007a, p.75)21 
 Population curves of normality 
By defining population as dependent on a multitude of complex and modifiable 
variables (Foucault, 2007a), population is characterised as a morphing object that 
contains vast differences within it at any moment, as well as involving transformations 
across time. For example, many sometimes conflicting customs and value systems may 
exist within and constitute the population at the same time, and institutions such as 
law may change dramatically from one time to another. Despite these variations, 
population does not become broken up into a series of disconnected phenomena, on 
the contrary, this diversity is used to create knowledge of the population, for example 
through techniques that create the normal or what Canguilhem calls ‘normalisation’. 
Foucault (2007a, p.57) discussed the notion of disciplinary normalisation, 
claiming that its purpose is to encourage conformity to a particular optimal model. 
Through this people become divided and classified as either normal – those who are 
able to conform, or abnormal – those who cannot conform. An example of this may be 
the traditional or medical model of disability, where an individual with a physical 
impairment would be classed as abnormal due to their inability to conform to the 
optimal model of unimpaired health and ability. Within a disciplinary system the norm 
is used to divide the normal from the abnormal. In this sense the healthy are divided 
from the sick, thus only the sick would be treated in an attempt to achieve their 
conformity to the norm, and to avoid the contamination of others. In contrast to this, 
within a system of governmentality individuals are not primarily known through acts of 
division.  Governmentality creates a form of unity over the whole by understanding the 
population in relation to various distribution curves of normality. Foucault (2007a, 
p.62) used the example of mass vaccinations to demonstrate that within a 
governmental system it is the population as a whole that is treated rather than just the 
‘sick’. Therefore instead of the norm being used to divide: 
                                                          
21
 The extension of governance over biological life has been developed by, for example, Rose (2001a; 
2007) and Agamben (1998).  
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we have a plotting of the normal and the abnormal, of different curves 
of normality, and the operation of normalisation consists in establishing 
an interplay between those different distributions of normality and [in] 
acting to bring the most unfavourable in line with the more favourable. 
(Foucault, 2007a, p.63) 
The norm is therefore secondary to, and a derivative of, the distribution curves of 
normality. The aim within this system is not to ensure the conformity of individuals to 
an optimum model, but to use the norm to determine favourable and unfavourable 
normality curves. For example, Foucault (2007a, p.62) highlighted that when it was 
discovered that infants were more vulnerable to catching and dying from small pox 
than other sections of the population, the problem became one of reducing infant 
mortality to bring it in line with the average level of mortality from small pox for the 
rest of the population. Thus infants are not divided from the population as abnormal in 
comparison to one another, but understood as an ‘outlier’ on a distribution curve of 
which they are a part. This highlights an important feature of the norm – that 
population can give itself a common denominator(s) without any reference to a point 
of externality (Dean, 2010). Thus the deviances and differences within a population 
become the points of reference through which that population becomes knowable and 
known, and so through which governance becomes necessary and justified.  
The norm is therefore the interplay of variations, rather than a pure formal 
ideal. The consequence of this is the instability of any norm: distributions of normality 
will constantly change, partly due to the forms of governmental practices that occur to 
influence the ‘unfavourable’ normality curves. For example the effect of recognising 
the greater likelihood of infants to die from small pox than other sections of society 
would be an effort to counteract this. The decrease of infant mortality would change 
the normality curve, which would alter the norm. As the concept of what is favourable 
or unfavourable is determined in relation to the various distribution curves, this would 
also change. Advances in technology will also affect the normality curves, and in turn 
the norm, as Rose (2007, p.17) highlights, the norm of ageing has been significantly 
altered through medications such as Hormone Replacement Therapy: a treatment 
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commonly used to halt the effects of the menopause – traditionally known as the 
‘change of life’ – aimed at, among other effects, avoiding changes traditionally 
associated with old age such as a drop in libido, or ageing diseases such as 
osteoporosis. The desired outcome of such a treatment is primarily that the body, and 
so life, remain as unchanged as possible22.    
Distribution curves created from information of the population signifies the 
importance of understanding members of the population as living beings.  For example 
demographic forms of information include birth rates, mortality and morbidity rates, 
levels of activity including employment and education. However, the interest in this 
information rests in what it is thought to reveal regarding the behaviour of individuals, 
creating the potential for that conduct to be regulated and governed. For example, 
Gordon ( 1991, p.4-5) demonstrates how in The History of Sexuality: An introduction, 
Volume 1 (Foucault, 1990a) Foucault used the term biopower to designate the forms 
of power that are exercised over people specifically as living beings23, here Foucault 
shows how individuals’ sexual and reproductive conduct became interlinked with 
issues of national policy and power. Hence biological features of individuals become 
the object of political strategy (Foucault, 2007a) through their assimilation into various 
normality curves that act to position them and their behaviour within the population, 
and level some form of judgment regarding the favourability of their conduct. 
Inscribed knowledge 
 In order to turn the biological and personal lives of individuals into forms of 
political power and strategies, information of individual characteristics and certain 
processes and relationships need to be measured, deciphered, compared, and 
presented in a way that demonstrates this. This information, presented primarily in 
statistical and demographic forms, establishes population as an objective and distinct 
reality focusing on its consistencies and trends, thereby demonstrating that there are 
certain truths relating to population. The use of numbers and statistics to divulge 
knowledge of the population has been, and still is, heavily relied upon. 
                                                          
22
 This point will be further discussed in Chapter 4. 
23
 Biopower as a form of governance will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
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Foucault (2007a, p.274) noted that ‘statistics’ relates etymologically to 
‘knowledge of the state’, and they still today have the function of calculating and 
presenting social knowledge. Hacking (1991, p. 181) details the impact statistics have 
had on the human sciences; specifically statistics have influenced what sort of 
information or knowledge is looked for and how it is expressed. For example, Hacking 
(1991, p.182) argues that many of our modern categories through which the 
population is understood are based upon the attempt to collect numerical 
information, giving the example that medical statistics gave rise to  a need for a 
conclusive list of all possible causes of death.  
The aim of statistics is to categorise, to find relations, similarities and 
discrepancies, within a certain population.  Statistics therefore look for certain 
information:  information that can be numerically expressed and is open to 
comparison and measurement. Rose (1999a, p.6) argues that it is the presentation of 
social knowledge in numerical form that causes it to become inscribed onto reality: 
certain phenomena such as births, rates of illness and so on, become inscribed onto 
reality through their presentation in the form of charts, demographic maps, reports, as 
these give the knowledge a material reality and truth through providing physical 
‘evidence’. Inscription therefore gives ‘weight’ to the facts and figures, turning them 
into objective information: thus charts and maps are used as reliable and objective 
representations of fact, rather than as inscriptions or representations of a specific or 
variable reality.  
 Hacking (1991) outlines the history of statistics detailing its construction 
including how each of its founders imposed something of their own character onto it. 
He (1991) exclaims, ‘We still live in the shadows of these men. Our governments 
classify us, lodge us, tax us, according to the systems that they began’ (p.193). 
Therefore despite often being presented as merely uncovering and presenting 
objective truths relating to the nature of population, statistical information can instead 
be shown to be constructing the domains it is thought to merely represent in two ways 
(Rose, 1999b, p.198). Firstly, the creation and development of statistics has 
determined the specific ways through which individuals are categorised and therefore 
characterised: Hacking (1991) highlights for example, that ‘by law we shall die of the 
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causes enumerated in Farr’s nosology’ (p.193), causing it to be (legally and medically) 
impossible to die of something not on the medical list: old age for example. Secondly, 
statistics rely on information that can be measured and categorised in a numerical or 
similar fashion, and so tends to overlook that which cannot be gathered and expressed 
in this way, perhaps not recognising it as reliable or useful knowledge of the 
population24. 
Numbers, far from objective and unbiased facts, are therefore more 
appropriately thought of as political judgements, as:  
political judgements are implicit in the choice of what to measure, how 
to measure it and how often to measure it and how to interpret the 
results 
  (Alsonso and Starr, 1987, in Rose, 1999b, p.198).  
Lemke (2007), using a term coined by Latour,                                                                                                                                                                                           
refers to these processes and products of calculation and measurement, for example 
scientific reports, statistical accounts, surveys and graphs, as ‘inscription devices’ 
stating that it is these that ‘made it possible to define problems, specify areas of 
intervention, calculate resources, and determine political goals’ ( p.7). Therefore 
despite the propensity for numbers to be used to evidence a truthful understanding of 
population, and from this suggest a normative way of living, Rose (1999b, p.198) 
argues that the use of numbers as evidence instead acts to disguise the political nature 
of these judgements, suggesting instead that the judgments are based on what is 
matter of fact, or evidently natural. Thus by creating a ‘rhetoric of disinterest’ (Rose, 
1999b, p.208) the use of numbers acts to hide the motivation and rationality that lead 
to one particular question to be asked, or a particular social phenomenon to be 
thought of as problematic and in need of investigation. Ruppert and Savage (2011) 
present a similar account of the recent use of transactional data to both identify and 
judge individuals. As digitalized transactional data represents people’s practices – what 
they have done and not what they say – they argue the analysis of such data is 
represented as ‘flat’ descriptions and visualisations of an objective reality. Despite the 
                                                          
24
 This will be further discussed in relation to policy formation in Chapter 3. 
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treatment of this sort of data as merely waiting a neutral analysis Ruppert and Savage 
(2011) emphasise the possibility of it being used to misrepresent by, for example, 
having no way to include the circumstances behind the transaction. 
Far from being politically disinterested, these kinds of inscription devices – the 
methods through which numbers become presented (such as reports, charts, plans, 
guidelines and so on) – have the aim of acting on the population in a specific and 
planned way. Rose (1999b) suggests that these inscription devices have the ability to 
produce conviction in people, thus they act as political arguments for one rationality 
over another. Furthermore, it is the ability to calculate and represent aspects of 
subjectivity that makes members of the population individually and collectively 
governable (Rose 1999a, p.8). The use of numbers and calculation in various forms 
should therefore not be understood as the mere presentation of information, but as 
actual techniques for the government of the population, used to map out possible 
spaces for government, justify particular governing programmes, and convince 
individuals of the need for certain practices of self-government.   
Rationalities of government 
The activity of government is intimately tied to specific rationalities, hence 
Rose (1999b) claims that government is ‘both made possible by and constrained by 
what can be thought and what cannot be thought at any particular moment in history’ 
(p.8). Thus as highlighted by Foucault (2007a) it is the belief that population is 
somehow ‘natural’ that inhibits any justification for imposing regulatory systems on it. 
More specifically, the belief (by the eighteenth century scientists and economic 
theorists who originally spoke of population as an objective reality,) that this 
naturalness rested on the universal motivation of desire to pursue individual interest 
(containing the belief that this desire will lead to the collective good), informs 
orthodox ways of acting on and governing society. This rationality inhibits forms of 
governing that may hinder the pursuit of individual interest, yet justifies intervention if 
this desire becomes stifled in some way. Lemke (2007, p.2) understands government 
as defining a discursive field where exercising power becomes rationalised. This 
demonstrates how the acts of government and governmental thought cannot be 
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detached from one another – orthodoxy and orthopraxy inform one another. It would 
be nonsensical to ask which comes first as they are part of the same occurrence–  
together they constitute the discursive field within which current forms of governance 
are performed and make sense. 
Rationality is not therefore referring to a form of transcendental truth or 
knowledge, but to the particular thought, beliefs and values that become normative in 
a particular place and at a specific moment in time, enabling certain things to be done, 
and others to be prohibited. Thus Lemke (2002) claims, ‘In this perspective, rationality 
refers not to a transcendental reason but to historical practices’ (p.55): rationalities are 
historically specific and so can never be stable or static. Rationality can therefore be 
defined as that which underpins and justifies normative governmental techniques. 
However, as Rose (1999b, p.275-6) points out, although governmental technologies 
are related to a particular rationality, this rationality is not straightforward – it does 
not have the coherence of a single origin, but may instead come from many places, 
giving the examples of philosophical doctrines, conceptions of power and justice, and 
notions of social reality. 
It is therefore important to pinpoint specific rationalities if governmental 
practices are to be recognised and analysed. This is emphasised by Lemke (2007) who 
notes, ‘political rationalities provide cognitive and normative maps that open up 
spaces of government ’ (p.7), suggesting that rationalities outline or mark out the 
boundaries of the reality in need of government, making it knowable and therefore 
open to intervention. For example, the general purpose of social policy is to advocate 
certain changes or institutionalise procedures and rules, these are underpinned by 
governmental rationalities that describe and map out the reality to be governed (older 
people, retirees, the socially isolated and so on), and through this justify any call for 
intervention (Rose, 1999a, p. xxii). Due to this Rose (1999b, p. 28) argues that every 
project of rationalisation is at the same time a strategy to intervene and regulate. 
Governmental technologies 
Governmentality can therefore provide a fruitful analysis of how society is 
currently organised and managed. Of specific interest are technologies that 
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demonstrate a preference for governing from a distance, the central position of 
freedom and free choice, and the particular purpose and aim of governance – how it 
justifies itself. 
Governing from a distance 
The contemporary state, often characterised as neo-liberal, leads individuals 
without assuming responsibility for them or becoming too involved in their lives 
(Lemke, 2001, p. 201). Rose (2001, p. 6), discussing the nation’s health, notes that the 
state is no longer expected to fulfil society’s needs, but rather to act as a facilitator: 
the state aims to enable individuals to fulfil their own needs rather than directly 
intervene. The question of how it is decided what these needs are remains an area of 
contestation however25. The conviction that governing from a distance, with as little 
direct intervention as possible, is a superior form of governance arises in relation to a 
belief in some kind of ‘naturalness’ regarding the population (Foucault, 2007a). 
Therefore:  
The basic principle of the state’s role, and so of the form of 
governmentality henceforth prescribed for it, will be to respect these 
natural processes . . . intervention of state governmentality will have to 
be limited . . . [therefore] It will be necessary to arouse, to facilitate, and 
to laisser faire, in other words to manage and no longer to control 
through rules and regulations. 
(Foucault, 2007a, p.352-3) 
Governing from a distance becomes a necessary technology when the population is 
assumed to be a natural and independent phenomenon, as this inhibits justification for 
direct intervention regarding its daily government26 . Government must instead take 
on the role of enabling these natural processes to continue and develop, intervening 
only to avoid stagnation27. 
                                                          
25
 Such areas of tension will be discussed throughout Chapters 4-7. 
26
 Authoritarian interventions are still abundant in society however, as will be discussed later (p.73). 
27
 Webb (2007) argues that social workers in Victorian England were for the first time able to regulate 
from a distance due to home visits and the spatial importance of ‘home’. 
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Responsibility therefore rests upon the individual to conduct themselves in 
ways that benefit society as a whole, with the aid of the various forms of life 
management that make up health and social care policies. Statements of active 
citizenship and social obligation contribute to the constitution of this discursive field, 
rationalising this version of social relationships. In an attempt to explain how 
individuals come to behave in ways in keeping with this dominant rationality (or view 
themselves or become judged by its standards), Rose (1999b, p.48) presents the 
notion of ‘translation’ as the forging of alignments between the objectives of the 
authorities that aim to govern, and the personal projects of the organisations, groups, 
and individuals that are its target. This suggests a top-down movement regarding 
governmental rationalities, where the intentions of central government and public 
bodies become filtered and dispersed into the daily lives of individuals through various 
social structures and the way society is organised. Rose (1999b, p.51) explains this 
using the example of the notion of enterprise in the 1980s which underpinned the 
critique of the social welfare state. He demonstrates how this became translated into 
specific strategies to reform policy, such as the restructuring of social security benefits, 
and reorganisation of universities and hospitals. This transition in thought, where 
individuals’ needs ceased being the direct responsibility of the state instead becoming 
the prime responsibility of the individual and, perhaps, the immediate community, can 
be demonstrated in more recent policy in the move from institutional to community 
based care in the 1990s, and more recently still the move from directly providing 
services to providing the funding for individuals to purchase their own services - 
through personal budgets and the strategy of ‘personalisation’(see Ferguson, 2007) - in 
the 2000s. Individual members of society therefore live much of their life through 
structures and organisations based upon a particular notion of society, but they may 
also come to take on board the values associated with ‘enterprise’, for example, and 
thus expect certain forms of conduct both from themselves and others28.   
                                                          
28
 An understanding of human behaviour as market relations has been put forward by neoliberal 
economists such as Becker (1981) who analyses human relations as rational and utility maximising. This 
takes the notion of internalising the values of enterprise further as even personal relationships are 
thought to be internally calculated in terms of utility. 
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Governing a population is not as straightforward as this may suggest however. 
The existence of organisational structures due to certain governmental rationalities 
may certainly encourage individuals to live their life in accordance with social norms in 
many instances. But governing at a distance requires more than this. To be able to 
successfully govern from a distance it is necessary to be able to rely on the initiative 
and voluntary active participation of individual members of the population, and for this 
to happen individual members of society must want to behave in certain ways due to: 
justificatory beliefs held regarding their role in society; expectations of what society 
should be like (the good society); values or ideals that they hold dear; or simply that 
they believe it to be in their best interest. Rose (2007, p.27) uses the term 
‘ethopolitics’ to describe how these desires are used as governmental rationalities and 
technologies that regulate conduct and encourage self-government. He claims:  
In the politics of our present, notably in the revival of communitarian  
themes, the ethos of human existence – the sentiments, moral nature, 
or guiding beliefs of persons, groups, or institutions - has come to 
provide the ‘medium’ within which the self-government of the 
autonomous individual can be connected up with the imperatives of 
good government. 
 (Rose, 2007, p.27)  
Knowledge of how individuals determine the standards and boundaries of their own 
conduct- through personal and moral codes for example – is used to inform 
governmental techniques. Therefore what individuals consider to be the ‘right’ way to 
behave, and hence the type of personhood to aspire to, can be utilised by the political 
state as tools of social regulation. The personalisation agenda in social work is an 
example of this where the values of choice and control expressed by the Independence 
Living movement, originating from the 1970s, became usurped by a market based 
neoliberal discourse which held onto the values of choice and control, but dropped the 
emphasis on rights and interdependence in favour of responsibility and independence 
(Ferguson, 2012). The values that the personalisation agenda is currently based upon 
make it difficult to argue against or reject, as Ferguson (2007) asks: who would be 
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against choice in health and social care services? But what is offered under the 
umbrella of ‘choice’, and equally important, what is not offered, combined with the 
responsibility to make the most of the choices on offer, act to regulate personal 
identities and lifestyles.  
State regulation and self-government - consisting of the monitoring of one’s 
own conduct against social and personal standards, values and expectations- whilst 
remaining two distinct forms of governance, are not fully separate or independent 
from each other. Rather external governmental techniques are often devised around 
and rationalised using social and personal values and expectations; in return these 
values and expectations may be forced back onto the population in the form of civil 
responsibilities using more or less subtle or coercive technologies. 
Dean (2007) details the vital connection between the state and civil society for 
enabling and rationalising contemporary liberal rule. In particular he (2007, p.113) 
claims that state regulation specifically employs the techniques and agencies located 
within civil society, therefore liberal forms of government are not limited to parliament 
and judiciaries, they can equally be found in aspects of civil society such as economics, 
biomedicine, and the social sciences for example. He argues  from this that ‘the liberal 
fear of governing too much is not so much a fear that the population is being governed 
too much but that the state is doing too much of the governing’ (Dean, 2007, p.113). 
The movement towards outsourcing social care services and encouraging service users 
to find and purchase (even commission) their own services in order to meet needs 
decided upon by social workers (as opposed to self-defined needs) is an example of 
this. Governmental regulation under liberal rule uses the forms of regulation already 
found in civil society in two ways. Firstly through adopting and adapting the processes 
of civil society: Dean (2007, p.115) gives the example of the market and how devolved 
budgeting, contracting out of services, and performance management systems have 
become common place in public organisations. Secondly, as discussed above, 
governmental regulation aims to replicate the patterns of values, expectations, and 
forms of conduct thought to exist in civil society independent of state administration 
and regulation. Some of the social values cited by Dean (2007, p.117) that are 
reproduced by liberal governmentality are self-responsibility, community, and 
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independence – values that have come to form the basis of much current social care 
policy. 
Dean (2007) describes this form of government as being possible through two 
interrelated and simultaneous movements: the unfolding of the political sphere into 
civil society, and the enfolding of civil society into the political sphere. This, he argues 
(2007, p.116) is demonstrated through the linkages, networks and partnerships of 
state organisations with the commercial, local and voluntary sector – hence what was 
traditionally contained within the political sphere has been extended into other/all 
sections of society. Dean (2007) claims that at the same time features of civil society 
become ‘folded’ back into the operations of the state (as demonstrated above), thus 
civil society becomes political29.   
It is this interrelation of civil society with the state and political sphere that has 
enabled and required government from a distance. Enabled because questions of 
regulation and government have become dispersed into all areas of social life; and 
required because the social and cultural values that have been taken up by the state 
and used in the governance of the population are often not tenable with direct 
intervention, but instead necessitates the use of liberal freedom, such as choice, 
responsibility and personal autonomy. 
Regulation through freedom and choice 
The regulation of the population therefore requires the voluntary participation 
of its individual members, which rests on the assumption that they are - or can be - 
free to make decisions and act on these. It is within governmentality then that liberal 
freedom becomes not only compatible with, but essential to, governance and 
regulation.  
                                                          
29
 The analysis in Chapters 4-7 focuses on the way that many ‘everyday’ traditionally private features of 
life have taken up a political significance that is thought to have a direct impact on the collective 
strength of the population as a whole. Thus the choice of leisure activities: a passive individual activity 
such as reading or participative and collective one such as volunteering or belonging to a community 
group, become politically charged choices with collective consequences in the policy documents 
studied. 
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But what is meant by freedom? Achieving freedom, or being considered free, 
does not require some kind of social emancipation. It is not related to a social 
condition at all, but to personal characteristics: freedom refers to an individual’s ability 
to act in an autonomous fashion. Therefore being free does not necessitate social 
structural change, but instead for each person to act on themselves - their ‘self’ - to 
ensure that they attain a form of personhood compatible with autonomous action. 
Thus, as Rose (1999a) claims, ‘Achieving freedom becomes a matter not of slogans nor 
of political revolutions, but of slow, painstaking, and detailed work on our own 
subjective and personal realities’ (p. 257-8). Understood as a personal attribute, 
strategies of self-government aim to ensure each individual makes their potential for 
freedom a reality. Individual freedom thus requires activity or reflection-in-action: it is 
not enough to know that one is free, one must constantly use and demonstrate this 
freedom – people must make decisions and choices for themselves and act on them.  
It therefore becomes possible for members of society to be governed because 
of their freedom rather than in spite of it.  As Rose (1999a) argues, society does not 
aim to impose lifestyles on individuals through coercive measures (at least not ideally), 
individuals have much more control over their lives: 
Rather than being tied rigidly into publicly espoused forms of conduct 
imposed through legislation or coercive intervention into personal 
conduct, forms of life, types of ‘lifestyle’ are on offer, bounded by law 
only at the margins. 
(p.230) 
In the absence of coercive measures as a primary tool of government, it is the ideal of 
individual freedom that is used to regulate. Individuals are encouraged to make 
choices, and these choices become the object of governmental intervention. This is 
what Foucault (2007a, p.353) referred to as ‘incentive regulation’, where the 
population is managed through, for example, economics or the social sciences - 
through taxes, monetary incentives, housing mortgages and expert advice, rather than 
controlled through compulsion.  
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Governing the population through the regulation of freedom and choices 
ensures individuals retain responsibility for their actions or decisions:  
As the choice of options for action is, or so the neo-liberal notion of 
rationality would have it, the expression of free will on the basis of a 
self-determined decision, the consequences of the action are borne by 
the subject alone, who is solely responsible for them.  
(Lemke, 2001, p.201) 
  One of the incentives for the individual to conform to expectations and standards of 
behaviour is that any consequences, whether good or bad, become their responsibility 
– what Lemke (2001, p.202) refers to as the ‘price-tag’ of social participation. This also 
reflects an ethical shift from a collective responsibility to an individual responsibility for 
social problems. 
An issue arising from this, as pointed to by Dean (2007, p.96) is that it is often 
hard to distinguish between the ‘soft’ powers of governing through freedom and the 
‘hard’ powers that ensure that freedom, especially as it is clear that many members of 
the population need coercing into freedom (that is, into a way of life based around 
autonomous action). It is due to this lack of clarity that Dean (2007) argues liberal 
rationalities and authoritarian measures are not incompatible: 
the limited sphere of the political (‘the state’) and the different 
conceptions of what is exterior to it (‘civil society’) interlace to turn the 
injunction to govern through freedom into a set of binding obligations 
potentially or actually enforceable by coercive or sovereign instruments. 
(p.111)  
The purpose of government 
  Regulation within a governmental society is primarily rationalised using 
schemata and performances about the well-being of the population. Although the 
population, in whatever form it has been understood, has invariably always been the 
target of governance, it has only fairly recently become used to justify governance. For 
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example, in a sovereign society regulation of the population would have been 
rationalised by the benefit to the sovereign. Whilst being a vague and currently 
ubiquitous term, the intention when invoking the well-being of the population is 
actually very specific: just as freedom is conceived in terms of individual actions and 
qualities, the well-being of the population requires maximising individual ‘potential’, 
which is assumed to lead to individual fulfilment. Therefore although the population is 
conceptualised and governed as a whole (collectively), the purpose and benefit of 
regulation speaks to the individual – of personal fulfilment, individual well-being, a 
secured personal future. Again, the effective regulation of all is essential to each 
individual’s chances of happiness and personal flourishing.  Governmental 
technologies and techniques that reflect commonly held values, for example those of 
liberal freedom, self-determination and democracy, become both acceptable and 
desirable (Dean 2007, p.116). A large proportion of regulation therefore acts to enable 
a ‘free’ lifestyle focused on self-interest. 
Contradictions and critiques 
Authoritarian rule in a governmental society 
The focus so far has been on how the population is governed through its 
behaviour and conduct in opposition to the coercive and disciplinarian forms of 
government thought by Foucault to be characteristic of eighteenth and early 
nineteenth century European societies (see for example Foucault, 1995; 2001).  
However, Dean (2007) has criticised what he considers to be the over exaggeration of 
governmentality in understanding contemporary society, arguing that despite 
sovereign power being considered as an outmoded form of power it actually still plays 
a key role in social governance (2007, p.15), albeit in ways where it has become 
dispersed and delegated, in contrast to its traditional association with a centralised 
State.  Furthermore, Dean (2007, p.94) continues, if governmental practices are to be 
understood as heterogeneous and existing in multiple fields, we cannot assume they 
are all conducted via governmentality – the government of conduct – but must also 
expect other forms of power to be in operation. For Dean this means that far from 
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side-lining sovereign and disciplinarian power, we should instead seek to understand 
governmentality in relation to them. 
  The assertion that authoritarian forms of power are still very much in operation 
in contemporary society leads Dean (2007) to claim that an understanding of society as 
neo liberal or advanced liberal is no longer fully appropriate, instead we should think 
of ourselves as existing in an authoritarian liberal society – that is, a society where 
liberal values and authoritarian means coexist within the same space. This suggests 
that we need to move away from an understanding of the government of individuals 
through regulated choices (as advanced liberalism is defined by Rose, 1996, p.41) and 
re-imagine government as coercive. This section will examine this claim by considering 
where and how authoritarian powers are implemented, and to what extent we can 
continue to analyse social governance as governmentality. 
The obligation of freedom 
As noted by Dean (2010) any form of government through freedom will always 
entail, at some level, a division of those able and willing to take up the responsibilities 
of freedom, and those who are not. Those considered to not be exercising their 
freedom responsibly, or at all, will ultimately attract some form of government 
intervention. One aim of government, then, is to coerce people into accepting their 
freedom and the responsibilities and obligations that accompany it. It is instructive 
here to revisit the notion of the apparatus of police; Foucault (2007a) notes that the 
apparatus of police has in modern times been divided into two separate roles, both 
with the combined function of governing a community: incentive regulation (which 
may include economic incentives or penalties, and governance through ethopolitics), 
and the negative function of the maintenance of order. This second function of 
government may be easily demonstrated through the police establishment and penal 
system, but is also, Dean (2007) suggests, more subtly and intricately woven within 
everyday governmental technologies, and therefore encompasses a wider domain 
than the penal and judicial arena alone. Therefore he suggests the two functions of 
police have not been clearly separated, and so the maintenance of order is not 
confined to the overtly authoritarian powers of the police and legal systems. 
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The rhetoric of obligation can provide a demonstration of this. Dean (2007) 
considers the realm of social assistance, where help is regularly conditional, continually 
assessed and always at risk of being withdrawn, to be a particularly useful example: 
the establishment of institutions and markets to provide for the long-
term unemployed or the single parent is accompanied by a fundamental 
threat to the life and dignity of the individual. Behind the agreements 
which the unemployed or the single parent must contract into in return 
for subsistence is the threat of an ultimate sanction, a withdrawal of 
assistance and thus a withdrawal of the means of life. 
(Dean, 2007, p.104) 
Thus the concept of ‘choice’ in relation to self-government sits astride the threat of 
sovereign violence: individual members of the population become obliged to make 
certain choices, and for those who make the ‘wrong’ choice the threat of violence may 
become a reality. Dean (2007, p.127) further demonstrates how many contemporary 
liberal political programmes are situated within the various languages of compulsion, 
giving the examples of the moral claims of community, the obligations of citizenship, 
the rhetoric of social inclusion, and the maintenance of social order. Thus sovereign 
force enters into everyday governance in a decisive way. 
Dean (2007, p.136) defines sovereign power as the right to use legitimate 
violence, and it is within this that we can perhaps understand the existence of 
sovereign powers within governmentality apparatuses. The existence of coercive and 
authoritarian practices within the government of the population cannot be in doubt: 
from the explicit use of force in the penal system or psychiatric unit, to the more 
subtle but perhaps equally coercive practices of the therapy room or of expert advice. 
However, it is precisely the conception of the subject as free and autonomous, coupled 
with the expectation and cognition of life as comprised of individual choices, which 
legitimates coercive practices. Crucially it is the justification of sovereign violence that 
has undergone a transformation (Dean, 2007). The  important difference - what 
enables us to speak of even sovereign practices as instances of governmentality, is that 
the very act of compulsion is understood as something the individual has done to, or 
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chosen for, themselves – they knew the consequences and therefore are considered to 
have chosen their current situation by default (by their lack of action, or erroneous 
action). Similarly instances of coercion are often thought to be no more than a rational 
individual making a rational choice. Thus the pensioner in poverty is not viewed to be 
the subject of an external form of violence (a system that withholds vital resources), 
but as an autonomous individual who, through their own irresponsible mis-
management, such as lack of forward thinking in planning a private pension scheme, 
must reap the consequences of their actions.  
This presents governmentality as paradoxical – where a governmental 
rationality based on freedom legitimises authoritarian technologies. However as 
previously noted30, Foucault (2007a) did not intend the different forms of government 
to be thought of as linear and necessarily distinct from one another - the governance 
of the population through an understanding of the subject in conjunction with liberal 
freedom may restrict the use of some forms of authoritarian rule in certain situations, 
but can legitimate them in others. 
Decision making 
Sovereignty is similarly prominent in contemporary society, Dean (2007, p.189) 
claims, through the prevalence of the sovereign decision in liberal government31. 
According to Dean (2007, p.189) a sovereign decision is a decision on the exception, for 
example an exception may include when it is possible to take life without it being 
considered as homicide. The sovereign decision has become delegated in this instance 
as although it is the legal state that has ultimately made this possible, through abortion 
laws for example, it is passed to doctors to decide upon its legality in specific instances, 
and ultimately left to the mother to make the final decision. Another form of the 
sovereign decision may be the power to decide what counts. For example, the ability 
of individuals to govern themselves through their freedom is dependent upon the 
initial decision of what constitutes freedom and what types of freedom are to be 
                                                          
30
 P.46. 
31
Contrary to Foucault’s understanding of the sovereign decision being connected to a centralised 
power, Dean’s premise that sovereign power has become dispersed and delegated suggests a 
significantly different set of consequences for this claim.   
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encouraged – as will be discussed later certain types of freedom, such as the freedom 
to not participate, are often not legitimated32. 
Dean (2007) insists that certain situations need to be understood as sovereign 
decisions, as the problematic and at times flimsy language of choice is often 
inappropriate. He argues that understanding social governance through the 
government of freedom and choice alone lacks gravity in certain cases – those 
concerning life and death matters for example. Therefore, alongside the issue of 
whether and in what ways the sovereign decision exists within contemporary 
governance,  it must also be questioned whether the consumer related language of 
choice that has to some extent dominated the current analytics of government, is 
sufficient for analysing the multifarious situations, events and conduct that constitute 
the government of the population.   
As already mentioned, there are countless examples of explicit authoritarian 
forms of rule and sovereign decisions in contemporary liberal government. However, I 
am interested in discovering whether such instances exist in the day to day, non-
extraordinary examples of governance that focus not on exceptional events but rather 
the mundane forms of time-related life management. Dean (2007, p.189) argues that 
sovereign decisions on the exception are present in every normalising power through 
which governing carves out the individual, and therefore plays a functional role in the 
daily governance of life. One example given by Dean (2007) to demonstrate this is the 
decision on the exception as supported by expert knowledge of the human sciences, 
which aims to govern individual conduct by acting on particular aspects of the self: 
Such an order thus interweaves the governmental powers and practices 
that seek to shape the conduct of such autonomous or free individuals 
located within civil society with a mass of sovereign exceptions which 
define the space of various kinds of treatment, from training, therapy 
and discipline to punishment and imprisonment. In these cases, the 
exception is not a result of a generalised political crisis but something 
defined through the singular bodies of knowledge, observations and 
                                                          
32
 This point will be raised at multiple points in the analysis of the policy documents, for example in 
relation to risk taking behaviour in Chapter 6. 
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practices. These identify and act upon such things as problematic 
personal conduct from being workshy to bullying . . . from the deadbeat 
dad to the drug trafficker. 
(p. 190) 
Although Dean (2007, p.189) clarifies that we should not think of the sovereign 
decision as having a privileged loci, such as the state, this still begs the question of 
where this power comes from and how it moves, as even this dispersed conception of 
the sovereign decision suggests the existence of a primary source, whether that be an 
individual, group, or institution, and a unidirectional movement. If we are considering 
the day to day government of the population however, this understanding of power 
neglects the relational aspect implied within a governmental understanding, where an 
individual must decide, speak and exist within a set of discursive boundaries that may 
be governed and reinforced by others: peers, experts, and so on.  That is, this 
understanding of the sovereign decision perhaps suggests an independence or 
autonomy that is not there. 
Rose (2001, p.9; 2007, p.73), discussing the biomedical field, suggests an 
alternative understanding of decision making based around a pastoral set of power 
relations. He refers to this as ‘new’ pastoral power highlighting that it entails a 
relational aspect based upon the dynamics of the guided and guider (Rose, 2007, p.29, 
74). He claims that it is not state administered, but rather: 
takes place in a plural and contested field traversed by the codes 
pronounced by ethics committees and professional associations, by the 
empirical findings generated by researchers, the attitudes and criteria 
used by employers and insurers, the tests developed and promoted by 
psychologists and biotech companies, the advice offered by self-help 
organisations, and even one might add, the critical perspectives 
contributed by religious organisations and sociological critics. 
(Rose, 2001, p.9) 
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This presents the process of decision making as an intercourse, or process of exchange, 
which acts to highlight the complex nature of the movement and uniqueness of the 
outcome. There are certain hard and complex decisions that it would be unsuitable to 
understand in terms of the government through choice, due to the simplistic and 
superficial connotations the concept of choice often holds – often related to consumer 
market options. However, even difficult, emotional and life changing decisions are 
subject to governance understood as the relational and circular power that has the 
conduct of the population as both its target and telos. Individuals are not left alone to 
make difficult decisions – even though they may have the final say – but are instead 
advised, mentored, counselled, filled with information and facts, and taught new 
languages through which to understand their predicament and justify their decision 
(Rose, 2007, p.29). It is the development of new micro-technologies that manage 
communication and information, Rose (2007) claims, that causes this new pastoral 
power to blur the boundaries of coercion and consent, as: 
They transform the subjectivities of those who are to give consent or 
refuse it through discursive techniques that teach new ways of 
rendering aspects of oneself into thought and language, new ways of 
making oneself and one’s actions amenable to judgment. 
(p.74) 
Dean is right to highlight an over-reliance on the doctrine of the government of 
choice in the social governance literature, and to criticise that this may naively lead to 
the assumption that this is the only form of governance or even the best form of 
governance: as has been seen the most liberal values may themselves call for the use 
of authoritarian means to ensure their survival. This emphasises Dean’s (2010) concern 
that the government through choice should not be thought of as a safeguard against 
authoritarian rule, or a more enlightened form of government. Finally, although the 
use of the word ‘choice’ can help to highlight how life events and situations once 
thought natural and beyond our influence have moved into the realm of human 
manufacture and  control, it may also at times misrepresent the  gravity of the decision  
or situation. A governmental understanding of decision making on the other hand 
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portrays the interaction and subtle technologies of governance that come into play, 
therefore rather than assuming individual decisions appear ex nihilo individual decision 
makers can be recognised as specific subjectivities equipped with the techniques and 
languages to understand and act on their situation.         
Freedom and counter-conduct 
 Whilst governmentality for the first time conjoins the possibility of autonomous 
action within social governance without contradiction, it also suggests the possibility of 
refusal and resistance: the possibility of governance includes the threat of acting 
otherwise either through apathy or explicit refusal. The questions, how might 
resistance be possible within governmentality? and if so what could it possibly be? 
have been a source of concern and criticism however. McNay (2009) clearly sets out 
this dilemma: 
If individual autonomy is not the opposite of our limit to neoliberal 
governance, but rather lies at the heart of disciplinary control through 
responsible self-management, what are the possible grounds upon 
which political resistance can be based? 
(p.56) 
She continues that the experimental process of self-formation that Foucault sets out as 
a form of resistance is uncomfortably close in structure to governance through 
individualisation (and self as enterprise), and therefore questions its ability to pose a 
threat to normalised hierarchical power structures.  
 Contrasting governance and resistance has been deemed unhelpful within 
governmentality (Valverde, 2010), partly because autonomy and heteronomy should 
not be thought of as polar opposites: they instead make each other possible. For 
example the relational aspect of power as understood in governmentality 
demonstrates governance as potentially enabling as well as constraining (Thompson, 
2003) - governance can open up a field of possibilities, although will simultaneously 
close off others. Whilst demonstrating the complex relationship between governance 
and resistance, this clouds the issue of when and how someone can truly resist. 
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Cruickshank (1999), for example, demonstrates that participatory democratic 
discourse is preoccupied with subjects who do not rebel against their inequality, and 
consequently fail to act in their own interests, thus even those that may be considered 
normative discourses invoke resistance as a governmental technique.  Cruickshank 
(1999) explores how ‘empowerment’ has been used by both the political left and right 
as a governmental technique; she argues that it cannot be said that one use is clearly 
liberatory and the other repressive: they are both instances of governance, where 
similar practices are utilised for different (yet equally normative) rationalities. She 
describes what Foucault (1993, cited in Lemke, 2001) referred to as the ‘contact point’ 
that constitutes governance: 
The line between subjectivity and subjection is crossed when I subject 
my self, when I align my personal goals with those set out by reformers 
– both expert and activist – according to some notion of the social good. 
(Cruickshank, 1999, p.92) 
This suggests rationalities and goals hold more importance for identifying resistance 
than the means and practices employed. 
 For Foucault resistance, like power, is dispersed and circulates within the social 
nexus (Brenner, 1994). He clearly regarded power and resistance as sharing an 
intimate relationship, stating: 
Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather 
consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in 
relation to power. . . Their [power relations’] existence depends on a 
multiplicity of points of resistance: these play the role of adversary, 
target, support, or handle in power relations. 
(Foucault, 1990a, p.95) 
Just as power cannot within this context be conceived as possessive, hierarchical, or as 
a power ‘over’ others, resistance should not be reduced to revolt, mere sabotage 
(although may of course include this), or be emancipatory. Resistance is not the 
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reverse of power.  In Security, Territory, Population (2007a) Foucault began to speak of 
resistance in terms of counter-conduct to demonstrate the similar functions it shares 
with the governance of conduct, highlighting that the aim of counter-conduct is not to 
stop governance – Foucault believed such a notion to be merely an abstraction 
(Foucault, 2002b), but to change governance: both how ‘I’ am governed and how ‘I’ am 
to govern myself. Governance can have a creative capacity, and similarly the aim of 
counter-conduct is not to destroy, but to produce viable alternatives – to push at the 
boundaries set by normative discourses. Thus Foucault’s concern was to neither 
contrast nor reconcile autonomy with heteronomy but to imagine how current 
practices of governance can be utilised to create new modes of existence (Thompson, 
2003). 
 Foucault (2007a) detailed examples of counter-conduct to pastoral power in 
the early Christian Church to demonstrate that counter-conduct does not rely on 
foreign strategies, but can make use of marginalised ‘border-elements’ (Death, 2010). 
In this instance, strategies such as asceticism and mysticism, whilst familiar to 
Christianity, went against the rationality of pastoral power that required continual 
subordination to the pastor, and so constituted, according to Foucault (2007a) 
counter-pastoral power. Thus the techniques and practices currently used to make us 
governable subjects also have the capacity to forge new kinds of radical subjectivities. 
Thompson (2003) notes that The History of Sexuality: The use of pleasure, Volume 2 
(Foucault, 1990b) and The History of Sexuality: The care of the self, Volume 3 (Foucault, 
1988b) aimed to demonstrate the possibility of this by investigating the use of 
(sometimes familiar) disciplines and practices to fashion the self. What are rejected 
through counter-conduct are often not the practices themselves but the goals they 
work towards and rationalities they employ. The issue is not therefore whether to be 
governed or not, but concerns ‘the will not to be governed thusly, like that, by these 
people, at this price’ (Foucault 2007b, p.75). For Foucault (2002b) then, counter-
conduct must question established rationalities. 
 It is this that prompted Foucault (1982) to suggest: 
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Maybe the target nowadays is not to discover what we are, but to 
refuse what we are. We have to imagine and to build up what we could 
be . . . We have to promote new forms of subjectivity through the 
refusal of this kind of individuality which has been imposed on us for 
several centuries. 
(p.216) 
Thus for Foucault, counter-conduct demands the refusal of what is given, and the 
experimentation with what may be possible (Thompson, 2003). It is important 
therefore that counter-conduct does not become normalised (Davidson, 2011), it must 
remain dysfunctional or nomadic by pushing and attempting to transgress discursive 
boundaries. As Brenner (1994) notes, resistance is not a coordinated system, but a 
multiplicity of points or entanglements, and must therefore remain fragmented, 
disjointed, spontaneous33. Counter-conduct therefore needs to remain temporally 
limited and nomadic: an instance of resistance must necessarily pass, move on, or 
locate itself/become located elsewhere in order to remain resistance. Counter-conduct 
must occur, can only occur, where it can push, flex and carve normative discursive 
boundaries to enable new visibilities and enunciations to emerge.  Thus whilst McNay 
(2009) raises an important question regarding whether Foucault’s notion of self-
formation can be seen as an example of the discourse that forms subjects into 
autonomous individuals, rather than its challenge, the answer must lie in the intended 
goal of the similar practices of self that would be employed. Crucially, rather than 
fulfilling a subject position aimed at managing the self according to some normative 
notion of the ‘social good’, self-formation as counter-conduct would possess no 
intended goal other than to resist or open up new forms of life34. However, as has 
been demonstrated in this section technologies of self are not clearly demarcated from 
technologies of domination. From this point of view, self-formation as an instance of 
                                                          
33
 Brenner (1994) takes issue with this however, claiming that it demonstrates Foucault holds a totalistic 
view of power. 
34
 I recognise that there are many criticisms that have been levelled against Foucault’s aesthetics of self, 
including ethical relativism and anarchy. A full discussion of Foucault’s ethical phase of his work is 
beyond the scope of this thesis, however it is clear that Foucault did not consider self-formation to be an 
invitation to ‘do anything’, and that it is intended as a way to provide alternatives to fascistic forms of 
life (Thompson, 2003).  
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counter-conduct would be possible because it is an ‘available’ agonistic practice that 
can be mutated for use at, and on, the borders. Whilst differences in practices, 
stemming from alternative rationalities, may be subtle, their social and political impact 
has the potential nonetheless to be fundamental.  
Conclusion 
 This chapter has brought to the fore the centrality of aspects of 
governmentality crucial to the analysis of the formation and function of social policy as 
a space of governance. Specifically, detailing how power shifts and functions within 
governmental apparatuses, and the type of subjectivities both possible and necessary 
within its forms of rationality. Whilst I will not always explicitly re-state the relations of 
power, formation of subjectivities, or the specific understanding of individuals and 
society/individuals in society, throughout the following chapters, these notions are 
implicit and provide the basis through which policy will be understood and the specific 
policies analysed. The following chapter will extend this discussion of governmentality 
by looking specifically at the formation and function of social policy as a space of 
everyday governance, in effect, highlighting policy itself as an example of 
governmentality: governance of individual conduct through the management of 
everyday life. Beyond this, the chosen policies will be analysed through this lens of 
governmentality, providing examples of governmental society: its various techniques, 
rationalities, and subjectivities. It will also discuss how these have been and can be 
displaced through forms of counter-conduct35.  
 
  
                                                          
35
 Many examples of counter-conduct occur throughout the policy analysis chapters (Chapters 4-7), 
where certain lifestyles challenge, upset, or somehow disrupt those put forward as normative in the 
policies. 
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Chapter 3 
Social policy as the biopolitics of security: conducting the conduct of everyday life 
 
Introduction 
 Social policy, according to Lavalette and Pratt (2001), is concerned with the 
analysis of access to life enhancing and life sustaining resources. In Foucauldian terms 
we can see how policy reproduces the care of ‘all living’ as the very foundation of 
biopower. This preoccupation with forms of ‘life itself’ is central to Foucault's thesis 
about the exercise of modern power. Here power is not a deduction but production: ‘It 
exerts a positive influence on life, endeavours to administer, optimize, and multiply it’ 
(1990a, p.137). Biopower compliments the right to ‘take life and let live’ under 
sovereign power with a power to foster and multiply life. With this novel form of 
modern power, Foucault maintains ‘Now it is over life, throughout its unfolding, that 
power establishes its dominion’ (p.138).  Areas of thematic focus and justification for 
social policy are therefore varied and comprehensive since, as argued in Chapter 2, 
private and public spheres of life are no longer distinguishable, all areas become 
significant to the analysis of sustaining, fostering and enhancing life.  
As will be shown a main concern of social policy lies not in the exceptional 
circumstances of life, what Agamben (1998) calls ‘bare life’ but in the mundane 
everyday practices encountered by all: what we ought to do with our money; how to 
optimise our health; calculating how to spend our leisure time; relationships with 
family and neighbours; planning our working life; enhancing our expectations and 
aspirations. In short, policy entails a governance of everyday living: of how we ought to 
live based on a synthetic notion of life as plenitude. Policy is therefore inclusive, not 
only in its scope but also in its intended audience. As Agamben (1998) points out the 
modern biopolitical order does not exclude anything – not even in the form of 
‘inclusive exclusion’ (p.188). The specific policies analysed in the subsequent chapters 
are a prime example of this – whilst they have been chosen for analysis because they 
relate to the topic of ageing and later life, they reproduce the multiplicity of strategies 
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of biopower in that they are aimed at everyone36, treating the population as an 
interconnected network where the movement of all parts are integral to the security 
of the whole37. Thus, as will be demonstrated in the analysis that spans Chapters 4 to 
7, issues such as antenatal health and the saving habits of children become significant 
to policy relating to old age. Children and their parents are therefore decisively 
included within the reach of policies aimed at later life. 
 Whilst social policies are often analysed as a way of understanding government 
priorities and ideologies, or evaluating social conditions and how they should be 
altered, O’Malley and colleagues (1997) claim a strength of governmentality analysis 
lies in its provision of analytical instruments for a critical engagement between theory 
and political practice. This is an important reminder that thought experimentation is 
(discursive) practice, not something separated from it. O’Malley and colleagues (1997) 
elaborate: 
the approach [of governmentality] is concerned with how government 
is thought into being in programmatic form, how the practitioners of 
rule ask themselves the question of how best to govern, what concepts 
they invent or deploy to render their subjects governable in certain 
ways, and how government constantly reforms itself in light of failures 
and evaluations. This is sharply distinguished from the more familiar 
historical and sociological approach of examining rule through the 
observation and documentation of ‘what actually happened ’. . . or of 
‘what government is really about’ (the concealed interests or underlying 
mainsprings explaining governance). 
(p. 501-2) 
Policy can therefore be thought of as having a creative capacity: of inventing and 
creating spaces of discursive emergence. But it can also be limiting and constraining: 
fixing boundaries, regulating and closing off possibilities. Studying policy has the 
                                                          
36
 This will be more fully discussed in Chapter 4. 
37
 There exists an inherent tension here with the emphasis put on the individual in these governing 
discourses. However contradictory discourses seem to unproblematically exist within the same space 
when having different scopes (Valverde, 2010). 
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potential to locate where and what the boundaries are; where and under what 
circumstances new vectors occur and spaces may emerge. The focus of Chapter 4 
through to Chapter 7 is to pinpoint with some accuracy where these shifting 
boundaries are currently settled, how they have been fixed, and what function they 
continue to fulfil. 
Just to map out the main objective of this stage of the analysis, the focus of this 
chapter is to undertake an exploration of policy itself, within the methodological and 
conceptual context laid out in the previous two chapters. It begins by linking 
contemporary social policy-making to biopolitics, where biopolitics is understood as 
governance over living beings and, more specifically, their subjectivities. In marshalling 
the Foucauldian framework a case will be made for understanding the logic of security 
as a prime concern of contemporary biopolitics and a prominent feature of everyday 
life. The chapter will then turn to a more detailed exploration of policy as a space of 
(in)visibility, one that can be both creative and destructive, concealed and revealed. 
Lastly, the form and function of policy will be analysed through a discussion of the 
instruments and techniques used in policy-making. The Foucauldian analysis of policy 
tools is in no way meant to be exhaustive, instead it will focus on three devices and 
techniques, all concerned with measure and value, that were found to be prominent in 
the policies chosen to be analysed: (i) quantifying numerical data and statistics, (ii) 
devices and strategies of inclusion, and (iii) the reproduction of subjectivity as it is 
deployed as a tool in the policy process.    
Biopolitics: securing life  
 Biopolitics was described by Foucault (2004) as a non-disciplinary power 
applied to living beings. As ‘the set of mechanisms through which the basic biological 
features of the human species became the object of political strategy’ (Foucault, 
2007a, p.1). He clarifies that this technology of power does not individualise (like 
disciplinary power) but is instead addressed to a multiplicity. It deals with: 
a new body, a multiple body, a body with so many heads that, while 
they might not be infinite in number, cannot necessarily be counted. 
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(Foucault, 2004, p. 245) 
Biopolitical apparatuses may still speak of and to the individual, and act on individual 
bodies, but the individual is primarily of interest only as an element of the multiplicity. 
To convey this preoccupation with the ceaseless dispersion of multiplicity as the 
multiplicity of forms of life, Foucault (2004) continues: 
The mechanisms introduced by biopolitics include forecasts, statistical 
estimates, and overall measures. And their purpose is not to modify any 
given phenomenon as such, or to modify a given individual insofar as he 
is an individual, but, essentially, to intervene at the level of their 
generality. 
(p. 246) 
Measure is a performativity of value and through this the population becomes a living 
and so governable entity, with intervention becoming a necessity through generalising 
strategies and the creation of normalities. The population is treated by biopolitics as a 
specific political, economic and scientific problem, one that can be summed up as 
concerning the optimisation of life (Rose, 2007), where ‘life’ has come to mean the life 
of a species: people connected not through laws and cultures, but primarily as sharing 
a biological connectedness – which, as will be demonstrated in subsequent chapters, is 
a notion strongly reflected in contemporary social policy. 
 The biopolitical apparatus of modern societies is therefore aimed at securing 
life. The logic or rationality of security has become pervasive in everyday life and 
language, as security awareness becomes an inevitable consequence of a risk averse 
society (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2008; Valverde, 2010). However in contrast to an 
understanding of security as protection, Dillon and Lobo- Guerrero (2008) suggest that 
biopolitical techniques can be most clearly understood as various ways of securing life 
and of being secured. These authors (2008) claim that for Foucault biopolitics is an 
apparatus of security, confirming: ‘when one says biopolitics one says security, albeit 
in a certain way’ (p. 266). This ‘certain way’ relates to governmentality in that the aim 
of security is to promote, optimise and regulate life – to secure life rather than to 
89 
 
protect it (Foucault, 2007a). In some ways this resembles a sort of ‘holding in place’ or 
anchoring. Thus as Valverde (2010) points out, much of what happens today in the 
name of security is not concerned with the problematic of sovereign control over 
subjects, but instead consists of rearranging objects and reshaping spaces.  An example 
of this, given by Dillon and Lobo- Guerrero (2008), is the collection and use of various 
types of information via shop loyalty cards (personal data, transactional information 
and preferences et cetera) as a biopolitical technique to secure individuals as on-going 
customers38. They continue that most people readily subject themselves to many 
everyday security practices: for example insurance, pensions, investments. 
 Foucault (2007a) discussed the strategic use of space as an issue for 
apparatuses of security in relation to the government of the movement of grain within 
the market town. Whilst this historical example is not overly applicable to 
contemporary society, it aimed to highlight firstly how security is exercised over a 
whole population: movement was enabled, influenced or restricted in terms of the 
general well-being of the town; and secondly security as a matter of circulation: it was 
the actual movement of grain alongside other products that became the focus of 
government. Current examples may include the collection and use of various forms of 
knowledge – including the example of the loyalty card as discussed above, and more 
generally the increase in the use and analysis of transactional data as a means of 
identifying and understanding individuals and populations (Ruppert and Savage, 2011)  
- and circulation through the movement of people and communications. Thus 
contemporary biopolitical mechanisms of security no longer operate in closed spaces, 
but across ‘planes of movement’ (Lentos and Rose, 2009, p.233). The issue of 
movement here is key: Foucault (2007a) is clear that security is not the exhaustive 
surveillance epitomised by the panopticon. Rather it requires movement based on 
relations between subjects – what Foucault (2007a) refers to as freedom: 
An apparatus of security . . . cannot operate well except on condition 
that it is given freedom, in the modern sense the word acquires in the 
                                                          
38
 The Active at 60 policy strategy also piloted a smart card that awarded loyalty points for using local 
transport, redeemable at local retailers, with the aim of increasing activity and securing community 
involvement (Mowlan et al., 2012, OA). 
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eighteenth century: no longer the exemptions and privileges attached 
to a person, but the possibility of movement, change of place, and 
processes of circulation of both people and things. 
(p. 48-9) 
Thus biopolitical strategies that are exercised in the regulation of space and time can 
be understood as dynamic practices of governmentality. 
Biopolitics, with its concern for the sustenance and optimisations of life, 
renders life governable. This means, as Cruickshank (1999) demonstrates, that it is 
‘possible to act not only upon the body, by force, but also upon the subjectivity (soul) 
of human beings’ (p. 39). Subjectivity, as well as the target of government, also then 
becomes a strategy of biopolitical forms of modern power. Lentos and Rose (2009) 
claim that social government is the government of a certain type of insecurity felt by 
people living in contemporary societies: for example illness, old age, divorce or 
unemployment, suggesting there is a need to govern security through inducing states 
of insecurity with the aim of responsibilizing individuals into action: ‘that is to say, by 
ensuring the vigilance, preparedness and pre-emption required to secure security’ 
(Lentos and Rose, 2009, p.235)39.  Governance therefore materialises in the spaces 
where personal interests become aligned with collective interests: 
biopower, through the administration and regulation of life and its 
needs, enacts the good of all society upon the antisocial bodies of the 
poor, deviant, and unhealthy. It seeks to unite the interests of the 
individual with the interests of society as a whole. 
(Cruickshank, 1999, p.39-40) 
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 Ferguson (2008) argues that responsible citizenship has become a central and defining concept for 
both New Labour and Conservative policy agendas. This political focus on responsibilization spans across 
and draws together policy initiatives in social welfare, civic engagement and community cohesion 
(Whiteford, 2010).  The reach of responsibilization is not confined to individual citizens however, rather 
the concept appears to hold a more encompassing social and moral significance. Barnett (2003) for 
example, hints towards the ubiquity of this concept by demonstrating how the principles of 
responsibilization are being applied to public agencies as much as to individual citizens. The issue of 
responsibilization will be revisited throughout the following chapters.   
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    In order for subjectivity to become governable, and for life to secured and 
optimised, there is a need for certain types of expert knowledge - for subjectivity to 
become knowable. For government to solve ‘social problems’ – events or situations 
that are rationalised as hindering rather than maximising life – it must first have a 
certain kind of specialised knowledge that is ‘measurable, specific, and calculable, 
knowledge that can be organised into governmental solutions’ (Cruickshank, 1999, p. 
40).  Hacking (1990) demonstrates how this type of knowledge became both possible 
and desirable through, what he refers to as, the ‘enumeration of people’, which can be 
traced back to the nineteenth century where the idea of human nature gave way to 
that of ‘normal people’ commonly expressed in terms of probability. These normalising 
‘laws’ of probability, he claims, become self-regulating as most people would actively 
avoid being deemed pathological. Thus, as shall be demonstrated later, the expert and 
professional knowledge used to govern constitutes the subjectivity that is to be acted 
upon. Hence: 
The systematic collection of data about people has affected not only the 
ways in which we conceive of a society, but also the ways in which we 
describe our neighbour. It has profoundly transformed what we choose 
to do, who we try to be, and what we think of ourselves. 
(Hacking, 1990, p. 3) 
Following this example given by Hacking it becomes conceivable that our neighbour is 
recognized primarily as a category, a ‘single parent’, an ‘ethnic minority’, or a 
‘Manchester United fan’ with the same level of equivalence as we see them as John or 
Jane from next door. Whilst the expert knowledge to be collected and mobilised may 
be presented as merely descriptive, this belies the dynamic relationship it holds with 
the formation of subjectivity. Description can suggest something static and finished, 
yet knowledge must be recognised as movement, and as such both constitutive and 
affective40. Hacking (1990) demonstrates this by indicating the need for someone to be 
ready and willing to read laws into numbers, noting the differences in East and West 
Europe during this time of how these emerging numbers were understood. In parallel 
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 Chapter 1 discussed how description of discourses does not lead to objectivity, or refer to something 
static. To describe something that is moving means that the description can never be finished. 
92 
 
to ‘the taming of chance’, a conception of pure irregularity also arose indicating that in 
spite of the natural or normal status attributed to numerical laws, contradictory 
discourses emerged within the same space creating various ways of understanding life.   
 
Policy as a space of (in)visibility 
 Petersen (1999) claims that policy is often viewed as a reaction to real and 
objective conditions. Volume 2 of OA, which consists of ‘evidence’ (mostly statistical 
and demographic information) detailing who old people are and what they do, is itself 
an example of this viewpoint, as quantitative information is used to point to the 
necessity for the overarching rationalities set out within OA (rationalities that are 
equally present throughout all the policies analysed) as well as its specific strategies. 
However, as Petersen (1999) points out, from a governmentality point of view policy is 
not reactive but productive. That is, policy is not responding to social problems but 
constituting them by framing and defining the boundaries of citizenship. 
 A need for quantifiable ‘evidence’ on which to base policy making has become 
prominent in recent years (Richards and Smith, 2004). Pawson (2002) notes that the 
policy cycle revolves more quickly than the research cycle, however, meaning that ‘real 
time’ evaluations often have little impact on policy making. Instead policy-makers have 
turned increasing to systematic reviews, studies that draw together the conclusions of 
already existing research, to provide relevant evidence. Whilst Boaz and Pawson 
(2005) demonstrate that using systematic reviews to provide a certainty regarding 
‘what works’ is a false expectation41, Young and colleagues (2002) question the extent 
to which policy informs research rather than research informing policy. To this end 
they suggest that the core beliefs of policy-makers are unaffected by information, 
rather: ‘policy change is driven by external factors, not by ideas and analysis’ (p.218).  
Despite the problems and complexities involved with quantifying human behaviours 
evidence-based policy has been presented as producing the best form of inclusive, 
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 Boaz and Pawson (2005) compare five systematic reviews regarding youth mentoring, noting the 
differing viewpoints, incompatibilities and contradictory advice they espouse. They claim these mixed 
messages are due to the immense complexity of evaluative questions that need to be, but are often not, 
addressed in reviews. 
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balanced and informed policy making, as, ‘All relevant evidence, including that from 
specialists, is available in an accessible and meaningful form to policy makers’ (CMPS, 
quoted in Richards and Smith, 2004, p.115)42. Whilst everyday constraints such as time 
limits question the reality of achieving what this implies (Minouge, 1997), more 
fundamental issues also need to be addressed. Murray and colleagues (2008) point to 
the vast influence ‘evidence-based’ information has on everything from academic 
institutions to policy and practice. However, rather than viewing this information as 
inclusive they claim on the contrary it excludes and so limits what is visible in the first 
place: 
EBHS [evidence based health services] limits not only what can appear 
within our visual field but also how it will appear and how that evidence 
will be framed. 
(Murray et al, 2008, p.273) 
Whilst evidence-based research is only one tool used in policy-making, the function its 
use has is to verify the ideals and strategies within the policy, to suggest a certain truth 
regarding its subject matter (who old people are in the case of OA for example) with 
the intention to exclude or render other versions invisible43. The danger here is that 
what has not been included or considered is assumed to be irrelevant or non-existent 
rather than the more likely case that it lies outside the interests of the research, that it 
is a form of knowledge not easily collected or presented in such forms (mainly, but not 
exclusively, numerically based), or (or maybe therefore) it lies outside what is visible to 
the researchers and policymakers. Thus whilst the information and evidence presented 
in quantifiable form in policies may appear comprehensive it instead structures a field 
of visibility, and ignores what might lie beyond this44. 
 Bowker and Star (2000) discuss the role invisibility of classifications and 
standards play in the ordering of human interaction, and demonstrate that standards 
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 See also Gray et al (2009) who detail the hierarchy of evidence in health and social science based upon 
the level of objectivity the evidence is perceived to maintain. 
43
 Boaz and Pawson (2005) argue, for example, that the problem with systematic reviews is the tendency 
to view them as definitive. 
44
 I am not interested here to start a debate regarding Evidence-based Policy/Practice, but to highlight 
the function this form of information has regarding the authority of policy to claim to know.  
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and classifications are often difficult to see – people are often very good at ignoring 
both. They highlight the political processes involved in constituting the dialectic of the 
visible/invisible within a system, claiming that: 
the spread or enforcement of categories and standards involves 
negotiation or force. Whatever appears as universal or indeed standard, 
is the result of negotiations, organisational processes, and conflict . . . 
someone, somewhere, must decide and argue over the minutiae of 
classifying and standardizing. 
(Bowker and Star, 2000, p.44)     
Invisibility as well as visibility is often fought for and highly contested. As boundaries 
become fixed subjects often strive to remain within them, whether to avoid the 
classification of being pathological as suggested by Hacking (1990), or perhaps to 
adhere to the rationality of responsible citizenship.  
 This reveals a vital function of policy as the need to motivate: to invoke action. 
It has been suggested that the aim of policy is precisely to enable people to do what 
they otherwise would or could not (Schneider and Ingram, 1990). This is reflected 
through the significant shift in social security being linked to independence rather than 
protection (Culpitt, 1999; Foucault, 1988a): policy-driven assistance must come in the 
form of enabling and aspiring change from within subjects and hence, at least 
primarily, focuses on rational self-government as the optimal form of social 
governance. Thus active citizenship and self-government are prominent policy 
solutions to various social problems such as poverty, crime (Cruickshank, 1999), and as 
will be demonstrated in later chapters, the social problem of ageing. 
Unproblematically setting participative citizenship up as a form of self-government and 
the solution to social problems, however, obscures how citizens and social subjects are 
brought into being to begin with (Cruickshank, 1999). In accordance with this, 
Cruickshank (1999) argues that democratic citizenship should not be viewed as a 
solution to political problems but instead as a strategy of government.  
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 Policy therefore should not be thought of as only restricting and constraining, it 
can also have a constructive and creative capacity - creating a space for certain 
subjectivities to emerge and be accepted (i.e. rational, responsible and independent 
citizens) (Biggs, 2001), and relies on subjects being willing to engage with this freedom 
up to a limit. The issue is that whilst strategies of government deployed encourage and 
depend upon subjects taking up this creative capacity, it provides room only to be a 
specific something other to what you are, but denies the justification to be anything 
other. Thus as far as policy provides the space for certain ways of life to be visible and 
therefore possible, it simultaneously obscures that which lies beyond them. 
 
Policy tools and techniques of governance  
 Analysing policy documents should not stop at a concern with their aims and 
strategies. As Lascoumes and Le Gales (2007) claim, policy is a socio-political space 
engineered through the tools and techniques used as much as through its aims and 
context. They argue, ‘every instrument constitutes a condensed form of knowledge 
about social control and ways of exercising it’, continuing, ‘instruments at work are not 
neutral devices: they produce specific effects, independently of the objective pursued’ 
(p.3). It is the tools, techniques and strategies used in policies, rather than their 
content and arguments, that constitute the political function of policy. Whilst there are 
many different tools and techniques employed within various social policies, this 
section will discuss three devices and techniques particularly prominent in the policies 
analysed in this thesis. They are: firstly, forms of quantification, secondly, tools relating 
to the inclusion of everyone in the policy process, and finally forms of subjectivity as it 
is used as a resource within policy. 
Quantification 
 The vast majority of ‘evidence’ and information presented in the policies 
studied takes a numerical form with the function of quantifying people and their 
circumstances, aiming to make life manageable and knowable. These are often 
depicted as quantifiable data through a variety of graphs and charts as well as 
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statistical information being incorporated into the written text, highlighting differences 
between age categories, establishing normalities, or to indicate future predictions. The 
aim of such probabilistic statistics is to reduce the ‘abundance of situations’ so that 
complex life events and situations can be summarised and suggested action 
rationalised (Desrosieres, 1998, p.13). One effect of trying to understand life through 
the calculating performativity of statistical data is, therefore, the limitation of 
possibilities: all life must be knowable, and so capable of being optimised; thus forms 
of life that cannot be grasped via this type of knowledge are treated as non-existent 
and rendered invisible. 
 In these policies, quantifying people according to certain characteristics and 
trends tends to lead to their classification according to other categories. For example, 
various attributes such as age, employment, and marital status, become indicators of 
levels of dependency, risk of reduced physical or mental health, or financial 
insecurity45. These classifications provide a spatial-temporal segmentation of the world 
(Bowker and Star, 2000), and as such produce the space through which subjectivity can 
become visible, representable and come to know itself. Paradoxically this process 
often remains invisible to the extent that many classifications are too ordinary and 
ubiquitous to notice (Bowker and Star, 2000).  In places where traditional 
classifications are queried in the policies – for example when the question ‘what is 
meant by old?’ is asked in OA vol.2 (p. 3), the actual classification of ‘old’, as 
distinguished from ‘children’ and ‘adults’, or ‘young’, is never challenged. The question 
has the function of opening a discussion about who old people ought to be today, it is 
never suggested that such a classification is untenable or defunct46. The category of 
‘old age’, even in this case, is treated as natural and therefore remains ignored: it is 
effectively a non-question. On the contrary, the use of numerical data throughout the 
policies, for example to express the probability or the proportion of older people 
experiencing isolation, or needing health and social care and living in poverty, is done 
to provide contrast with the rest of the population. It is done to indicate their 
                                                          
45
Annex D of SS for example provides a chart with the aim of guiding policy readers in identifying where 
excluded older people live based on age, ethnicity, deprivation of area, income and house tenure 
(p.115-6). Further examples from the policies will be explored throughout Chapters 4-7. 
46
 This will be explored in more detail in Chapter 4. 
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difference, and therefore verify the existence of old age, confirming the truth of such 
classifications. The insertion within the main policy text of text boxes presenting 
statistical information as ‘Key Facts’ (see for example SS, p. 38, 40), is an example of 
how these data are used to claim some form of knowledge over subjects – to 
subjectify, even though the subject categorisation is recognised as changeable and 
therefore at least partly constructed (OA vol.2, p.3 – see example above and further 
discussion in Chapter 4). Data are therefore assembled within the policies in ways that 
inscribe subjectivity (Rose, 1999b), setting expectations and standards of who to be 
and how to live based on life stage and age. 
 The use and function of numerical data in the policies exposes a normative 
assumption that numbers are somehow neutral. Instead, as has already been argued, 
they are inherently political47. The presentation of numerical data rarely exposes the 
discursive rationalities from which they emerge, yet these formalised rationalities are a 
vital part of the function these data serve. For example, as Rose (1999b) argues, ‘the 
relation between numbers and politics is reciprocal and mutually constitutive’ (p.198), 
highlighting that numbers are not just ‘used’ for political effect, but have the capacity 
to constitute the domains of which they are part – numbers ‘act on’ politics. This is 
exemplified through classifications leading to ‘standard setting’: once the category of 
old age is embedded in the social order, who and what old people are and old age is, 
become inevitable points of focus for government. Various devices are used in the 
policies to justify the move from presenting data on what can be known about old age, 
to claims regarding what subjects (of all ages) ought to do. Firstly quantification, 
presented as factual - which within a discursive formation that values numerical data 
above all else becomes synonymous with being truthful (Porter, 1995) – can be used as 
a way to make decisions without any decision making process being apparent: 
A decision made by numbers (or by explicit rules of some other sort) has 
at least the appearance of being fair and impersonal. Scientific 
objectivity thus provides an answer to a moral demand for impartiality 
and fairness. 
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 See Chapter 2, p.63. 
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(Porter, 1995, p.8) 
 The success of numbers to be used to import authority – or perhaps the expectation 
for standards to be rationalised through numerical data - explains the immense and 
constant use of statistical information in the policy documents48. Hacking (1990) has 
written extensively on the history of the ‘avalanche’ of printed numbers, and notes 
that the success of probability can be seen through it now being considered an 
essential component to ethical decision making, primarily due to the expectation for 
decision making to be considered impartial.  
 For the information presented within the policies, whether numerical or 
otherwise, to fulfil this function it must be believable - have authority. The appeal to 
expertise is one device used to create this, through the commissioning and use of 
research for example49, but also by being seen to seek opinion, both expert and that of 
the ‘citizen public’. In line with New Labour’s aim of inclusion (Larsen et al, 2006; 
Levinas, 1998), the policies studied here make a point to identify the variety of 
external stakeholder bodies included in the policy process (for example SS, p.113; OA 
p.x-xi). Alongside the authority bestowed by the scientific and technical rationality of 
quantitative data, the inclusion of a variety of expert sources creates authority through 
a form of democratic consensus (Borraz, 2007), which in essence aims to depoliticise 
the process by claiming impartiality through agreement50. Whilst consensus 
strengthens the dominant technical rationalities, it simultaneously blocks the 
emergence of alternative discourses.   
Tools of inclusion  
 Authority is also developed in the policies through inclusive devices that 
suggest a consensus amongst the population or ‘the public’, for example through the 
constant use of ‘us’ and ‘we’ in the policies to refer not to the government or New 
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 This is particularly evident in SS and OA.  
49
 For example ELSA – The English Longitudinal Study of Ageing, an on-going research into old age 
(defined as 50+). This research programme is funded primarily by various government departments and 
provides the majority of the (quantitative) information used in SS defining who old people are and what 
they do.   
50
 Porter (1995) notes that the ability to reach consensus has often been construed as objectivity in 
science. 
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Labour, but to everyone (for example OA, p.3). Particularly powerful illustrations of 
this are the allusion to a consensus of values and aspirations suggested by a box filled 
with bullet points entitled ‘the public’s priorities’ (OHOCOS, p.15), or references to the 
public’s point of view (OHOCOS, p.79).  Flint (2003), discussing housing policy, claims 
the reference to ‘people’s attitudes’ is an example of how ‘ethopower’ is worked into 
governing discourse, through which policy is presented as a recasting of the ‘natural’ 
beliefs of the majority of the people. The utilitarian principle of rule by a majority 
consensus might seem reasonable when the main sources of knowledge act to 
generalise and normalise. Ethopolitics, according to Rose (2007), attempts to shape 
the conduct of people by acting upon their beliefs and values. It requires individuals to 
first of all judge and consequently act upon themselves in order to improve 
themselves. There is a clear example of this inclusive discourse coupled with 
references to shared values in OA: 
  In the years after 50 we all want three main things: 
 the opportunity to continue in our career . . . 
 to play a full and active role in society . . . 
 to keep independence and control over our lives . . . 
(p.3) 
The automatic inclusion of everyone in this quote clearly identifies what it is that 
individuals are expected to judge themselves against if they wish to remain part of the 
‘we’. 
 Participatory policy tools, such as focus groups, surveys, deliberative 
democracy forums, stakeholder engagement consultations and self reporting 
questionnaires, are a dominant feature in the policy process.  As mechanisms of social 
engineering they work to justify the reference to some kind of consensus, which is 
graphically visualised in the policies by a multitude of quotes from various 
consultations and participatory groups. These mostly do not form part of the main text 
but surround it and interrupt it, in the margins, at the head of the page, or breaking up 
the main text within coloured boxes. Whilst each quote is attributed to an individual, 
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often just referred to as ‘focus group participant’, ‘consultation response’, ‘service user 
response’ or ‘individual respondent’ (SS; BNCS; BSFA), it is clear that they are intended 
to be representative - to be exemplars of commonly held beliefs and values, and thus 
to create generalisations and normative agreements. Any quotes that question or 
challenge established order serve a purpose of highlighting a need for a change in 
policy direction (for example the proposal of the National Care Service) or to indicate 
an unavoidable tension (how limited resources ought to be prioritised). 
 The policy tools discussed so far all aim to work not on structures but rather on 
forms of subjectivity. Thus the tools function not to create social inclusion, but to 
discursively form citizens who will create the conditions for their own inclusion 
(Finlayson, 2003). As well as through analysing the tools and techniques that are 
present in the policies, this becomes equally apparent when considering what is 
absent. There is little focus upon legislative change for example (the abolition of a 
compulsory retirement age perhaps the exception here), and no mention of strategies 
that might significantly alter social or economic structures. Instead the focus tends to 
be on making minor adjustments to service delivery or service structure – for example 
an emphasis on joined-up working in the Link-Age Plus project (SS), or on altering how 
services are delivered through the promotion of Individual Budgets (see for example 
Ferguson, 2012, on the personalisation agenda in social work). These do not aim to 
affect social structures but instead the behaviours of individuals, specifically to 
encourage participation and self-management. Such devices therefore instil ‘the 
capacity to act as a certain kind of citizen with certain aims’ (Cruickshank, 1999, p.4).  
This inclusive approach became characteristic of New Labour’s (and more widely social 
democracy’s) solution to the perceived problem of social exclusion, with the aim of 
bringing as many groups as possible to identify with the state (Biggs, 2001). Thus as 
Cruickshank (1999) explains, to govern first requires citizens to have the desire, the 
interest, and the will to participate and act politically. 
Subjectivity as a policy tool 
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 This desire is promoted and developed in the policies partly through an appeal 
to responsible citizenship as has been already noted51, but also by attempting to tap 
into subjectivity. In contrast to quantitative knowledge of generalities and 
comparisons, this knowledge aims to identify the individual, to govern precisely via 
particularity of the self52. This is done through the use of narrative within the policies: 
of narrativity – the use of a story (Biggs, 2001). SS explicitly uses this technique as each 
chapter starts with a short narrative outlining an individual’s life in keeping with the 
theme of the relevant chapter. Using life stories to introduce the policy aids each 
individual’s identification with the policy strategies, personalising strategies that to 
many may seem otherwise distant and beyond their influence and control. Quoted 
responses, as discussed above, have a similar function of bringing an inclusive and 
personal element to policy construction. But beyond these, narratives are also used to 
demonstrate individual lives as simultaneously the reason for specific policies, and its 
solution. Examples of this include quotes from service users or their families and carers 
detailing how certain policy strategies have improved their lives (for example BNCS, 
p.6, 42, 76), and the many case studies featured in the policies demonstrating 
successful solutions (for example OHOCOS, p.101, 131). Whether these case studies 
are written as a narrative by a service user, or a description of a service, they function 
to demonstrate the possibility of success: to highlight how any life, notwithstanding 
any problem has potential. Personal life stories are therefore used to develop a 
connection between individual and collective success: 
Narratives bring people to see that the details of their private lives   and 
their chances of improving their lives are inextricably linked to what is 
good for all of society. 
(Cruickshank, 1999, p.90)    
 These policies therefore strategically deploy subjectivity as a policy tool, as well 
as focusing on it as a target. Their narrative devices aim to create an enabling 
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 And will be further explored in the following chapters, particularly Chapter 7. 
52
 Boltanski and Chipello (2005) demonstrate this through their investigation into the continuing 
strength of the ‘spirit’ of capitalism as the belief that the pursuit of individual interest serves the general 
interest. They argue that the ‘spirit’ of capitalism must coincide with people’s moral experiences and 
suggest models of action they can grasp. As such it must speak to the individual. 
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atmosphere, providing the incentive and will to act. The call within ‘Third Way politics’ 
then was to invest in human capital in order to promote autonomy and the 
development of self, which is understood to be ‘the medium of expanding individual 
responsibility’ (Giddens, 1998, p.128).  The subject, individualised and known through 
its narrativity, must then, be responsible and accountable. In a similar way Shore and 
Wright (2000) claim audit technologies are agents for new kinds of subjectivity- 
specifically the self-managing individual who must render him or herself auditable. 
They discuss ‘audit’ as a technology that aims to measure performance, and to render 
visible. Auditing technologies, as technologies that monitor and evaluate the progress 
of individuals relating to the success they are making of their own life course 
(measured of course against how it contributes to social order or the collective 
success), can be found throughout the policies analysed here in the form of various self 
assessments and retirement planning tools for example53. Shore and Wright (2000) 
highlight the importance of the inclusion of these tools in the formation of the policies 
by indicating that audit technologies refashion the way people perceive themselves 
and their relations, resulting in the transformation of identities. Thus it is not merely 
that lives have become open to audit, but that people become identified, and identify 
themselves, as comprised of a subjectivity that can be known and understood through 
evaluating its present by assessing its past, measured against an already known 
(desired) future outcome. Shore and Wright (2000) note that this process is often 
presented as empowering by enabling self-management, but that this conceals the 
hierarchical relationships and coercive practices that audit cultures rely upon. By 
rendering an individual’s life visible, and furthermore measureable (and so 
accountable), audit technologies enable subjectivity to be utilised as a resource – life 
understood in terms of its narrativity cause it to become a utility. 
This focus on enabling and self-development appeals to the personal, 
connecting an individual identity with a collective responsibility through the very act of 
its individuation54. However, it simultaneously makes the assumption that subjectivity 
contains some kind of latent potential. Subjectivity is not only useful by managing and 
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 These tools of self-management will be discussed in Chapters 4-7. 
54
 This will be discussed at multiple points in the policy analysis, primarily in Chapter 5. 
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monitoring itself, there is also the assumption that each person has something innate 
to offer if only it can be realised:  
People are born with talent and everywhere it is in chains . . . Every 
person liberated to fulfil their potential adds to our wealth. Every 
person denied opportunity takes our wealth away. People are the 
contemporary resource that matters 
(Blair, 1999, quoted in Finlayson, 2003, p.83) 
Life, the formation of the self, is understood here as following a single linear and 
striated trajectory that needs to be known in order to be realised, which is reflected in 
the many policy tools found within the documents analysed that aim to know, assess, 
and from this develop the individual. What is called for is some kind of personal 
liberation, for us to follow our individual path to self-fulfilment and personal 
flourishing. Here we can make the link with the previous discussion of discursive 
practice dealt with in Chapter 1. Strawson (2004) argues that there is widespread 
agreement that people see, live, and experience their lives as a discursive narrative, 
and moreover that this is mostly seen as a good thing: necessary for a good ethical life, 
as it brings with it a presupposition, he argues, that it is necessary for life to be 
purposeful, or fully developed. He defines a narrative as a conventional story 
containing a developmental and temporal coherence and unity. From this point of 
view narrativity is looking for, or trying to create, some kind of order and unity, not 
merely as a chronology but as a way of finding coherent iterative patterns throughout 
the life-course. Whilst many people may experience their lives in this way, Strawson 
(2004) points out that for others ‘living well’ does not involve this reflective narrative 
project: self-understanding may be experienced as osmotic or systemic rather than as 
a narrative (p.448). The problem with believing in, or presenting the self as, a 
narrativity as how we ought to be, or simply as how we (all) are is that it may: 
hinder human self-understanding, close down important avenues of 
thought, impoverish our grasp of ethical possibilities, needlessly and 
wrongly distress those who do not fit their model 
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(Strawson, 2004, p.429) 
Whilst closing down possibilities, closing off ways of life, the implementation of 
subjectivity as a narrativity in the policy documents has several different 
governmentality functions. Firstly the appeal to the individual to assess, evaluate and 
plan their life-course with the suggestion that they each have a potential they must 
aim to fulfil, responsibilizes each person, tying their personal life (and their successful 
management of it) to the social order. Secondly, and connected to this, is a focus on 
future orientated behaviour as necessary for governance: being able to see where you 
want to go (or at least should be going), and knowing how you will be getting there, as 
opposed for example, from understanding life as an unknown adventure, or full of 
radically unconnected events. Lastly, the idea of a self as a linear, rational and 
coherent unit is utilised when redefining who old people are: urging individuals to see 
old age as a continuation of active citizenship is a crucial governmental tool in these 
policy documents55.      
Conclusion 
 Whilst touching on some areas that will be further explored and developed in 
the analysis of the chosen policies in the chapters to come, this chapter has taken the 
construction of policy itself as a subject matter that needs to be explored within a 
governmentality perspective that draws on the archaeological method of discourse 
analysis. The aim of the chapter has been to demonstrate how policy documents are 
an importance surface upon which discursive rationalities of government not only 
emerge, but are shaped, framed and brought into being. The authority of policy 
documents to make claims to knowledge indicate that this is not an area abstracted 
from practice: policy documents are a means through which the visible is structured, 
how its light becomes refracted. Not only are policies implemented, they are also only 
possible because of the already existing discourses of which they are a part, of which 
they demonstrate: they are not non-sense – they make sense – and as such contain 
the rationalities within which it is possible to act and to be. 
                                                          
55
 This is discussed in Chapter 4. 
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 At this point it is worth mapping out the direction of the argument taken in the 
forthcoming chapter. The aim of the following four chapters is to hone in on some 
detailed analysis of the chosen policy documents as set out in the Introduction56. Using 
the strategy set out in Chapters 1 and 2 the material will explore aspects of these 
governmental rationalities, to find the discursive boundaries, framing devices and to 
determine what their function is: what do they allow, what do they hinder, what do 
they do? In brief, Chapter 4 introduces the problem of old age and ageing as a 
discursive object and instrument for the government of the population by identifying 
how the category of old age has changed in recent years, and focuses on how old age 
is discursively reproduced in the policy documents. Chapter 5 explores the focus given 
in the policy documents to the individual person, extending the debate started in this 
chapter regarding the use of subjectivity as a resource used by policy. Chapter 6 draws 
upon the extended reference to risk in the policies to analyse how people ought to be 
governed, looking specifically at the relationship between the service user and the 
expert, and how the individual is called to simultaneously take up the expert role by 
managing uncertainty in order to maximise their selves. Finally Chapter 7 discusses the 
use of discourses of community as governmental spaces used in the policy documents 
that require participative citizens. The self as a resource is once again highlighted here 
as not only are individuals expected to be self-reliant, this is presented as a solution to 
social disorder.         
 
  
                                                          
56
 And expanded upon in Appendix 1.  
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Chapter 4 
Old Age, Ageing Populations and Policy 
 
Introduction 
The issue of ageing has become increasingly prominent in social policy in two 
distinct but interrelated areas. Firstly, policy strategies have focused on how the 
individual ages – what it is that they do, and how old people are or ought to be treated 
and located in contemporary society. Secondly the problematic of an ageing 
population has been developed within policies that frame it as both a potential threat 
and a potential opportunity, but either way as an inevitable phenomenon that needs 
to be actively managed and prepared for. The category of old age, traditionally taken 
as having an obvious and natural reality, can therefore be understood as a novel space 
through which the governance of individuals throughout the life-course becomes 
rationalised and necessary. What old age is thought to be makes certain forms of 
behaviour and consequently certain strategies of governance both possible and 
desirable; at the same time governmental practices focused on old age influence the 
possibilities of what old age can be, both as object and as a form of subjectivity. Thus 
policy initiatives strive to define and redefine old age in an attempt to regulate 
behaviour and set ethical standards pertaining to a fulfilling life; simultaneously, these 
governmental practices are used to demonstrate the nature of old age or prescribe 
that old age encompass a particular set of lifestyles.  The category of old age has 
therefore been made relevant to all both as individuals required to prepare for ageing 
at the earliest opportunity, and as situated members of an ‘ageing population’. Hence, 
as we shall see, old age becomes a prominent and important concept to ensure the 
security of society and the well-being of the population at large. 
The following four chapters will use the governmentality perspective to 
conduct a discourse analysis of eight UK health and social care policies produced by 
the New Labour government between 2001 and 2010. The analysis will therefore be 
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specific to the UK context, however worldwide references will be used both in order to 
highlight normative values, whilst at the same time indicate global similarities.  
An understanding of life divided into different phases or ‘life cycles’ due to lived 
years appears so entrenched within these policies that the category of old age is 
repeatedly called upon, used, and assumed to have an obvious existence. Yet 
alongside this, its relevance to understanding or providing knowledge of an individual 
is questioned and its use criticized. The discourse of old age and ‘old people’ as a 
targeted policy population are at the forefront of contemporary social policy, 
presented as creating new challenges for society, and so demanding new strategies to 
manage these. The need for specific ‘old age’ policies such as NSF, OA, and SS, which 
all take the issue of ageing and the older population as problematic and in need of 
address, is therefore justified. Furthermore, in line with the view that old age is not 
just a problem for older people and older peoples’ services, generic health and social 
care polices including OHOCOS, SFC and BNCS also pinpoint ageing as a significant 
potential problem that needs active management in order for the social care system to 
‘cope’ and therefore for society to prosper. For example: 
 
We must set out a new direction for health and social care services to 
meet the future demographic challenges we meet. 
(OHOCOS, p.9) 
 
weaknesses in the system are put under further strain by the growing 
pressures from changes in life expectancy  
  (SFC, p.9) 
 
Paradoxically however, age is dismissed as being an unhelpful and even 
irrelevant category in relation to social care: 
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We must . . . develop policies and services that respond to need rather 
than simply to chronological age. 
(OA, p.ix) 
 
This creates a situation where despite the issue of age taking centre stage, the 
usefulness and importance of age as a category is being destabilised and questioned 
within these polices. Furthermore, a desirable outcome in terms of policy targets is for 
the category of old age to continue to disintegrate: 
 
Age should come to mean less as older people are recognised for the 
contribution they can make to our economy 
(OA, p.75)    
 
This chapter will discuss where the category of old age in Western societies has 
come from, what form it currently takes, and how the characteristic of age has come 
to be associated with the object of population. From this I will start to analyse how 
policy is using age as a governmental tool. In particular I will begin to explore how old 
age becomes redefined in the policies, paying particular attention to the relevance it 
attributes to activity and independence. I will endeavour to demonstrate how old age 
is presented within the policies as a specific category and population that can be 
governed, whilst simultaneously undermining the extent to which older people can be 
differentiated on the basis of age. Thus the boundaries of this category and population 
start to breakdown and disperse, yet at the same time individuals are encouraged to 
identify themselves with, and find meaning in the categories of ‘older person’ or ’being 
in later life’ in order to successfully manage their lives. 
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Old age and policy 
Defining what old age is, and importantly what it is not, is greatly emphasised 
in the policies, particularly in OA which openly brooches the question. Specifically 
there is a desire to distance ‘old age’ from association with decline, dependency and 
passivity: 
 
In the past, older people have often been treated as dependent and a 
drain on society. The reality is that so many contribute a huge amount 
as grandparents, volunteers and in numerous other ways. 
(OA, p.30) 
 
The reality that the policies are concerned to emphasise is that the image of old age as 
dependent and in need, if it was ever true, is now outmoded. Furthermore this view of 
old age is discriminatory, as it is: 
 
ageist attitudes that perceive loss of function, ill health and decline in 
health to be inevitable and irreversible impacts of the ageing process. 
(SS, p.30) 
 
The implication is that the relationship between old age and decline is no longer 
morally applicable to today’s old people – it misrepresents who old people are and 
therefore unfairly discriminates against them. Even under new age discrimination laws, 
for example, an employer can still force an individual to retire at 65 if they have ‘good 
reason’. This association of old age with loss of function or general decline is long 
standing. This matter is highlighted by Bourdelais (1998) who claims that although old 
age has always been identified as a specific stage in life, it was not until the end of the 
seventeenth century that it became a measurable socio-demographic category that 
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created a threshold relating to whether men could be called upon to bear arms. He 
argues that the negative image of the over 60s caused by this threshold conformed to 
already existent attitudes in European societies.  In the twentieth century this was 
reflected in the institutionalisation of a formal and compulsory retirement age which 
fitted in with the premise of disengagement theory - that the withdrawal of older 
people from work and social roles was an inevitable and beneficial process (Powell, 
2001). This process, according to its advocates, matched the natural process of ageing: 
‘The (disengagement) process is graded to suit the declining biological and 
psychological capacities of the individual and the needs of society’ (Bromley, 1966, 
quoted in Powell, 2001, p. 3). There were of course critics of this view of old age in the 
post war years – Powell (2001) notes that Havinghurst and Albrecht, in 1953, argued 
disengagement was not a natural process associated with cognitive or physical decline, 
and therefore any roles lost due to age ought to be replaced by new ones. However, 
the institutionalisation of retirement and pensions, alongside the rise of specific older 
peoples’ services and residential homes, mapped out old age as something 
differentiated from adult life in general, and old people as in need of allowances and 
specialised help purely on the grounds of age (Katz, 1996). The justification for the 
differentiation between old age and adult life was therefore based on knowledge of 
the nature of older people. However the need for this differentiation, and to set old 
age as a distinct socio-demographic category, was related to state security: the 
threshold of 60 years was originally set for ‘old age’ for fear that those over this 
threshold would be unable to fight effectively for their country. Later advocates of 
disengagement theory in the twentieth century saw retirement, in terms of 
disengagement from work and social duties, as reflecting the natural decline in old age 
and therefore commensurately necessary for ensuring that society did not decline too.  
Similarly, Phillipson (1982) details the flexibility of the compulsory retirement age 
throughout the twentieth century. He argues that despite the consistency of the 
retirement age, the pressure for older people to give up work and retire, or to 
continue working into retirement years varies depending upon the current economic 
condition. In this sense the old are used as a cheap reserve of labour when needed, 
but are expected to withdraw from the labour market when jobs are scarce, making 
retirement function to the needs of capitalism. Thus the definition of old age and its 
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construction into a socio-demographic category is intimately related to the perceived 
needs of Western society. 
 Arguments abound both within policy and in wider social gerontology research 
that this view of old age, and therefore of older people, is neither true nor acceptable 
for contemporary society as: 
 
society has changed and attitudes have changed. Retirement is no 
longer seen as preparation for decline . . . the attitude that too often 
wrote people off as ‘elderly’ has given way to one that demands that 
older people are seen as having individual needs . . .Older people should 
no longer be seen as a burden on society. They are a vital resource of 
wisdom, experience and talent. 
(NSF, p.2) 
 
According to Bourdelais (1998) the use in Europe, since the eighteenth century, of 60 
as the threshold for old age has led to the belief that it is an immutable category. 
However, he argues that:  
during the misleading continuity of categories, often unconsciously 
accepted, realities have changed. Neither the thresholds nor the 
connotations have budged, and yet everything else has evolved: the 
sexagenarian’s health, their place in the generational chain, their 
economic resources and lifestyles. 
(p. 128) 
This view is strongly portrayed within contemporary policies too. Those adults over the 
threshold of 60 today are incomparable to previous generations of ‘pensioners’ - to be 
old today implies a different lifestyle and different identity: 
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We are not just living longer; we are living differently. We are healthier, 
more active, more conscious of our rights as consumers, better 
educated, and more willing to try new experiences than ever before. 
(OA, p.31) 
 
Two potential strategies for reconfiguring old age become apparent- one suggested by 
Bourdelais, the other mapped out within the policies. Firstly, to  move the threshold of 
old age so that people do not become associated with the traditional characteristics of 
old age until perhaps at 70 or 80 (Bourdelais, 1998). Secondly, to leave the threshold of 
‘old age’ intact, but attempt to redefine what old age is to take account of increased 
abilities and the expectation of continued activity and participation in later years. It is 
this second route that is taken within the policies, demonstrated through the attention 
given to the redefinition of old age coupled with the continued attempt to understand 
old age and older people by gathering information concerning those aged 50 and 
above.  
 In contrast to old age being conceived as a burden on society, the policies are 
quite clear that longer lives are a positive development: 
 
The fact that we are living longer is a cause for celebration – a tribute to 
human progress, to the success of the welfare state and the genius of 
medical science. 
(BSFA, p.5) 
 
The threshold of old age is still spoken about in the policies as starting at around 60 (or 
the gendered threshold of 65 where related to men’s statutory retirement age), and 
sometimes those aged 50 are included due the trend of ‘early retirees’, as well as in 
order to gain knowledge of the next generation of older people (OA vol2, p.3). 
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Therefore ‘old age’ is held on to as a relevant category, and ‘old people’ are 
continuously described and measured as a knowable and relatively cohesive group 
despite the many references to the differences and diversity within this group.  
 Despite this, in the one place where ‘old age’ is explicitly defined it is related to 
experience and attitude rather than an encompassing socio-demographic category. In 
answer to the question ‘what do we mean by “old”?’ (OA vol.2, p.3) we are told: 
 
 Perceptions of ageing and old age depend on where you stand . . 
.  
 Many people would agree, therefore, that old age is a state of 
mind rather than a fixed chronological point. 
(OA vol.2, p.3) 
 
This hint towards a cultural relativity reproduces aspects of the postmodern obsession 
with difference and diversity as hallmarks of social progress. OA then presents what it 
considers to be ‘key evidence on ageing today’ (OA vol.2, p.3) by measuring the living 
conditions and activities of those over a fixed chronological point. This inherently 
contradicts its definition of age as subjective, although perhaps more realistically 
demonstrates how old age is relevant to social policy: as data and forms of 
information. Alongside this it highlights the reliance of policy knowledge on the 
creation of categories and thresholds, even when these categories do not match with 
the stated understanding of the concept.  
Presenting old age as a state of mind rather than a fixed and inevitable point in 
time serves the purpose of making old age mutable and therefore, importantly, a 
process open to human control and intervention. Thus old age is no longer an 
inevitable part of life, but a category both capable of being, and in need of, shaping 
and developing. The biological status of an individual is therefore not a reprieve from 
governance but the reason it is necessary.  
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Vincent (2006) discusses the rise of bio-gerontology and its connection to the 
construction of old age as something both manageable and even avoidable. He quotes 
Aubrey de Grey (2002), an influential albeit controversial ageing geneticist, who 
describes ageing as a pathology that can be overcome: 
Aging is a three-stage process: metabolism, damage, and pathology . . . 
Interventions can be designed at all three stages . . . intervention to 
remove the accumulating damage would sever the link between 
metabolism and pathology, and so has the potential to postpone aging 
indefinitely . . . ways exist in all cases, implying that indefinite 
postponement of aging – which we term ‘engineered negligible 
senescence’ – may be within sight. 
(Quoted in Vincent 2006, p.685) 
Here with this engineering perspective ageing is not understood as a natural process 
but a failure in the biological mechanisms of self maintenance (Vincent, 2006); 
therefore old age is differentiated from youth only by its ‘risk status’ regarding its 
susceptibility to disease. In this sense old age loses its relevance as a meaningful 
category in terms of what makes a way of life or life situation acceptable: for example 
‘there is no meaningful boundary between cancer as a disease and cancer as linked to 
age-related failures of cellular regulation’ (Vincent, 2006, p.688). This verifies the 
policy insistence that it is need and not age that is important: it is not age but risk 
factors and risk management that become relevant – old age is merely an increased 
risk status. As Castel (1991) points out, under these systems of risk assessment, ‘the 
new preventive policies primarily address  . . . no longer individuals but factors, 
statistical correlations of heterogeneous elements’ (p. 288). However, effective 
preventative strategies will ensure the best chance of remaining healthy no matter 
what an individual’s age: 
 
Carefully considered preventative services will work to stop decline and 
improve life chances. 
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(SS, p.30) 
 
Decline is no longer considered a natural process, as asserted by advocates of 
disengagement theory for example, but caused by a lack of effective services, hence 
biological existence becomes used to simultaneously justify and neutralise political 
judgements and decisions. 
 By holding the position that ill health and disability are not an inevitable part of 
becoming older (NSF, p.107), the policy strategies set out within the documents 
analysed focus upon the manageability of ageing, setting ageing up as a process that 
can and should be managed – not a natural, that is, inevitable process at all. The 
perceived increase in health related risks in old age, and the accompanying social 
consequences they bring such as increased risk of social exclusion and isolation, ensure 
that the over 60s become prime targets of life management strategies. Here again the 
contradiction surfaces where despite holding onto the claim that old people are not a 
homogenous group, and should have access to health and social care services based on 
their needs rather than their age, blanket policies are created that target the group 
‘older people’, defined by their chronological age, and based on knowledge of the 
increased risk status of this group as a whole. For example: 
 
We are commissioning 46 national governing bodies of sport to help 
create a world leading community sport system including plans to 
encourage the over 50s to participate in sport. Physical activity 
currently decreases with age and at the moment the fitness industry is 
not taking full advantage of the market opportunities demographic 
change represents. 
(BSFA, p.23) 
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We have also launched a programme of free swimming for people over 
60 
(BSFA, p.23) 
 
Older people are included as part of the population at large by understanding their 
activity levels as in decline in comparison to younger adults, and this decline is 
regarded as problematic. Thus older people are not divided from ‘adults’ in general but 
measured against the overall norm or average. Within this, not only is there the 
implication that older people ought to be active, but that they should also be able to 
‘keep up’ with younger generations, yet they are simultaneously targeted as a group 
differentiated by their (chronological) age and not by their personal experiences or 
attitude to age. Therefore, whilst being defined through characteristics knowable due 
to their statistical age, they are targeted because there is no reason for this 
differentiation – decline is not inevitable and so is not an excuse for inactivity. 
 Therefore, whilst becoming older is an inevitable part of life, something to be 
celebrated and a sign of success, ageing - in terms of decline or failures of self-
maintenance, is neither. Good self-management becomes the key to avoid ageing into 
old age, or at least to put it on hold for as long as possible. Ageing in terms of decline is 
no longer a natural or inevitable process, but a problem that requires both 
professional and medical intervention, and a proactive approach from individuals - 
hence the importance that ‘old age’ can encompass activity and old people remain 
active agents, rather than passive recipients. It is even suggested that old people ought 
to remain active in order to prove the truth that old people are active: 
 
if we want other people’s perceptions to change, we also need to 
challenge outdated assumptions in ourselves as we grow older 
(OA, p.4) 
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This implies that older people need to behave in a way that shows they are not ageing 
– that they are not in decline, in need of assistance, and do not need to ‘rest’. In this 
way ‘old age’ is redefined in order to break down the differentiation of lifestyles and 
expectations between old people and younger adults, hence the similarities in lifestyle, 
desires and capabilities have been highlighted in the policies:  
 
Just like the rest of us, older people want to enjoy good health and 
remain independent for as long as possible. 
(NSF, p.i) 
 
Older workers, at least up to the age of 70, are as productive in most 
jobs as younger workers 
(BSFA, p.32) 
 
The issue of presenting old age as an extended youth has been criticized by some as 
ageist and a sign of the value society attributes to youth culture (Andrews, 1999). 
What it also does however, is rid ‘old age’ of its otherness and makes it mainstream – 
old age is a period not to be shunned as something that concerns others but has 
nothing to do with you, but to be prepared for. The challenges brought by old age are 
relevant to everyone, and can be effectively managed by everyone. Old age no longer 
signifies passivity and withdrawal, but that there is something to be done and 
progressively achieved.  
Ageing population and policy 
 The idea of an ageing population is not new: the notion was first used in 1928 
in France in relation to concern for the population’s future (Bourdelais, 1998). 
Preceding this, Bourdelais (1998) also notes the importance of Jacques Bertillon, the 
French statistician and demographer, who in 1896 compared an ‘older population’ 
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with a living being and therefore capable of taking on the attributes of an ageing 
declining body. Thus the association of the population with old age carried a warning 
of its decline in strength and vigour. Current social policy recognises that an ageing 
population is not only a recent concern, but sees the current situation as unique in that 
an ageing population is no longer a future threat, but a current operationalized reality: 
 
More of us are living longer than ever. This is not a new phenomenon – 
life expectancy has been growing steadily for over a century, but the UK 
has just passed a demographic tipping point. In 2007 for the first time in 
the UK there were more people over State Pension age than children; 
an ageing society is no longer coming tomorrow – it is here with us 
today. 
(BSFA, p.7) 
 
 
 Relating the issue of old age to not only individual ageing but also the 
characteristics of society, of which we are all a part, ensures that all members of the 
population – regardless of their actual age – become part of the problem of ageing. In 
turn they are all required to be part of the solution, both as responsible citizens with 
obligations to others, and as individuals whose desire is assumed to be the 
maximisation of their own life potential. Some of the challenges that are claimed to 
arise with an ageing population are not presented as problematic for the current 
generation of old people, but for future generations. Examples include poverty in old 
age and the pension crisis – the current generation of old people are thought to be 
relatively well off in comparison both to previous generations of old people and to the 
current population in general (Gilleard and Higgs, 2009; OA vol.2, p.18). In this sense 
many governmental strategies aimed at managing an ageing population are targeted 
at working age adults, or even younger.  Gilbert (2006), for example, claims that 
discourses are being deployed to change people’s future expectations concerning work 
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and pensions provision, citing the Child Trust Fund as a form of encouragement to 
develop a saving habit early on in preparation for financial security in later life. 
 Thus the concept of ageing, and its presentation as problematic on both an 
individual and collective level, provides the rationality through which governmental 
technologies concerning how individuals ought to conduct their everyday lives - from 
finance and work, to health and social participation, reaches out across all life stages 
and geopolitical situations. What may seem a rather singular issue of age becomes an 
all-encompassing vision of society that demands a specific form of active citizenship, 
and that each individual takes on a specific persona in keeping with this.57 Hence policy 
calls upon everyone to be involved in preparing for an ageing population: 
 
we must create an environment where our later years can be a time to 
be enjoyed. This is not just an issue for people already approaching later 
life. It affects everyone, not only because we are all getting older, but 
because we will all increasingly interact with, look after and learn from 
the greater numbers of people who are in their later life. 
 In the presence of such a shift in the age of our population we 
must adapt as a society 
(BSFA, p.6) 
 
All individuals must prepare for their own old age, but this personal preparation is 
understood as part of the collective adaptation to an ageing population which 
demands that individuals change their attitude regarding who older people (including 
themselves) are, and take on board a new mentality and set of expectations regarding 
the role of older people in society: 
                                                          
57
 The concept of ‘body maintenance’ (Featherstone, 1991) presents an example of this, where the body 
is treated as something that can be endlessly repaired if regularly attended to throughout the life cycle. 
But furthermore this ability to maintain the body implies the moral duty to do so, lest the disorganized 
uncared for body serves as a reflection of the ‘self’ (Piqueras, 2007).  
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For individuals . . . A personal responsibility rests on each one of us to 
plan and provide for a different life-course that is also better. 
For business, a changing customer base offers new markets. But the 
workforce is changing too . . . Employers have a huge role to play in 
enabling society to adjust effectively to a new balance of life. 
For all of us, dealing successfully with demographic change means 
shedding outdated stereotypes and changing mindsets about 
retirement and the process of growing older. 
(OA, p.v-vi) 
 
Part of the rationality here relies on the value of inclusion: ensuring not only that 
ageing is not sectioned off as an ‘older people’s’ problem, but also that old people 
become and remain fully integrated in mainstream society by continuing to play a 
similar role to that expected of working age adults. 
 As discussed in Chapter 2, understanding subjects as individuals who 
collectively make up a population determines what sort of demographic information 
becomes relevant and important for understanding people; it also presents a specific 
relationship between individuals, and between individuals, scientists and the state. A 
connection between the individual and the collective is assumed and relied upon in 
order to rationalise the need for both social and self-government, and is used as a 
governmental technology. For example, in the policies the happiness and security of 
each individual is presented as intimately tied to the actions of others– the extent to 
which others strive to lead or succeed in leading fulfilling lives. The same applies vice 
versa: an individual’s success at achieving a good life quality adds to the overall quality 
of society:   
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As well as rights, older people are citizens and as such have 
responsibilities like all of us to contribute to society. They can do this in 
many ways, not least by taking sensible steps to look after their health 
(OA, p.xvii) 
 
The significant link between an individual’s lifestyle and the economic stability of the 
population (and so of each individual) is also highlighted: 
 
It has been estimated that improving life expectancy by just one year 
each decade, could generate a 14 per cent saving in spending on health 
care and an 11 per cent saving in spending on benefits between 2007 
and 2025. 
(BSFA, p.15) 
 
A cycle of decline in quality of life and health is devastating to the 
individual and costly to the state. 
(SS, p.30) 
 
Thus the individual is included in a collective so far as her or his actions impact upon it, 
yet ultimately remains a single unit individually responsible for her or his present and 
future58: 
 
The challenge is also for each of us as individuals to take responsibility 
for our own lifestyles and aim for a healthy and fulfilling old age. 
                                                          
58
 This will be further explored in Chapter 7. 
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(OHOCOS, p.17) 
 
  
 This notion of the category of the individual is also demonstrated through the 
information collected concerning them: individuals become known through the 
collective knowledge of the population, yet they are ultimately detachable from it and 
accountable as a singular subject. Thus much of the information regarding individuals 
that is presented in the policies is based on characteristics generated through 
quantitative aggregates: statistical averages, standard deviations, percentages and 
estimates (OA vol.2 is itself an example). These aggregate or generalised 
characteristics are then used as gauges against which individuals are measured and 
can measure themselves, and are used to decide upon any necessary lifestyle changes. 
Therefore as well as creating knowledge of risk factors, actuarial predictions and 
individual risk status as already discussed, aggregate knowledge of the population is 
used to incite individual lifestyle changes. For example: 
 
The broad picture is that the years after retirement are largely healthy 
and can be made even healthier through relatively simple preventative 
measures.  
(OA, p.9) 
 
This tactic is deployed to justify governmental technologies aimed at specific 
individuals to produce a lifestyle focused on active participation: 
 
there is a need for a range of interventions later in life such as ensuring 
that older people are targeted with active ageing opportunities in the 
same way as younger age groups. 
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(SS, p.10) 
 
They are governmental in the sense that they are targeted interventions aimed at 
mobilising a particular type of conduct that will ultimately prevent unwanted 
outcomes and possible burdens to society. Knowledge of the population as a whole 
and of specific populations within this, is used to determine acceptable levels of 
health, finance, social participation and so on for everyone, and thereby is used to 
justify what can be expected of individuals. Although, as noted by Rose (2001), 
programmes that have taken the ‘nation’s health’ as their object have been prevalent 
for some time, the rationale behind this is no longer concern for the strength of the 
state compared to other nation states (as in the capacity to bear arms), but rather 
concern for the population both in economic and moral terms. Thus concern for the 
health and life quality of individuals is based on the economic stability and 
sustainability of society, as well as the concern to reduce inequalities by providing 
equality of life chances: 
 
Our aspiration is to achieve a world-leading employment rate of 80 per 
cent, including a million older workers. If we achieve this, the ratio of 
workers to non-workers in the economy would be about the same in 
2050 as it is now. Society can thus grow older, and sustain its economic 
capacity. 
(OA, p.xv) 
 
Every one of us will have different needs and expectations as we get 
older. This strategy reflects that, and aims to give people the tools and 
the encouragement they need to prepare more effectively for later life. 
(BSFA, p.6) 
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Diversity of policy strategies is therefore assumed to be necessary to cater for the 
diversity of life situations and levels of need, thereby ensuring equal opportunity to all 
to live a healthy and fulfilling later life. This ‘celebration of difference’ demonstrates 
the uniqueness of a governmental society in that it is the well-being of the population 
that is both the rationalisation for and the target of governmental technologies59. 
 Whilst highlighting the social impact of ill health and increased need, the 
policies are clear that an ageing population does not necessarily equate to a declining 
population, but should instead be met with optimism: 
 
As this snapshot of research has shown, getting older in this new 
millennium is the start of a new road, not the end of a road. 
(OA vol.2, p.38) 
 
However this is based on the immediate action by all members of society, as discussed 
above. Specifically this new society must embrace activity, responsibility and 
independent living.  
Activity and independence 
 The redefinition of old age within these policies is primarily linked to the social 
role of older people, both in terms of what they take from contemporary society: 
 
FACT 1: People often have the greatest need for public services in their 
later years 
(BSFA, p.38) 
 
                                                          
59
 This has been discussed in Chapter 2, and will be further explored in Chapter 5. 
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and in terms of what they may be expected to contribute. The aim is therefore to find 
ways of decreasing the demand on services from older people by increasing health and 
making preparations for self-support, and simultaneously increasing the variety of 
ways in which old people can contribute and participate as consumers, workers and 
volunteers. Thus this logic of advanced capitalism is part of the reason for the policy 
argument that age is an irrelevant category for understanding a service user group, or 
for providing health and social care services: age alone should not tell us anything 
about an older person’s capabilities and lifestyle.  With this in mind, OA (volumes 1 
and 2) reworks the ‘dependency ratio’ to take into account the newfound link between 
old age and activity: 
 
[the dependency ratio] is usually defined as the ratio of those aged 
under 16 or over State Pension Age, to those aged 16 to State Pension 
Age . . . though there is no reason why we should see older people as 
necessarily dependant – many keep economically active beyond 
traditional retirement ages. 
(OA vol.2, p.8) 
 
It continues, 
 
the current population can only consume the output produced by the 
current population . . . So, the problem of sharing limited output is not 
really determined by the number of older people, but by the proportion 
of the population that is productive. 
(OA vol.2, p.8) 
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The problem of an ageing population is therefore not thought to be well characterised 
by focusing on old age, but by potential high levels of inactivity: 
 
More important than the simple numerical relationship between those 
above and below certain ages is the ratio between active and inactive in 
our society. 
(OA, p.7) 
 
The separation of the inactivity ratio from categories of age has two significant thrusts. 
Firstly it emphasises the disintegration of the boundaries of old age, in terms of its 
differentiation from other life stages by specific lifestyles or expectations. Secondly 
and concurrently it sets the expectation of a continued productionist economic 
contribution in old age. 
 The well-being and security of the population is therefore related to levels of 
individual activity. Alongside the concerns of economic activity demonstrated via the 
inactivity ratio, other forms of activity are equally expected. Consumerism, for 
example, is framed as a desirable form of activity in old age, but currently problematic: 
 
older people- especially those over 75 – tend to spend less of their 
income the older they get. 
(OA vol.2, p.20) 
 
Hence the Department for Work and Pensions has commissioned research to 
investigate the ‘problem’ (OA vol.2, p.20). Consumerism becomes desirable precisely 
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because it is seen as a form of social action and, importantly, social participation60. So 
as well as helping to sustain the economy, being a consumer, along with other forms of 
participation, is argued to be beneficial to individual health and well-being; this in turn 
will have a positive effect on society in terms of increased independence of the 
individual and less reliance on support.  
 The question of activity as presented in these policies goes beyond economic 
activity and the crude capitalist imperative, however. Health is also important as both 
a form and an aim of active ageing, as highlighted in WHO’s (2002) definition: 
[active ageing is] the process of optimising opportunities for health, 
participation, and security in order to enhance quality of life as people 
age. Active ageing applies to both individuals and groups. It allows 
people to realise their potential for physical, social and mental well-
being throughout their lives and to participate in society according to 
their needs, desires and capacities, while providing them with adequate 
protection, security and care when they require assistance. 
(Quoted in Walker, 2009, p.84) 
Walker (2009) sees WHO’s definition as providing an important contribution to 
discourses of active ageing by refocusing away from employment to consider the wide 
range of factors that contribute to well-being, in particular the link between 
employment, health and participation. Thus well-being is not only reliant on individual 
and social economic security, but also on an individual’s health and social inclusion. 
Furthermore, Walker (2009) claims that the emphasis on the link between 
participation and well-being is derived from scientific evidence of their 
interrelationship and the beneficial effects on health of positive well-being. By way of 
evidence he (2009) cites SS, pointing in particular to the ‘cycle of well-being’.  This 
proposes a relationship where increased participation leads to increased ability and 
                                                          
60
 Blaikie (1999) claims that retirement has become conceived as primarily a form of leisure, and so it is 
now a period characterised by more than simply being non-productive, although alongside this it could 
be argued that productivity has also been reconfigured.  
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opportunities; these in turn lead to increased personal health and well-being and 
onwards to increased participation (SS, p.32), with the note that: 
 
The positive effects on health of positive well-being have been found to 
be even larger than the effects from body mass, smoking and exercise. 
(SS, p.32) 
 
The scientific evidence cited to verify this is an article by psychologists Levy and 
colleagues (2002), which examined ‘Longevity increased by positive self-perceptions of 
age‘. They found that those with more positive self-perceptions of ageing lived 7.5 
years more than those with less positive self-perceptions of ageing. Self-perceptions of 
ageing were measured by asking participants to agree or disagree with 5 statements: 
Things keep getting worse as I get older; I have as much pep as I did last year; As you 
get older you are less useful; I am as happy now as I was when I was younger; As I get 
older things are better than/worse than/ the same as I thought they would be (Levy et 
al, 2002, p.263). It is not difficult to cast some doubt on the validity of these findings as 
sufficient basis for robust evidence based policy. Individuals’ responses to five ready 
made statements according to fixed response categories can provide only a simplistic 
understanding of their perceptions of their lives and of old age; in addition, the 
measures of outcomes used were not well-being but simply survival and longevity. 
What this research has neither explored nor verified, therefore, is any link between 
well-being, health and participation – as implied in SS. Instead this research argues for 
a link between internalised social stereotypes and life expectancy, thus the article 
concludes by highlighting the impact of stigmatisation of old age on longevity (Levy et 
al, 2002). Although longer life may indicate a healthy life,  this is not automatically 
true, and although well-being is at least partly associated with self-perceptions of 
ageing in the policies, there is nothing in this research that links well-being to activity 
and participation as implied in the ‘cycle of well-being’ (SS, p.33) and reiterated by 
Walker (2009).  
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Katz (2000) argues that this association is too often assumed in gerontology 
research:  
The association of activity with well-being in old age seems so obvious 
and indisputable that questioning it within gerontological circles would 
be considered unprofessional, if not heretical. 
(p.135) 
He continues that despite being a relatively recent ‘keyword’, this notion of ‘activity’ 
has already helped to shape our understanding of later life. In this sense activity and 
participation have become not only options for the current population of older people 
but essential for general well-being and a good life quality: 
 
Greater active participation, stronger social roles and empowerment 
can have a positive impact on the individual, improving well-being and 
health. In the ELSA research commissioned, lack of physical activity was 
found to be a significant factor in three of the seven domains of 
exclusion . . . Poor mental and physical health can affect participation in 
wider social, leisure and civic activities. 
(SS, p.45) 
 
Having a role and active participation are significant protective factors 
against loneliness and social isolation, and are important for quality of 
life. 
(SS, p.62) 
 
Activity is thus more than just a lifestyle choice - it is presented as key to maintaining 
relationships, staving off isolation, and is associated with good mental and physical 
health. Hence general well-being depends on being active – physically, economically, 
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and socially - and so also requires individuals to take on an active persona: to become 
proactive in terms of planning and managing later life.  
 The strong link between activity, health and well-being, and the responsibility 
of each individual to lead a healthy, full and independent life for the sake of others as 
well as themselves, ensures that an active lifestyle becomes a moral obligation. Katz 
describes how Ekerdt (1986, cited in Katz, 2000) saw the construction of a ‘busy ethic’ 
in retirement to be akin to the ‘work ethic’ as a form of moral regulation of the 
population. Rose’s (2001) concept of ethopolitics is useful here, whereby:   
the ethos of human existence – the sentiments, moral nature or guiding 
beliefs of persons, groups, or institutions – have come to provide the 
‘medium’ within which the self-government of the autonomous 
individual can be connected up with the imperatives of good 
government . . . ethopolitics concerns itself with the self-techniques by 
which human beings should judge themselves and act upon themselves 
to make themselves better than they are. While ethopolitical concerns 
range from those of lifestyle to those of community, they coalesce 
around a kind of vitalism: disputes over the value to be accorded to life 
itself: ‘quality of life’, ‘the right to life’ or ‘the right to choose’ 
(p.18) 
What individuals do, or do not do, in terms of preparing for and living later life, 
becomes subject to a moral judgement, where levels of independence and the 
fulfilment of social obligation denote the ethical status of the individual. Thus a 
responsibility to lead a healthy and fulfilling life through activity and participation is 
made clear: 
 
longer life is a blessing where the extra years are fulfilling and active. 
They should not be years of inaction and exclusion. A personal 
responsibility rests on each one of us to plan and provide for a different 
life-course that is also better. 
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(OA, p.v) 
 
The primary responsibility for keeping active and participating in society 
lies with older people themselves. 
(OA, p.30) 
 
However, it is clear that only certain types of activity are included and valued as forms 
of active ageing. Katz (2000) notes that many activity studies indicate as appropriate, 
normal and healthy activities for older people those that coincide with middle-class 
family orientated conventions. By contrast, activities such as drinking, sexual 
preferences and gambling tend not to be included, yet could feasibly be significant 
activities in an individual’s life. Biggs (2001) echoes this, claiming that the ‘astonishing 
absence of diversity’ (p.313) in the policies exposes the assumption that everyone has 
the same set of personal and social priorities. This dominance of the active lifestyle, 
and belief in its supremacy, makes other approaches to old age as a specific life stage 
untenable. That later life might, for example, be a time for contemplation and turning 
inwards or just for resting is effectively disallowed.  
 Furthermore the polarisation of activity, health and good life quality with 
decline, ill-health and poor life quality has been continued through the creation of the 
constructs of the Third age and Fourth age as a way of understanding different phases 
of old age. Laslett conceptualised the Third age as a life phase where older people are 
able to seek self-fulfilment beyond the constraints of work and child rearing; this is 
only ended by the Fourth stage, characterised by frailty and decline (Higgs et al, 2009). 
Higgs and colleagues (2009) highlight that the creation of health as a social 
responsibility may lead to the situation where an older person’s health determines 
their social status: as either agentic and fulfilled ‘Third agers’, or as inactive and 
dependent ‘Fourth agers’ – the latter assumed to bring with it a low quality of life. This 
reasoning also suggests that the young/active-old/passive dichotomy is actually still in 
place but in a different guise and with an altered purpose and target. 
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 Activity is promoted as a positive value and of significant importance as it is 
considered essential to enabling independence, which itself is perhaps the overriding 
value and aim in the policies. The assumption is made in the policies that 
independence is fundamentally positive, necessary, and something that all members of 
the population strive for: 
 
Just like the rest of us, older people want to enjoy good health and 
remain independent for as long as possible. 
(NSF, p.i) 
 
People will be helped in their goal to remain healthy and independent. 
(OHOCOS, p.4) 
 
we all want . . . 
 to keep independence and control over our lives as we grow 
older, even if we are constrained by the health problems that 
sometimes affect the final years. 
(OA, p.3) 
 
In contrast to these assertions made in UK New Labour policy, Plath (2009) 
demonstrates that independence is not a universal aim of social policy. Comparing 
ageing policies from Australia, Denmark, India and UK she found that the principle of 
promoting independence was not adopted by all. Rather dependence is viewed as 
unproblematic in that social support is considered an entitlement in Denmark, or even 
as advantageous – familial dependence is desirable in Indian policy. In this light, Plath 
(2009) raises the question: ‘When policies promote independence, from what are 
older people being encouraged to be independent?’ (p.220). 
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 Public and familial support are clearly presented as undesirable and a sign of 
dependency in the policy context analysed here: 
 
 Older people wish to remain healthy, active and independent of the 
need for support from services and their families. 
(NSF, p.14) 
 
The economic logic at stake here is that remaining active and healthy is necessary for 
an individual to stand alone ‘independently’, and not need to rely on either public 
services or their personal relationships for support. However, Plath (2009) claims there 
is a ‘conceptual difficulty’ with the notion of independence, in that no person is 
completely independent: reliance upon the support of others is a common human 
state in all life stages. The aim of making individuals independent to the extent that 
they no longer require any form of support from family or other personal relations 
may therefore be both impossible and arguably undesirable. 
 Not all social care support is assumed to be encouraging dependence however. 
Rather policy strategies work to refocus health and care services on enabling 
independence: 
 
‘Care and support’ describes the activities, services and relationships 
that help people to be independent, active and well throughout their 
lives, and participate in and contribute to society. 
(SFC, p.29)   
 
Support that enables independence is therefore not only acceptable but a right: 
 
134 
 
  everyone in the country should be able to expect: 
1. The right support to help you stay independent and well for as 
long as possible and to stop your care and support needs from 
getting worse. 
(SFC, p.10) 
 
The kind of support promoting independence rather than enforcing dependency 
focuses on prevention: life planning, remaining in general good health, early 
intervention services to manage care needs with minimal intervention61. In this sense 
the support on offer is framed in terms of ‘that bit of help’ (SS, p.27), and so seen as 
ideally providing minimal assistance to enable the individual to remain the primary 
agent and in control at all times. Only certain forms of dependency are therefore 
framed as problematic: whilst social dependency is to be avoided, dependency on 
medical and technological aids is often considered enabling - itself a form of 
independence (Higgs et al, 2009). 
This indicates that the importance of independence is not linked to support as 
such, but to agency. Dependence on mechanisms and networks of support that 
encourage an individual to play the role of an active agent, making their own life 
decisions and consequently remaining responsible for these life choices, is actively 
encouraged. It is forms of support that position the individual as the passive recipient 
that are to be avoided, those that construct an active consumer seeking out and 
creatively using the forms of support available proves to be a desirable goal.  
Conclusion 
 This chapter has shown that the paradox of old age then, is that its boundaries 
are simultaneously fixed and dispersed through the attempt to use it as a 
governmental tool that rationalises both what old age is, and the technologies and 
processes we should all subject ourselves to. Old age is both something solidly defined: 
pertaining to activity and social participation; yet also meaningless: it should not be 
                                                          
61
 This will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
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used to signify a difference from the rest of the population. These conflicting notions 
of old age manage to sit side by side within the policy documents as they both adhere 
to, and emanate from, a rationality that subjectifies the older person as independent, 
active and responsible for their continued contribution to society. Thus the 
contradictory definition of old age is intimately connected to the perceived needs of 
society. Due to this, old age becomes a reason for all life to be managed, and a reason 
for us all to be governed in line with this rationality in our everyday lives: the problem 
of ageing becomes the problem of social activity. Old age therefore provides an 
example of how a singular issue pertinent to governance becomes dispersed into many 
spheres of life: health, work, family relations, leisure, and translates into a 
responsibility for us all to plan for our futures by taking care to manage our lives today. 
This discussion will be taken forward in the next chapter to focus on how subjectivity is 
both framed within and utilised by governmental strategies within these ageing 
discourses.   
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Chapter 5 
Governable identities and the limits of the self 
 
Introduction 
 The governmentality rationalities and technologies displayed within the policies 
chosen for analysis in this thesis rest upon an assumed reality of self that can be 
moulded, worked upon and changed. At the same time the self appears to remain as a 
universal phenomenon due to the tightly tailored boundaries within which this work is 
to be done – that is, all ‘selves’ are expected to work towards the same goal in similar 
ways, being motivated by similar desires and necessities. Therefore despite the implied 
flexibility, ideas of a mutable and potentially unlimited self are not problematized 
within the policies: even with the portrayal of unending lifestyle choice, its flexibility is 
constrained within rigid boundaries. It is however, this specific understanding of the 
self as capable of, and in need of, formation that rationalises and makes necessary the 
policy response to old age and an ageing society. This in turn causes certain social 
concepts and realities to become prioritised in relation to the problem of old age: such 
as risk, community, life quality and well-being, along with the associated social actions 
of responsibility, participation and fulfilment. 
This chapter will explore the discursive boundaries and possibilities of the self 
set out within these policy texts to determine both how the self and associated notion 
of identity are configured and deployed. Drawing on the Foucauldian perspective, this 
will focus upon both the ways individuals become governable, and govern themselves, 
as well as determining what the limits of individual possibilities might be: what and 
where are the constraints of the self? Three significant characteristics of the individual 
will be discussed: the individual as essentially reflexive; the self as a resource; and 
individuality. 
Transition and reflexivity 
 Chapter 3 of BSFA is entitled: 
137 
 
 
  HAVING THE LATER LIFE YOU WANT 
  (BSFA, p.17) 
 
In order to obtain the later life you want people need to: 
 
think about their aspirations for later life and prepare accordingly. 
(BSFA, p.17) 
 
The presentation of old age as a lifestyle choice requires thought and preparation from 
the individual. It is suggested that each individual’s later life will be and ought to be 
unique to the extent that it should be tailor made – reflecting both their aspirations 
and perhaps also the effort they have put into realising these. The portrayal of life as 
something to be chosen and formed by the individual is expressed by Giddens (1991) 
as endemic of our current society: 
Each of us not only ‘has’, but lives a biography reflexively organised in 
terms of flows of social and psychological information about possible 
ways of life. Modernity is a post-traditional order, in which the question, 
‘How shall I live?’ has to be answered in day-to-day decisions about how 
to behave, what to wear and what to eat 
(p.14) 
Adams (2006) discusses how the notion of a reflexive self has been formed in relation 
to increased exposure to others and diversity, brought about by changes in 
communication and technology. However, he demonstrates that an array of social 
theorists whose work varies widely, have gravitated towards this reflexive 
understanding of the self, and refers to ‘extended reflexivity thesis’ to capture this. 
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This view of the self as reflexive assumes that nothing can be taken for granted – no 
lifestyles are essential or fixed, with the result that every decision is counted as a 
deliberate expression of self and lifestyle. 
 With later life presented as an array of lifestyle choices, help is offered in the 
form of presenting the choices available (as well as their consequences), and providing 
the information and advice to enable good decision making62. Hence it is claimed 
people want services that: 
 
 help them to make choices and take control of their health and 
well-being by understanding their own health and lifestyle 
better 
(OHOCOS, p.15) 
 
Pre-retirement courses are also made available to encourage individuals ‘to make the 
most of later years’ (BSFA, p.19): 
 
 “Pre-retirement education helps to encourage people to consider 
options . . . and provides up to date information and signposting.” 
(Response to Preparing for our Ageing Society: A Discussion Paper, 
BSFA, p.19) 
 
Having the later life you want therefore seems largely dependent on knowing what 
your individual possibilities are, both by understanding one’s self better, as well as 
ensuring access to the most current and relevant information. 
                                                          
62
 The policy strategy of information and advice will be further discussed in Chapter 6. 
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 Despite the apparently endless paths open to the formation of the older self 
and later life, Adams (2003) notes the persistence of a centred subject upon which this 
uncertainty and fragmentary choice is based: 
While on the one hand the world is dissolving into a malleable and 
‘open’ backdrop, the rational, choice-making, bounded individual 
remains, is expanded even, at the core of selfhood. 
(p.224) 
Thus whilst there is a sense that individuals choose who they want to be, and what life 
they want to lead, these choices are assumed to be made by a relatively consistent self 
who uses a reflexive knowledge of themself to make a decision based on an evaluation 
of best outcomes. It is due to this that Adams (2003) critiques the ‘extended reflexivity 
thesis’ for equating reflexivity with an innate rationality that will always guarantee the 
‘best’ outcome. 
 The emphasis in these policy strategies on being aware of self and lifestyle as a 
deliberate manifestation of the will, does not mean that individuals actually do behave 
in a reflexive manner the majority of the time. Bauman (2004) for example, argues that 
the question of identity only arises when ‘belonging’ becomes an issue – that is, it is 
only those who feel or are made to feel that they do not belong that begin to ask 
questions regarding their identity and way of life. This suggests that for at least some, 
if not most of the time, individuals do not consider their self reflexively, in that they 
may not consider their self at all. Old age however, has commonly been understood as 
a transitional point in life, rather than a continuation (Rudman, 2006), and so is often 
thought to bring with it these questions of belonging in relation to identity and 
lifestyle. 
 Later life is understood in these policies precisely as a time of major life 
transitions: 
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The period between the ages of 50 and 70 is a time of significant life 
transitions for many people – the departure of grown up children from 
the household, the move from full-time employment to a reliance on 
retirement income, more leisure time, and later on, bereavement and 
possibly the onset of poor health. 
(OA vol.2, p.14) 
 
The effect of these life transitions is that individuals have to re-evaluate their role and 
therefore dispositional aspects of identity. The view of old age as a transition into a 
somehow different life brings with it the need to make sense of your ‘self’ in relation 
to this life: 
 
many people have said that after retirement they were viewed 
differently, that they suddenly didn’t belong or felt like they no longer 
had a respected role. The things that defined their identity and self-
esteem, for example work and family roles, disappeared and left a hole 
that was not filled. 
(SS, p.98)    
 
The transition from working age and middle age into old age is presented here as 
fundamentally a transition of self and identity, characterised by a loss or change of 
social and personal roles, and subsequent loss of identification with certain groups and 
individuals. The suggestion is that something basal has changed which has caused a 
destabilisation in self-knowledge. The task ahead then (or ideally to be prepared for in 
advance), is to fill the hole by actively carving out a suitable identity for oneself. 
Identity and sense of self are being explicitly associated with an individual’s personal 
and social roles and activities.  
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 A tension has been highlighted between continuity and change in relation to 
the self. In contrast to identity as the continuity of self-sameness (Bendle, 2002), the 
self is presented within these policies as in need of transformation in order to adhere 
to the new social and personal roles an individual will find themselves in during later 
life. Andrews (1999) criticises this view of later life for treating old age as presenting a 
chasm between a younger and older self, typified in a mind/body split. He argues old 
age needs instead to be understood as a continuity of self, claiming: ‘We are still the 
same people who we have always been, but more deeply so’ (Andrews, 1999, p.31). 
Whilst recognising change, this argues change is perhaps better understood as an 
extension or development of the current self, where old age is: 
a time of ongoing personhood, neither the retardation or complete 
cessation of development, nor a radical transformation of self from ‘us’ 
to ‘them’. 
(Andrews, 1999, p.31) 
 This understanding of old age and older people as not essentially different from 
individuals of working age, is in keeping with the ethos set out in the policies. As 
explored in Chapter 4, the policies redefinition of old age is actively opposed to the 
idea that old age brings with it a radical transformation of an individual – rather an 
individual is expected to remain an independent and valuable active citizen. 
 However, it is suggested in the policies that this continuation of selfhood will 
not just happen. Instead it is precisely to enable the continuation of this active and 
independent self that a transformation and re-evaluation of self is deemed necessary: 
hence the portrayal of the loss of social and personal roles as a hole that needs to be 
filled. The importance of having defined roles is apparent: 
 
People’s sense of self worth and identity is, in part, determined by the 
roles they fulfil such as grandparents, carers, employees or voluntary 
workers. 
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(SS, p.62) 
 
This relational approach to social being suggests that the loss of roles caused by life 
events such as retirement and the changing dynamics of family life therefore become a 
threat to the consistency of a meaningful identity. The consequences of this are made 
clear: alongside putting into question an individual’s self worth, loss of meaningful 
roles is also coupled with the risk of social isolation (SS, p.56, 58). 
 The strategies and interventions put forward within the chosen policies focus 
on ensuring individuals are equipped for the task of re-evaluating their knowledge of 
themselves: via self-assessments to identify lifestyle risks followed by specific health 
and social care advice (OHOCOS, p.7); web-based self-assessment and diagnostic tools 
relating to careers advice, coupled with guidance and information on jobs and training 
(OA, p.23). What is clear is that whatever else might change in order to reach the 
desired goal, that goal is for the self to remain active and independent through the 
reflexive task of acquiring self-knowledge, and using this to maximise life quality. 
Identity must alter only to the extent that an individual remains able to identify 
themselves with a legitimate social role. The presentation of the self as mutable and in 
need of constant evaluation is precisely to preserve the consistency of the self, and 
enable it to continue its status of belonging.  
 In order to realise this, the tools offered by the caring policies are designed to 
encourage individuals to observe themselves and generate information about 
themselves. According to Callero (2003), the reflexive process precisely describes the 
uniquely human capacity to become an object to oneself, and it is due to this 
objectification of the self that its limitations become formed. Thus whilst the idea of a 
reflexive self contains the assumption that nothing can be taken for granted, that all 
lifestyles and paths are options, the necessity to, and responsibility of making these 
choices bears down on the importance of attaining the ‘right’ information about one’s 
self, and the need to re-evaluate this at appropriate intervals. In this sense reflexivity 
can be understood not as a sign of the freedom of an individual to carve out their own 
lifestyle, but instead as the parameters within which she or he must make sense of her 
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or his self. It is within the boundaries of reflexivity that the individual must act (Adams, 
2003). This is akin to Foucault’s description of practices of self, where the individual is 
not supreme in being able to form her or his life in any way: 
these practices [of the self] are nevertheless not something that the 
individual invents by himself. They are patterns that he finds in his 
culture, his society and his social group. 
(Foucault, 1988, cited in Oksala, 2005, p.165) 
An important difference between Foucault’s development of practices of the self, and 
the construction of a reflexive self in the policies examined here, is that the portrayal 
of the self as reflexive in the policies focuses on the achievement and maintenance of a 
certain goal: that is of the formation of a particular type of self (rational and self-
determining for example) that lives and understands itself in a very specific way 
(actively and responsibly). Thus as highlighted by Adams (2006) reflexivity becomes the 
perfect self-management tool, ensuring the constant regulation and surveillance of the 
self. In contrast to this, the very purpose of practices of self for Foucault is to avoid an 
end goal by constantly finding ways to be other to what you are (Foucault, 1982)63. 
The self as a resource 
 Alongside an understanding of the individual as a perpetual reflexive project, 
the individual is also presented in the policies as something that can be used to the 
advantage of society as a whole: not in terms of their capacity to fight for and defend 
the country, but rather by the capitalist economic gains of realising maximum 
outcomes from limited resources. The aim and rationale of social care and support 
relates specifically to ensuring individuals give what they can: 
 
the right care and support, with choice and control, is essential to 
ensuring that everyone can make the most of their chances in life, and 
that no talent is wasted. 
                                                          
63
 This point was more thoroughly discussed in Chapter 2. 
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(BNCS, p.7) 
 
Expressed within these policies is the fear that old age currently causes individuals to 
lapse into a sedentary unproductive lifestyle that has proved to be detrimental for 
capitalist society: 
 
a lower than average proportion of people over 50 are employed and 
fewer of them have qualifications. People with low skills are less 
productive and more likely to be claiming benefits. We cannot afford 
this waste of potential for the individual and for society. 
(OA, p.xv)   
 
We recognised that too many people were suffering from the combined 
effect of problems such as poverty, unemployment, poor housing, ill 
health and discrimination . . . We also recognised that this waste of 
human potential was bad for society as a whole. 
(SS, p.5) 
 
Despite the overtly socio-economic terms within which this waste of potential is 
described, the policy aims are focused on the individual older person - specifically on 
their future self and what it is possible for them to become: 
 
One challenge is to unlock the potential for older people to play an even 
greater role. 
(OA, p.iv) 
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The strategies set out therefore aim to increase opportunities for individuals to grasp, 
and ensure these individuals are in a position to seize them: 
   
We will take steps to ensure that older people are able to maximise 
their potential, unhindered by prejudice. 
  (OA, xvii) 
 
 
Greco (1993) demonstrates the expectation for individuals to take care of 
themselves by regulating their lifestyle and moderating their behaviour, claiming that a 
failure to do this constitutes a personal failure of the individual. To be healthy and 
maintain a healthy lifestyle therefore requires a level of self-mastery. This implies that 
those who do not grasp the opportunities offered have somehow not only let down 
society by not contributing to the extent expected, but have also failed to become the 
person they ought to be, or are capable of becoming. Frey and Stutzer (2009) note 
however that relying on individuals to make the ‘right’ preferences is valid only if 
individuals act in a fully rational way, however the realities of decision making show 
that in fact they do not: 
To the extent that these effects occur [i.e. irrational behaviour], 
individual choices do not reflect true or normative preferences . . . and 
expanding people’s opportunities will not necessarily increase their 
utility. 
(p.308) 
146 
 
Increasing opportunity does however responsibilize those irrational behaviours and 
sets a precedent for optimising the possibilities of an individual self for the sake of 
all64. 
Policy strategies such as these reconstitute subjectivity as a form of social 
investment, that is, resources and services are modelled and justified with the 
intention that any investment in the individual will be paid back through their 
contribution to, and participation in society. As life has meaning only as a form of 
social and economic utility, individuals are obliged to engage in techniques of self-
fulfilment or personal growth as part of their active participation in society (Culpitt, 
1999; Rose, 1996). The expected form of our social contribution is made clear: 
 
The challenge is also for each of us as individuals to take responsibility 
for our own lifestyles and aim for a healthy and fulfilling old age. 
(OHOCOS, p.17)  
 
These responsibilities laid upon old people sound positive, coinciding with their best 
interest: to be healthy, fulfilled, and to continue to have new opportunities in life. To 
not do what is required to have these would therefore seem nonsensical. However the 
issue of individuals failing to optimise their selves is not new -  Cruickshank (1999) 
argues that participatory democratic discourse is preoccupied precisely with those 
individuals who fail to act in their own interest, and who choose not to participate 
even though free to do so. This must be at least partly due to the lack of true variety 
regarding lifestyles and ways of ageing (as discussed in Chapter 4 for example), causing 
the opportunities to not be as tempting or personally relevant as they are presented. 
Regardless of this, it results in making the subtleties of an individual life a public 
concern: 
                                                          
64
 The issue of ir/rational behaviour and decision making will be discussed further in Chapter 6.  
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Self-fulfilment is no longer a personal or private goal. . . Hence, the 
solution to the current ‘crisis of governability’ is discovered in the 
capacity of citizens to act upon themselves, guided by the expertise of 
the social sciences and social service professionals. 
(Cruickshank, 1999, p.89) 
In order to maximise potential and live a life of fulfilment, individuals must be 
enterprising. In line with this, the distinction between service providers and consumers 
is being deliberately disbanded: 
 
We want to encourage those working within the [care] sector to be 
innovative and develop new approaches within employee-led social 
enterprises. For example, we will encourage those currently using 
services to consider new ways of providing services themselves – either 
individually or through mutual solutions such as collective 
commissioning. 
  (BNCS, p.107) 
 
Within this framework the traditional role of caring ‘staff’ will become obsolete: 
 
For example, care workers will need to work with people as expert 
partners, to help them to achieve what they want to achieve. 
(SFC, p.74) 
 
Social support is here described as a partnership, joining an individual with the aim of 
enabling them to develop and realise their aspirations. Whilst the service user is 
positioned as the one who decides upon what is to be aimed for, as will be discussed 
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later65, the goals of social care are not so unlimited - they instead must coincide with 
the overriding aims of independence and activity. 
In developing this notion of the individual self as a market, Foucault (2008) 
traced the emergence of the relation between subjectivity and enterprise in his 
discussion of the ordoliberals - a group of German thinkers from the 1930s-1940s. At 
this time, Foucault argued, the notion of enterprise became so generalised it began to 
encompass subjectivity itself (McNay, 2009). Arising from this is the use of the market 
economy to understand non-market relations: 
A conventional liberal understanding of the role of the state is 
principally one of intervention to mitigate social inequalities and 
injustices thrown up by the operation of the market economy. In their 
desire to reduce such overweening intervention, the ordoliberals 
rejected the idea that social rationality can be used to correct market 
dysfunctions, arguing instead that economic rationality should be used 
to correct social dysfunctions. 
(McNay, 2009, p.57) 
Many strategies within the policies clearly follow this, where social and personal 
relations are measured and valued within the schema of an economic rationality, a 
market. This has been extended within the policies, as shown below, where lives are 
not only measured against market rationalities, but are expected to themselves 
become (successful) markets: to become fulfilled and remain productive by 
approaching old age with an entrepreneurial spirit, and within a consumerist network. 
Thus individuals must first know what they need (by utilising rational decision making), 
and then have the knowledge, ability and creativity to fulfil this need. Social care 
services are therefore based upon the use of the market to fulfil personal needs, 
requiring the individual to play along in this role. Strategies range from relying on the 
individual’s role as consumer to know how to ‘fix’ their situation, to positioning the 
service user as concurrently the designer and provider of the service: 
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 In Chapter 6. 
149 
 
 
Shop4support is a unique shopping experience used by Harrow Council . 
. . The service is an online shopping forum that enables care users to 
search for and purchase clearly priced products and services. It enables 
people to see the range of services on offer, and to then put together 
their own shopping baskets and mix and match the services they need. 
(BNCS, p.114) 
 
Rather than seeing people as passive recipients of care and support, our 
vision sees them as citizens who are involved in designing the services 
that will help them live their everyday lives. 
(SFC, p.32) 
 
The priority of individual choice and control, exemplified through personal budgets for 
example, rests firmly on the expectation of the individual to be enterprising and 
innovative: 
 
This has made a real difference to people’s lives, by allowing them to 
decide what is most important to them and find innovative ways of 
meeting those care needs. 
(SFC, p.35) 
 
This reconfiguration of subjectivity as enterprising focuses on the pluralisation of 
individual differences through a consumerist market matrix (McNay, 2009)66.   
                                                          
66
 The issue of using individual differences as a form of governance will be explored further in the next 
section. 
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Focusing on the improvement of individual selves and lives, rather than altering 
socio-economic structures, has the consequence of politicising happiness, causing 
concepts such as ‘well-being’ and ‘quality of life’ to become commonplace within the 
policies. These concepts are mostly used as obvious everyday realities in need of no 
explanation: shown, for example, through the creation of ‘well-being services’, 
designed to keep older people independent (BNCS, p.14; OA, p.43). Similarly OA states 
there is a statutory duty to promote the well-being of older people (p.71). Despite the 
current ubiquity of these terms, they are relatively recent additions to health and 
social policy and politics – Shah (2006) notes the term ‘quality of life’ did not make it 
into dictionaries until 1978, and although ‘well-being’ has a longer history it is only 
recently being taken seriously as a political concern. The perceived existence and 
political importance of well-being and quality of life is therefore something distinct to 
our current time, where they have become posited as significant justifications for 
particular policy strategies whilst being simultaneously used as governmental 
strategies.   
A general movement has occurred – primarily in economics - that views 
happiness as something that can be (and perhaps should be) measured (Frey and 
Stutzer, 2002). According to Bruni (2010) whilst interest in happiness is not new the 
methodology used to analyse and study it is: today it is considered to be empirically 
measurable67. This has meant that questions concerning whether we ought to be 
striving for happiness, and how this can be achieved, have become answerable not so 
much through spiritual and philosophical deliberation, but by scientific exploration. 
Layard (2005) confirms: 
Until recently, if people said they were happy, sceptics would have held 
that this was just a subjective statement. There was no good way to 
show that it had any objective content at all. But now we know that 
what people say about how they feel corresponds closely to the actual 
levels of activity in different parts of the brain, which can be measured 
in standard scientific ways. 
                                                          
67
 The Journal of Happiness Studies, first published in 2000, is an example of this, where its stated aim is 
concerned with the scientific understanding of subjective well-being. 
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(p.12) 
However, this view conflicts with alternative research knowledge of the effect cultural 
influences play on an individual’s willingness to claim they are happy, or understand 
themselves in terms of happiness and well-being. Frey and Stutzer (2002) highlight the 
differences between the value placed on happiness in the USA and Japan, claiming that 
this impacts on the tendency for individuals to claim to be happy or not from these 
two regions. They conclude from this that well-being measures are not suitable for 
cross-cultural comparison, but it could also be suggested that well-being measures 
would be illogical and meaningless outside of cultures that put a high value on 
individual happiness. In cultures that value individual happiness, positive emotions are 
often treated as a sign of both personal and social success (Carlisle et al., 2009), their 
measurement therefore become a significant form of knowledge of the social wealth. 
Joshanloo (2013) notes the general culture-free stance of much of the current 
literature on happiness however, and through detailing the perspectives of five Eastern 
traditions regarding happiness demonstrates how Eastern life practices and values are 
often incompatible with Western conceptions of well-being. At the heart of many of 
these differences lies the emphasis on individualism in the Western tradition, leading 
to virtues such as autonomy, self-determination, and personal positive regard to be 
used as indicators of happiness in research. In contrast, in Eastern traditions happiness 
is understood as mostly relational and collective, encompassing virtues such as 
harmony. Contra to the emphasis on individual happiness, the values upheld within 
some Eastern traditions may call for self-sacrifice for the happiness of others. 
Furthermore negative emotions are often viewed as contributing to spiritual 
development, and so happiness-unhappiness cannot be so clearly dichotomised into 
good-bad categories (Joshanloo, 2013).  This acts as a reminder that although well-
being and any feelings of happiness are treated as if located within the individual as a 
singular unit (and therefore researchers look to individual brains to find it, for 
example), they must in fact be built into a social nexus within which they can be given 
form and meaning.     
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One reason for the policy interest in well-being may be, as suggested by Layard 
(2005), that it is a motivational device: we seek to feel good68. This makes the 
assumption, as mentioned previously, that individuals act rationally and always in their 
‘own interest’ which, as already noted, has been contested. Using well-being as a 
motivational device for individuals to live independent lives is clearly a strategy in the 
policies: 
 
Better health and participation can become self-reinforcing to improve 
well-being and boost resilience factors that prevent a negative cycle of 
decline in quality of life. 
(SS, p.31) 
 
A focus on well-being covers many areas of life: health, income, personal and social 
relationships, specifically with the intention of promoting independence and active 
ageing: 
 
Promoting well-being, independence, choice and accessibility underpin 
our strategic approach to all services used by older people. We want to 
achieve a society where increasingly diverse older people are active 
consumers of public services, exercising control and choice, not passive 
recipients of them. 
(OA, p.xviii) 
 
From this it is clear that achieving and maintaining well-being requires the individual to 
be doing something: 
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 In line with Eudaimonic well-being, Layard (2005) notes we seek to feel good not moment to moment, 
but overall. 
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not making the most of opportunities can result in inactivity and 
loneliness, reducing an individual’s well-being. 
(BSFA, p.17)  
 
This activity of maintaining a happy and fulfilling life – making the ‘most’ of your life - 
consequently becomes a consuming activity an individual must perform, as Baudrillard 
(1998) describes: 
Modern man spends less and less of his life in production within work 
and more and more of it in the production and continued innovation of 
his own needs and well-being. He must constantly see to it that all his 
potentialities, all his consumer capacities are mobilised. If he forgets to 
do so, he will be gently and insistently reminded that he has no right not 
to be happy. 
(p.80) 
Chapter 2 highlighted this as a feature of a governmental society, where the state 
becomes interested not just in the basic survival of the population but in the way 
individuals’ live their lives: in all their activities insofar as they impact upon the security 
of the population, thereby legitimating the extension of governance into the personal 
daily concerns of individuals. To reiterate this point, Foucault (2007a) stated: 
police must succeed in linking together the state’s strength and 
individual felicity. This felicity, as the individual’s better than just living, 
must in some way be drawn on and constituted into state utility: 
making man’s happiness the state’s utility, making men’s happiness the 
very strength of the state. 
(p.327) 
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 This ‘better than just living’, which may today be called ‘quality of life’ or ‘well-being’ 
is therefore utilised in the policy texts as a governmental tool, which does not aim for 
the personal happiness of each individual, but instead requires each individual to find 
happiness through continual self-development and social participation. 
Well-being, or happiness, has therefore become an essential and expected part 
of life. However, as Baudrillard (1998) suggests the happiness required is not that of 
inner enjoyment that needs no outward signs: the policies are clear, well-being is not 
linked to inner peace or contentment, but must be found through activity, 
participation, having and making choices, and taking control. Thus the policy concern 
with well-being is explicitly linked to the aim of mobilising individuals so that their daily 
lives can be socially and economically productive in retirement and old age.   
Ward and colleagues (2012) highlight the specific impact this may have on 
older people, arguing that basing policy strategies upon a relation of well-being with 
independence, activity and participation may lead to the severe neglect of care and 
caring relationships69 – an aspect their research found to be of prime importance for 
well-being in their older participants. They argue: 
definitions that emphasise physical health, people’s capacity to plan and 
set goals, and to be active within their communities, may exclude from 
any hope of being well those people for whom old age is accompanied 
by illness, a reduction in physical horizons because of mobility problems 
and who, because of advanced old age, are focused on being well in the 
present rather than planning for the future. 
(Ward et al., 2012, p.8) 
Rather than promoting the well-being of older people then, the policy strategies aimed 
towards well-being examined here, based as they are upon market conceptualisations 
of productivity and potential, instead act to hinder the possibility for at least a 
significant section of older people to be and live well. This is compounded by the 
severe neglect of relational and collective aspects of well-being, where meaningful 
                                                          
69
 Alongside informal carer relations, Ward et al. (2012) include human interaction as a potentially 
significant care relationship, such as face to face contact and friendships. 
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interaction is understood not primarily within a framework of ‘care’ but conversely as 
a form of active citizenship.      
Individuality 
 The NSF begins by criticising the rigidity within which health and social care has 
previously been constrained: 
 
In the NHS, the one-size fits all world of the post war years has survived 
for too long. 
(NSF, p.2) 
 
The issue with a ‘one-size fits all’ approach to care is that it is at odds with the diversity 
thought to be inherent to individuals. In recognition of this the evidence presented in 
OA Volume 2: 
 
challenges the stereotyping of older people as a homogenous group, 
with uniform needs and aspirations 
(OA vol.2, p.3) 
 
It therefore focuses on diversity even within a social group (originally constructed 
around an assumed similarity): individuals both need different things, and want 
different things. In sum: 
 
  Each of us is unique 
  (ICR, p.12) 
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This focus on uniqueness inevitably emphasises how individuals differ from each other, 
suggesting no need, solution, or way of life can be replicated.  
The emphasis on individual diversity expressed within these polices, asserts 
that difference is not only a reality, but also a value. It is not just that each individual is 
different to every other, but that these differences are intrinsic to what make up the 
individual – the defining points of a self. Social care support services must respect and 
promote this individual diversity. Personalised services – those tailored to individual 
needs – therefore become paramount as: 
 
“Personalised care and support is the key to upholding an individual’s 
human rights.” 
(Stakeholder response to the Consultation, BNCS, p.145) 
  
Understanding difference as a value society ought to cherish has caused the 
prioritisation of difference to become commonplace in social theory and social policy, 
highlighted by the prevalence of identity politics, and associated rights based 
discourses. Webb (2009) argues that the neo-liberal celebration of difference and 
diversity has transferred across to social work as a ‘right to difference’, indicating that 
the aim of social care support and services is to promote and enable difference, to the 
detriment of recognising and utilising sameness – something he asserts is vital for 
sustained social justice and political change. For Badiou (2001) this emphasis on 
difference is both shallow and dishonest, as only differences that conform to a certain 
identity are actually tolerated. He uses the example that immigrants only become 
acceptable within society to the extent that they seek integration to demonstrate this, 
concluding: ‘(which seems to mean, if you think about it: [they are tolerated] only if 
they want to suppress their difference)’ (Badiou, 2001, p.24). Despite valuing diversity, 
this suppression of difference can be demonstrated in the policies, where the diversity 
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of individual needs and aspirations is emphasised and valued only insofar as they are 
useful for encouraging the self to conform to a particular identity which, as has been 
argued, is characterised by the necessity to be both constantly active and 
independent. For example, whilst recognising in principle the ‘right’ of an individual to 
choose ‘unwisely’ (ICR, p.21), in practice it appears this choice would not be 
supported: 
 
whilst the individual is entitled to live with a degree of risk, the local 
authority is not obliged to fund it. 
(ICR, p.22) 
 
Therefore whilst later life is presented as unlimited lifestyle options, for those who 
need assistance at least, the choices are severely constrained by structural conditions 
such as eligibility criteria and funding priorities, designed and constructed around 
specific value systems and political agendas. Thus an individual’s lifestyle choice is 
tolerated to the extent that it matches the identities and legitimate lifestyles already 
set out within these.     
 The ‘right to difference’ is promoted in the policies via the extension of choice, 
and putting service users back in control of the services they use. The ‘right to 
difference’ therefore translates into a ‘right to choose’ coupled with personal 
responsibility for your own life course: choice and control are vital to the ‘individual’: 
 
Personalisation means that systems and those working within them 
treat each person as an individual; choice and control are critical 
elements in moving towards more personalisation in health and social 
care. 
(ICR, p.18) 
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Ferguson (2007) claims that the personalisation agenda is based upon a flawed 
conception of those who most use social care services. He notes that the most 
commonly shared characteristic of social work service users is poverty, continuing that 
the combination of poverty with multiple discrimination, lack of (financial and social) 
resources, and often mental and/or physical impairment means that the typical user of 
social care services is not best thought of as a choosing individual shaping their own 
life. By contrast the choices open to them will often be of an extremely limited nature. 
 The limit of choice, however, marks the limit of our individuality by 
constraining our ability to act upon ourselves, to carve out our own lifestyle, and so to 
be self-determining. The issue of whether every person wants this choice and control is 
raised to some degree: 
 
‘You can give people control of it and you can also give people the right 
to control how much control they have over it. That might seem a funny 
point, but it is also important. People do not always want complete 
control but they want some control’  
  (Quote in SFC, p.39) 
 
Yet whilst there is some recognition that not all individuals want control over all 
aspects of their life, it is clear that being in control is the desired state and should be 
aimed for: 
  
People should be in control of their own care and support as far as 
possible. 
(SFC, p.48) 
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Thus choice is positioned as a value (OA, p.iv), and maximum control over one’s own 
life is desired, creating an expectation of active independence. Whilst it is 
acknowledged that not everyone will want full control, this is presented as less than 
ideal. However it is also still described as a form of control:  being able to choose the 
extent to which you are in control of your life is itself an exercise of self-determination 
and as such an expression of your individuality.  
 Personalisation and person-centred care have taken centre stage in the policies 
as a way of fulfilling the diversity of needs, as well as treating individuals as the 
responsible, self-determining subjects they ought to be. Individual budgets play a key 
role in this: 
 
older people are still often treated as passive recipients rather than 
active consumers with their own views about their needs. Our purpose 
in the next years must be to transform that picture . . . That is why I 
particularly welcome the proposals here for individual care budgets. 
This shows how services can extend to some of the most vulnerable the 
benefits of choice and control over their own lives that the rest of us 
take for granted. 
(OA, p.iv-v) 
 
The value of individual budgets lies in the provision of the greater choice they are 
claimed to enable, and the central position they place the individual. It has also been 
asserted they are both more economical and effective at meeting needs than 
traditional services (Glasby et al, 2009), however ‘need’ is here being understood as 
something that is self-evident rather than itself an issue of contestation. The focus of 
the proposed National Care Service, alongside the aim of providing free social care, is 
to create a: 
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system [that] is personalised and flexible enough to support people to 
live their lives the way they want to. . .  [where] needs are supported 
through personal budgets and services and support in line with the 
principles behind the right to control. 
(SFC, p.100)  
 
Who decides upon what these needs are in the first place is not discussed (although as 
disclosed in ICR, local authorities decide what ‘needs’ will be eligible for funding), 
neither is it recognised in the policies that there could be disagreement over what an 
individual might ‘need’. However, it is the ability to be, and remain, in control of one’s 
life that is focused upon as the main problem, and is attended to by the various policy 
strategies. Thus, personalisation: 
 
extends beyond being offered a tailored package of care. It means 
shifting control to the individual and enabling them to identify how 
needs will be met. 
(BNCS, p.91) 
 
 
Whilst individual budgets are valued because of the flexibility they allow, and 
the opportunity to tailor care to the diversity of individual needs, at the same time 
assessments, eligibility criteria and funding levels become standardised in a universal 
system. The standardised single assessment process is expected to be able to discover 
the whole range of needs that might be encountered (NSF, p.30). Beyond this it is 
claimed that care reforms will develop a universal system: 
 
 which empowers people to live their lives the way they want to. 
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 (SFC, p.11) 
 
This implies the policy strategy of standardisation will both promote and enable a 
diversity of lifestyles rather than constrain and homogenize. There appears therefore 
to be a tension between the particularisation and diversity required to cater for 
individual needs, and the standardisation deemed necessary to create a system seen 
to be fair, as well as providing or imposing standards and ways of measuring need and 
success. This tension is noted in BNCS: 
 
There were concerns that a standard assessment risked pigeonholing 
people’s needs, and might conflict with the moves to personalisation of 
services. 
(BNCS, p.59) 
 
However this concern is not resolved or discussed further. The contradictory 
coexistence of standardisation and universal services with personalisation 
demonstrates the complexity with which the self must understand itself and others: as 
unique, solitary, and related to others only via points of difference; yet simultaneously  
through spaces of normalisation – knowing what categories and groups one can be 
assigned to, and how one measures up in relation to others. Once again, whilst choice 
and control are presented as paramount to the individual and their lifestyle, this choice 
and control must exist within the parameters of already existent categories and 
definitions of self and lifestyle. 
 Despite the constant reference to the ‘individual’ in the policy texts, what an 
individual is, and to what extent this term can be used as a way of understanding the 
self needs to be questioned. Discussing Deleuze’s concept of the ‘dividual’, Bogard 
(2008) describes the individual subject as the product of the Modern era: 
encompassing the associated liberal notions of rights and duties. Explaining Deleuze’s 
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(1995) description of individuals being produced via a ‘mold’, Bogard (2008) highlights 
the inappropriateness of the static and contained form of the individual for the 
contemporary demands on the self. The notion of the individual in particular refers to 
a self that is both authentic and irreducible (Williams, 2005) – as has been 
demonstrated with the emphasis on uniqueness in the policies. Deleuze (1995) 
questions this however with his concept of the dividual: the self of the control society 
that is endlessly reducible and continually modulating. Bogard (2008) distinguishes the 
two: 
The dividual is a more flexible form; it is programmable, updatable, 
rewritable, and renewable. Individuals are ‘molded’ or fixed forms 
(persons, human beings, or corpses), but dividuals are settings within 
adjustable parameters, that is, within numerical characteristics of a 
population, like credit scores or risk ratings. 
(p.197) 
Bogard (2008) clarifies that when we see a human being, we still ‘see’ an individual: a 
unique self-determining subject, characterised by liberal notions of human rights and 
social duties. We see a dividual when that same subject becomes understood within 
networks of information: sequences of numbers or letters (as when a self becomes a 
chain of DNA information), or through various profiles (risk assessments for example). 
In this sense the person is not an individual, unique and distinguishable from all others, 
but information plotted out within wider parameters, understood and assessed in 
relation to others, and because of this required to constantly transmute. The proposed 
standardisation of assessment and eligibility provides an example of this:      
 
In the future, we propose that everyone will be assessed in the same 
way. 
(SFC, p.54) 
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Hence, rather than finding ways to understand the uniqueness of each individual, a 
standard assessment will ensure that the same information is routinely collected; 
information that can be broken down, fragmented, used to create risk profiles, 
categorise areas of high need et cetera. Through this the individual becomes lost, and 
in its place appears a mass of information that can be used and reused in a variety of 
ways to understand and judge not only the ‘individual’ it was collected from but also 
others. Deleuze (1995) claims through this that there is no longer a duality of individual 
and mass: only dividuals and data, where separateness becomes less apparent. For 
example: 
Dividuation does not separate you from other individuals (like, e.g., the 
dividing walls of the prison, the school, or the office), but from other 
points along the parameter, and from other parameters that comprise 
your multiple connections to distributed networks (your health 
information, voting records, web surfing habits and so on). 
(Bogard, 2008, p.197) 
Dividuals are separated from others only in the same way as they are separated from 
past and future selves. Thus whilst we are expected to behave as individuals by acting 
as if we are the creators of our futures, individuals become governable via dividuation: 
through being reduced to information and data that can be used both to plot a person 
within certain parameters as well as used to create these parameters to begin with. 
Thus nothing authentic or irreducible remains. 
Conclusion 
 Through this analysis of the techniques of governmentality it has been argued 
that whilst reflecting contemporary notions of a reflexive self, this flexibility assumed 
by the self in the policies marks the parameters within which the individual is expected 
to make sense of and manage her or his life. Therefore alongside the responsibilizing 
anxiety created by the prospect of unlimited choice regarding how it is possible for us 
to live our lives, the expectation that we can all rationally discover our optimal path 
provides the constraints within which these choices must be made. This focus on the 
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individual, and the need to recognise, respect and enable diversity, appears to stand in 
stark contrast to the forms of knowledge presented in the policy texts regarding how 
people are known, and what is important to know about them: primarily as points 
plotted within collective data, of which sense can be made only by its relation to other 
points. As has been suggested, dividuation perhaps provides a more suitable concept 
for understanding the subject within these governmental techniques, and makes more 
sense of how individuality and standardisation have been paradoxically brought 
together in the policies. The focus on the individual as a singular and linear unit then, 
reveals its function of making the individual life responsible for the collective security, 
albeit within the context of utilising collective knowledge of the population. 
Furthermore this responsibility must present itself through the future-orientated 
behaviours only possible within this conception of the self as singular and linear. The 
following chapter will further explore this responsibilization specifically through the 
requirement to navigate and balance personal risk-avoidance and risk-taking.   
  
  
165 
 
Chapter 6 
Risk Rationalities and Responsible Decision Makers 
 
Introduction 
Risk rationalities have become commonplace in the structure and formation of 
social policy. Two rationalities of risk can be identified within these policies which 
situate problems and present solutions that are at times in tension with each other. 
Firstly, risk understood within a rationality of preparation through which strategies and 
technologies of future orientated behaviour emerge, including forms of prevention 
and insurance; and secondly a rationality of opportunity and productivity, where 
decision-making within an uncertain world becomes strategized as key to a successful 
future. Constructing social and personal problems (and their solutions) within these 
risk rationalities has the result that they focus on and contain specific features: 
indicating what is to be sought after (valued), what is in need of change 
(problematized), and what type of subject is required to achieve this. This chapter 
attempts to analyse how apparatuses of risk within the policies map out a specific 
terrain within which individuals are required to monitor and manage their lives in 
relation to ageing. Specifically this involves paying particular attention to future events 
with the aim of minimising risks, thereby avoiding the problems associated with 
developing needs (such as dependency for example). It is shown how this impacts 
upon the ageing subject, which becomes responsibilized by the ubiquitous problem of 
exclusion and the assumption that individuals are rational decision makers. Yet despite 
the culture of risk avoidance and aversion, risk taking is expected of individual subjects 
through the requirement to show independence in decision making and seize 
opportunities. As will be shown, this creates a tension between the requirement for 
the individual to be a sovereign decision-maker, yet to simultaneously make choices 
within the already existent parameters of this risk apparatus.       
Exclusion 
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The problem of ageing is presented in these policies as primarily an increased 
risk of social exclusion. The concepts of social exclusion and inclusion are firmly 
entrenched in both British and European government policy (Levitas, 2006). Yet ‘social 
exclusion’ has been used to present perceived problems of society, and suitable policy 
solutions, in multiple ways, indicating that a reference to social inclusion or exclusion 
alone does not reveal the content or direction of the policy. Levitas (1998), for 
example, outlines three discourses that, briefly, are concerned with: i) redistribution, 
primarily concerned with poverty; ii) the moral underclass, centred on the moral and 
behavioural delinquency of the excluded; iii) social integration, focused on paid work 
as the route to inclusion70.  SS defines social exclusion as: 
experienced when a person lacks one or a number of those factors 
important for a good quality of life [decent health, income, home, good 
relationships, and feeling useful]. A shorthand definition is an 
experience characterised by deprivation and the lack of access to social 
networks, activities and services that result in a poor quality of life. 
(SS, p.18) 
Social exclusion is therefore described as an individual experience, it is an 
individualized risk associated with identity and personal lifestyle. Social stability and 
security become threatened by this social exclusion of the individual however, due to 
the burden of increasing and on-going need: 
   
Avoidable illness matters to individuals and their families but it also 
matters to society and the economy. We all bear the costs of days lost 
at work and expenditure on avoidable care. 
(OHOCOS, p.31) 
 
                                                          
70
 Levitas (1998) argues that New Labour policy features a mix of the second and third social exclusion 
discourses: redistribution from rich to poor has been abandoned as a way of tackling poverty in New 
Labour policy, with the focus instead centred on increasing employability (rather than jobs) by tackling 
problem behaviours and lifestyles.   
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Once the social consequences of individual lives have been established, the full threat 
to social order becomes apparent: analysis undertaken to measure the extent of 
exclusion experienced by older people took account of seven dimensions (all relating 
to ‘good life quality’) including: social relationships; participation in both cultural and 
civic activities; having access to basic services (shops, health services); feeling safe in 
your neighbourhood; having a bank account and savings; and being able to afford 
household utilities and an annual holiday (SS, p.18). Using this framework 49% of older 
people are thought to be experiencing exclusion on at least one dimension (SS, p.19). 
This signals the breadth of this threat, calling for us all to be vigilant as the risk 
becomes located in our own lives, rather than contained externally in others. This 
definition of social exclusion concurrently brings personal relations, such as 
friendships, and seemingly trivial lifestyle choices, such as attending the cinema, to 
take on a social and political importance related to the collective security of the 
population. 
Several risk discourses can therefore be identified that focus on two 
interrelated consequences: the personal repercussions of exclusion and dependence 
on the individual’s quality of life, countered by specific strategies to combat this; and 
risk understood and tackled collectively through knowledge of populations and the 
rhetoric of shared responsibility. In light of these tensions three broad strategies of 
management can be identified within the chosen policy texts that encompass both 
individual and collective responses to risk: (i) a focus on prevention; (ii) the need for 
increased information and effective communication; and (iii) the importance of choice 
within an expanded market. These strategies target a subject expected to navigate the 
risks identified within the policies through both responsible self-management and a 
sense of social obligation or duty. 
Prevention 
Contrasting with influential theories that claim fear and anxiety, caused by an 
increase in actual or perceived risks, dominate our lives (Beck, 1992; Furedi, 2002), 
there is evidence to suggest that reaction, to some risks at least, is better characterised 
by apathy. Hood and colleagues (2001) demonstrate and endeavour to explain the 
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surprising lack of regulation, and apparent public concern, for various risks, and the 
over regulation of others. A general lack of concern was also found in a qualitative 
study conducted by Hawkes and colleagues (2009) that focused on risk and worry in 
everyday life71. They (2009) found that a prominent category to emerge from the 
analysis was the lack of worry reported, that ‘Participants were often keen  to stress 
that they were not the worrying kind’ (p.218), and ‘that the  media ‘tried’ to make 
them worry about certain topics, but that they did not succumb to this’ (p.218). This 
apparent lack of concern in relation to certain sorts of risk may explain the effort 
within the policies to depict exclusion as a personal and social problem. The aim of the 
policy strategies is to motivate and mobilise individuals into action. It has already been 
demonstrated (in Chapter 4), that risk avoidance in old age does not and should not 
involve avoidance (to participate) or inactivity – as would be the apathetic response, 
but instead requires being active: actively preparing. An older person should not, for 
example, stay at home to avoid falls, but actively prepare for the eventuality by 
remaining fit, adapting the domestic environment, and so on. A plethora of 
safeguarding techniques already exist that aim to protect individuals from the 
traditional burdens of old age, enabling them to continue to enjoy life and contribute 
to the state’s prosperity. The need to motivate and convince individuals to act is 
demonstrated through presented evidence of a general lack of preventative behaviour, 
which therefore increases the risk of future exclusion: 
 
FACT 1: 7 million people are estimated to be under-saving for 
retirement – this means they will not be able to fund their aspirations 
or, in the most extreme cases, may find themselves living in poverty in 
retirement. 
FACT 2: Only 17 per cent of men and 13 per cent of women between 
the ages of 65 and 74 meet the Chief Medical Officer’s 
recommendations for physical activity of 30 minutes on five or more 
                                                          
71
 This research used diary entries and unstructured interviews to determine what the main worries and 
perceived risks in the participants’ lives were, as well as the extent to which participants thought about/ 
worried about these risks (Hawkes et al, 2009). 
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days a week. Yet people who are physically active reduce their risk of 
developing major chronic disease by up to 50 per cent and the risk of 
premature death by between 20 and 30 per cent. 
(BSFA, p.17) 
 
This is an appeal to be concerned about the future, to worry about its effect on your 
personal lifestyle, to recognise the gravity of the potential risk. The strategies 
suggested are based on a conception of old age as a period of life that needs planning 
if it is to be successful, thus the problem of exclusion is the result of a personal failure 
to prepare. It is therefore implied that exclusion is not due to a lack of welfare or social 
concern for individuals, but is rather an individual failure to prepare for and suitably 
manage their own life.   
Preventative services 
  There is a clear focus on preventative services in the policies, directly linked to 
the problems arising from the ageing population: 
 
We must set out a new direction for health and social care services to 
meet the future demographic challenges we face. We must reorientate 
our health and social care services to focus together on prevention and 
health promotion. 
(OHOCOS, p.9) 
 
Despite the root problem being old age, the risks of ageing are presented as a concern 
to us all requiring the involvement of the whole of health and social care: 
 
a key principle is that issues relating to older people need to be: 
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 Embedded in the normal planning and management structures 
of local agencies – older people’s issues should not be 
ghettoised in separate ‘older people’s departments’ or in social 
services 
(OA, p.70) 
 
 Similarly, it appears that it is never too early to prepare for old age as even actions in 
utero are presented as important for successful ageing:  
 
Prevention begins by building good health and a healthy lifestyle from 
the beginning of an individual’s life. We are strengthening the provision 
of antenatal, postnatal and health and early years services, including 
through our proposals for the new NHS ‘Life Check’. 
(OHOCOS, p.46) 
 
Thus it is never too soon for an individual to be concerned about the impact of their 
current lifestyle on their ability to manage old age. As discussed in Chapter 4, this 
demonstrates how old age is treated as a specific category when relating to the 
lifestyles of older individuals and the challenges it raises for social welfare, yet its 
solution involves the dispersion of the problems of ageing throughout all life stages 
and all public services. Due to this, antenatal services and early years education 
become important elements in managing the risks of old age and an ageing 
population. 
 One specific aim of preventative services is to stop need, and so the threat of 
exclusion, from developing in the first place: 
 
171 
 
We will do more to stop people developing care and support needs in 
the first place. We will also help to prevent people’s condition getting 
worse once they have a care and support need. 
(SFC, p.50)  
 
Most illnesses are avoidable. 
(OHOCOS, p.16) 
‘Need’ is presented here as both undesirable and unnecessary. It is claimed that it is 
possible to stop physical needs from developing, with the implication that not 
requiring help or support from others is a normal, achievable and desirable state. 
Furthermore, by targeting members of the population before  a ‘need’ has even 
developed means everyone can be subjected to interventions and risk management 
technologies, for example mid-life health checks, accessible online self-assessments, 
participation in community activities, and universal services to support good health 
and well-being in the general population72 (BNCS). Problematizing need results in a 
problematization of dependency. Culpitt (1999, p.148) argues that neo-liberal welfare 
discourse constantly portray welfare negatively by warning against the dangers of 
dependency, and claims this is played out through discourses of risk reduction and 
social exclusion amongst others. In relation to social exclusion Culpitt (1999) highlights 
the subjectification of social problems, through their location in the self: ‘Dependency . 
. . is related not only to poverty, youth, ill-health etc. but to the ‘problem’ of having 
poverty, youth and ill-health as an expression of the self’ (p.149). It is not the need-in-
itself which is focused upon but how this need becomes manifest as an individual 
feature of the person, for example: 
 
                                                          
72
 These are services designed for people who do not have the level of ‘need’ that would enable them to 
access the proposed National Care Service. Their scope is wide including employment, care and support, 
health, housing, volunteering, education and leisure and are aimed at the ‘general population’ (BNCS, 
p.78). 
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Poor health can have a major impact on well-being and the ability to 
remain independent. However, there is evidence to suggest that older 
people only feel that their independence has been compromised if their 
ability to exercise control and choice over their daily living is lost. 
(SS, p.40) 
 
Here the issue is not presented as the ill health, but how ill health impacts upon the 
character of an individual, affecting both their relationship to society, and their 
capacity to independently control their daily lives, it is therefore not the ill health that 
becomes the focus and target of risk reduction strategies, but the individual regarding 
how they manage their ill health. Fraser and Gordon (1994), through their genealogy 
of dependency, demonstrate that various forms of dependency were at one time an 
acceptable way of ensuring proper hierarchical subordination. However, in what they 
term post-industrial use, all forms of adult dependency are to be avoided as it has 
become symptomatic not of a person’s economical standing or socio-legal status, but 
of their moral or psychological strength: ‘dependency in this sense is an individual 
character trait like lack of will power or excessive emotional neediness’ (p. 312). 
Despite illness and physical infirmity being ordinary and everyday occurrences, the 
need for support is associated with a flawed character. The policy focus on the 
prevention of needs therefore acts to responsibilize and moralise the individual, hence 
strategies focus not on state interventions but lifestyle management. 
Preventative lifestyles 
 
People are responsible for taking good care of themselves throughout 
their lives, and for knowing when to ask for extra help. 
(SFC, p.82) 
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Taking care of yourself, and knowing when help is needed to retain a suitable level of 
independence requires knowledge: knowing what signs to watch for, being aware of 
what needs will require support to stop them spiralling. To aid this, many policy 
initiatives centre on the production of self-knowledge in order to enhance successful 
self-care: 
 
To help people take control over their health and the steps they need to 
take to improve it we are currently piloting the NHS Mid-life LifeCheck. 
This is an online health and lifestyle assessment for people aged 45-60 
focusing on factors including smoking, healthy eating, alcohol use, 
physical activity and emotional well-being. 
(BSFA, p.19)  
 
Access to interactive online tools will enable individuals to enter 
information about themselves and allow them to review their options . . 
. about retirement. 
(BSFA, p.20) 
 
Self-knowledge is paramount to successful preparations for later life. Situated 
knowledge of the individual is required to determine possible futures and discover 
suitable life strategies for avoiding undesirable futures, and as an individual’s health or 
future security can never be assured this requires a continual habit of ‘watching’ to 
respond to personal and environmental changes (Greco, 1993).   This knowledge needs 
to be actively created, however knowledge of the self is not gained through a process 
of inner contemplation, but is instead found in demographic information – do they 
belong to any ‘at risk’ groups?; and specialist knowledge  – medical categories or 
diagnoses, financial options and so on. Self- knowledge is not, therefore, simply 
knowledge of the self, but knowledge of where the self is positioned within a network 
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of collective and collected self-knowledges. Knowledge of others is then essential for 
preventing a later life of exclusion, or alternatively, knowledge of the self must at the 
same time be knowledge of the collective.  
The importance and value of demographic knowledge of a population is 
demonstrated through measuring the success of healthy lifestyle promotion in terms 
of the proportion of the population that take up ‘flu vaccinations, or are screened for 
breast cancer (OA, p.56) for example. Alongside showing the proportion of a 
population vaccinated against ‘flu, this demographic information more importantly 
evidences to the extent to which individuals are active in their own self-care – itself a 
preventative factor: 
 
Key to this project is the notion that older people’s active citizenship is a 
form of prevention in itself. 
(SS, p.33) 
 
Self-care therefore necessitates social activity focused on an individual responsibility 
for current and future lifestyles, both requiring the active collection of self-knowledge. 
The development of a health or social care need will always, therefore, be tainted with 
a suspicion of a lack of adequate effort or motivational ability: 
If the regulation of lifestyle, the modification of risky behaviour and the 
transformation of unhealthy attitudes prove impossible through sheer 
strength of the will, this constitutes, at least in part, a failure of the self 
to take care of itself – a form of irrationality, or simply a lack of 
skilfulness. 
(Greco, 1993, p.361) 
Due to this Greco (1993) links the individual ‘duty to be well’, with the necessity of self-
mastery for good health. Good health requires control of the self: ill health is 
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problematized not for the physical incapacity it may bring, but the decline in 
independence that it signifies. 
Information and Advice 
Self-knowledge and self-care, essential for successful life management, require 
input from public services as a point of contact for information and advice. The 
accepted and expected role for government, as discussed in Chapter 2, as a body that 
administers and manages the population, steering rather than rowing, focuses on the 
production and distribution of information, support and advice73. The aim to govern 
the population through information and advice giving implies the assumption of a 
particular type of subject: specifically the rational or prudential actor (Kemshall, 2010), 
which becomes responsible for the management of risk (or lack of it) via rational 
decision making. 
Accessible information 
The risks of ageing are presented as having their origins in a lack of knowledge: 
 
Many people currently do not prepare well because they underestimate 
how long they will live or do not know how to access the right 
information and advice. 
(BSFA, p.17) 
 
This deficit model suggests that ignorance and flawed calculations are the cause of 
insufficient preparations, coupled with an inability to access the information and 
advice to correct this. This implies that with the correct knowledge of the self, and 
some guidance in collecting and understanding this, individuals will make satisfactory 
preparations for later life and so avert the risk of exclusion. The individual is therefore 
                                                          
73
 As discussed in Chapter 2, Dean (2007) argues that individuals and populations are also governed by 
authoritative and coercive forms of power dependent on the status they hold and what the situation is. 
For the government of everyday life management however, as is the focus of the policies being 
analysed, a governmental approach based on ‘governing from a distance’ dominates.   
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treated as a rational actor by policy makers, thought to be driven by personal and 
individualised preferences (Taylor-Gooby, 2008). Arising from this, the logical role for 
central government is to provide accessible information and support on risk 
assessment and management, to enable individuals to effectively manage themselves 
by striving towards their personal aspirations. It is made clear in the policies that this is 
what individuals expect, and so is in keeping with how the population wants to be 
governed:  
 
People want to keep themselves well, and take control of their own 
health. This came through clearly in our consultation. People asked for 
more help to do this, through better information, advice and support. 
(OHOCOS, p.31) 
 
‘Many of us are trying to muddle through the system without any help 
or guidance’ 
National Pensioners Convention, response to the engagement process 
(SFC, p.43) 
 
Justifying strategies and interventions as manifestations of a collective consensus, and 
treating the targets of the strategies as independent rational citizens, unites 
governmental discursive strategies with public desires. This retains the ideal of the 
subject as an independent sovereign of her or his future whilst setting the parameters 
within which these futures will develop. The key to ‘good’ and acceptable governance 
then is to set the boundaries within which individuals can get on with it themselves: 
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Public bodies can and should do more to support individuals and give 
everyone an equal chance to become and stay healthy, active and 
independent. 
(OHOCOS, p.25) 
 
‘We are not here to dictate to people about their lifestyle, just to give 
them information on other options and advice’ 
(Case study, OHOCOS, p.37)  
The provision of information and advice therefore become key governmental 
strategies, essential for individuals to age successfully. As well as being one of the six 
key aspects of the proposed National Care Service (SFC, p.47), strategies based on 
information and advice form the basis of many policy initiatives including the proposal 
of an ‘information prescription’ for those with long-term needs: 
 
to signpost people to further information and advice to help them take 
care of their own condition. 
(OHOCOS, p.114); 
 
 the development of an interactive ‘one stop shop’ to help those in mid-life to plan 
ahead (BSFA, p.8), and an ‘Active at 60’ package – an initiative to use smart card 
technology to bring together access to various services and entitlements (Mowlam et 
al., 2012), aimed at: 
 
[providing] people approaching their 60th birthdays with information 
about their entitlements and opportunities such as the free swimming 
initiative launched this year. 
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(BSFA, p.8)  
 
These strategies demonstrate the many opportunities already available to enable 
successful preparations for later life, whatever their current life stage or personal 
circumstance. Any failure to do so must therefore be an individual failure to grasp 
these opportunities.  
Petersen (1999) notes that ignorance is often seen by experts as a deficit in 
need of correcting by more and better information, continuing, ‘There has been little 
apparent recognition of the fact that public ignorance is actively constructed and few 
efforts to understand what lay people’s apparent ignorance might reveal about their 
relationship to science’ (p. 135). Similarly, Giddens (1991) suggests that modern forms 
of expertise are understood as a combination of specialisation and training, meaning 
that expertise is thought to be available to everyone with the time and resources to 
attain it. Ignorance due to inaccessible information is therefore unnecessary and a 
major obstacle to self-management, hence policy initiatives focus on the development 
of easy and simplified access to information and services (OA, p.59; SFC, p.10), making 
it both convenient to access and understandable to everyone. By connecting the need 
to be informed with an individual’s ability to manage themself, the onus is on the 
individual to take part in this pathway acquisition of knowledge. Rather than being 
looked after, or having their needs managed by someone else, those who make the 
effort to be informed become partners in their care, and experts of themselves: 
 
People who need services are often the experts in their own care  
(SFC, p.9) 
 
Furthermore, not only will knowledge of her or himself aid an individual’s own self-
management, it will also enable others to better understand and care for themselves: 
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The Expert Patients Programme (EPP) provides training for people with 
a chronic condition to develop the skills they need to take effective 
control of their lives. Training is led by people who have personal 
experience of living with a long-term illness. 
(OHOCOS, p.112) 
 
Understanding service users as having, or ideally attaining, expertise of their needs 
changes the relationship they have with services and workers: 
 
Care workers will need to work with people as expert partners, to help 
them achieve what they want to achieve. 
(SFC, p.74)  
 
The aim then, is for individuals to become ‘partners’ in the management of their needs 
through gaining expert knowledge of their individual circumstances and using this 
information to plot a path to the attainment of the/their desired future. However, a 
problem noted by Petersen (1999) is that, ‘What empirical evidence exists suggests 
that there is likely to be a significant mismatch between expected rational practices of 
the self and subjects’ participation in preventative behaviours’ (p.139). 
Knowledge production 
Alongside accessibility, a specific duty of government is the production of the 
information needed for self-management. Information needs to be produced in order 
to know what services and resources are needed, and how they need to be targeted: 
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There is . . . clear evidence that simply offering routine physical checks, 
such as cholesterol testing, to everyone in the population is not an 
effective way of identifying people at risk of disease and ill-health. 
(OHOCOS, p.31) 
 
Instead: 
 
The best way of empowering people to take charge of their own health 
and well-being is to focus on the major risk factors that may affect their 
health 
(OHOCOS, p.31) 
 
Knowledge of the self here relies upon the assessment of individual ‘risk factors’ and 
categorising the individual accordingly. Through this self-knowledge becomes directly 
linked to specific knowledge of the population. In an attempt to highlight the diversity 
of risk rationalities and the logics on which they are based, Dean (2010) describes 
‘epidemiological risk’ as that concerned with rates of morbidity and mortality across a 
population. Based on a preventative ethos, this specific risk rationality acts to screen 
and observe population characteristics in order for individuals to better screen and 
observe themselves. In this way the generalised risk of ageing can be personalised and 
made specific so that each individual can target their own weaknesses, lifestyles can be 
tailored to personal needs, and interventions can be targeted to ensure maximum 
benefit. 
The mapping and targeting of populations is suggested as a current example of 
good governance. This information is claimed to be necessary for highlighting gaps in 
service provision, alongside, and perhaps more importantly, identifying groups who 
are not so effective at managing their own needs:  
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The Director of Adult Social Services and the Director of Public Health 
will carry out regular needs assessments of their local population . . 
.This will ensure that PCTs and local authorities have a better 
understanding of their local populations and the challenges they face in 
tackling health inequalities. They should already be mapping and 
targeting at-risk populations as part of their community strategies   
(OHOCOS, p.166) 
 
Mapping an ‘at-risk population’ gives it a physical and objective reality – it makes the 
assumption the population already exists; the job of local government is to locate it so 
that it can be made subject to the appropriate services and interventions. The job of 
the expert then, is to describe the size and shape of this population, and through this 
identify which individuals belong to it: that is, to identify which individuals are falling 
short of effective self-government (Rose, 1999b). 
When the aim of risk management is to prevent ‘unwanted’ futures, the 
techniques used aim to turn generalised demographic knowledge into personalised 
risk factors, with the intention that individuals will act in their own best interest. 
However, there are situations where a broad knowledge of population characteristics 
is not seen as helpful to their prevention:  
 
Funding options 
Our care and support needs in life and old age are inherently uncertain. 
Two in three women and one in two men will develop high care needs 
during their retirement. But some people will need no care and support 
at all. 
(SFC, p.14) 
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Here, rather than being used to map and target, knowledge of the development of 
needs across the population only highlights the uncertainty and unpredictability of the 
situation - some individuals will be affected, but we cannot know who: 
 
At the moment . . . although there are risk factors which can make it 
more likely that someone may need some care later in life, there is no 
way of knowing whether a particular person will need care at all, or how 
much it might cost. 
(SFC, p.98) 
 
The aim here is not to prevent, but to encourage all members of the population to 
accept equal responsibility for the social and economic impact of these needs, through 
the inherent uncertainty of their own personal future. This emphasis on unknowable 
futures rationalises practices aimed at spreading the burden of the risk, making sense 
of managing the economic risks of an ageing population through social insurance 
schemes for example (SFC, Chapters 5-6). According to Ewald (1991) insurance posits 
risk as collective: it functions by socializing risk, thereby making each person part of 
the whole. This requires a further level of preparation on the part of the individual as 
Ewald (1991) elaborates: 
To provide for the future does not just mean not living from day to day 
and arming oneself against ill fortune, but also mathematizing one’s 
commitments. Above all, it means no longer resigning oneself to the 
decrees of providence and the blows of fate, but instead transforming 
one’s relationships with nature, the world and God so that, even in 
misfortune, one retains responsibility for one’s affairs by possessing the 
means to repair its effects. 
(p.207)  
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Whilst the focus on unknowable futures appears to be in contradiction with an 
understanding of risk as manageable through preparation and increased knowledge, 
both of these rationalities of risk rely on responsibilizing the individual for managing 
and preparing for the future. Whether risk is knowable and can be planned for, or 
uncertain and so requiring some form of insurance as protection, successful ageing and 
the security of the collective are presented primarily as dependent upon an 
individual’s ability to create for themselves a future characterised by independence 
(physical, emotional and financial) and activity.   
Despite the requirement for individuals to be aware of any risk factors that may 
inhibit them from ageing successfully, it is not up to individuals to determine what 
these factors are. Individuals are encouraged to take responsibility for managing, and 
even assessing risk, but not to decide what constitutes a risk.  In ICR individual 
perception of risk is spoken of as a hindrance to actual knowledge of risk, therefore: 
 
a perceived risk needs to be tested and assessed to see if it is real. 
(ICR, p.9) 
 
Here a two-fold conception of risk is revealed: perception of risk ‘which may or may 
not be real’ (ICR, p.10), and real risk – that which has been assessed. An individual’s 
knowledge of what risks, if any, are relevant to them is therefore necessarily 
dependent on expert knowledge and guidance. Even self-assessments require that the 
individual self-diagnose against a set of already determined risk criteria and categories. 
Slovic (1999) highlights how risk has tended to be dichotomised: where experts are 
thought to be dealing with real risks – objective and rational, and the public as relying 
on perceptions of risk – distorted by the influence of emotion. He endeavours to 
demonstrate the complex and judgemental nature of expert risk measures and 
assessments, for example by listing nine different ways that mortality risks are often 
expressed dependent on who the information is being produced for, and for what 
purpose. Whilst maintaining that there does indeed seem to be a difference in the way 
184 
 
experts and the public understand and assess risk, the former understanding risk as 
synonymous with probability of harm and the latter with more qualitative information 
and uncertainty, Slovic (1999) dismantles the suggestion that one understanding is 
more neutral or ‘reliable’ than the other, rather both versions are constructed around 
what is thought to be relevant and useful within the context of the situation. 
By considering risk as real only when it has been assessed, what is shown to be 
important is some form of consensus to agreed norms and standards. Hence the 
individual is not to be left alone to assess, diagnose, and act on his or her own needs, 
but must do this only within the nexus of already existing knowledge and consensual 
understanding. This points to the continual tension of the need for the ‘expert other’ 
by individuals tasked to be masters of their own future (O’Malley, 2000). 
Supported decision making 
  The practice of supported decision making aims to stabilize this tension 
through making expert input the foundation upon which individuals can take control of 
their situation: 
 
Individuals need information, signposting and support, so that they can 
take control and make informed choices about their care and 
treatment. 
(OHOCOS, p.111-112) 
 
This suggests the ability to make advantageous decisions is only possible through the 
consumption of expert knowledge and guidance. The individual is in control of her or 
his future not by looking only to her or himself for guidance on how to navigate the 
future, but conversely by seizing the opportunities made available in the form of 
information of services, activities and entitlements; knowledge of risk factors and their 
individual application via assessment and diagnosis; and tailored support and guidance 
to make sense of these risks in relation to a specific life.  
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Within this there is a clear link between information and good decision making: 
 
Empowerment can be achieved through the simplest approaches such 
as providing the information to make good decisions 
(SS, p.30) 
 
Good, clear information to help people make informed choices . . . will 
ensure the best possible outcomes. 
(ICR, p.21) 
 
The necessity of information for decision making, as implied above, reflects the idea 
that individuals make decisions based on an assessment of the consequences of 
possible alternatives (Loewenstein et al, 2001), suggesting that decision making is both 
a rational and cognitive activity. This assumption has been challenged by some 
psychological research that claims not only is decision making an emotive activity, but 
too much information can actually hinder an individual’s ability to make ‘good’ 
decisions (Finucane and Holup, 2006). Damasio (1996) studied the impaired decision 
making skills of brain damaged patients whose ability to experience emotions had 
been affected, whilst their cognitive faculties remained intact. He demonstrated that in 
contrast to decision making as a rational cost-benefit analysis, emotions and feelings 
are enmeshed in the networks of human reasoning and are therefore a necessary 
component of good decision making. Furthermore, research by Loewenstein and 
colleagues (2001) suggests that decisions are not made by considering anticipated or 
possible future emotions, but through the experience of the immediate emotions at 
the moment of decision making. Through this they claim that decisions are not based 
on a consequential analysis but on ‘gut feelings’, and suggest this explains why 
reactions to risk often depart from what would be considered as the ‘best course of 
action’ . What a policy strategy based around the provision of information fails to take 
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into account therefore, is the situated response of the individual to a standardised 
service, and the complexity of influences in decision making. Echoing this, Kemshall 
(2010) argues that policy makers have a tendency to work from a normative and 
instrumental view of risk rationality whereas practitioners operate from a situated 
rationality. With the role of government as responsible for providing equal opportunity 
through accessible information, and the individual’s responsibility to utilise this 
effectively to ensure good decision making, bad decisions will signify either the need to 
generate more information or the irrationality of the individual – assuming them to be 
unable or unwilling to correctly weigh up the benefits. Thus whilst the rational-
consequential perspective does not work hard to understand situational decision 
making, it does provide an effective framework through which the individual is 
responsibilized by making their actions a direct consequence of their (deliberative) will. 
The value of self-determination is therefore made clear.  
Miller (2009), discussing the influence of modernist assumptions that underpin 
various risk rationalities in organizational risk research, points out the priority given to 
decisions over actions, arguing the logic that decisions cause actions neglects the 
impact practices may have on risk and responses to risk. This priority of cognition over 
action is demonstrated within the policies in terms of how the relationship between 
decision making and risk taking is presented:  
 
It is . . . for the older person to determine the level of personal risk they 
are prepared to take when making decisions about their own health and 
circumstances. 
(NSF, p.27) 
 
levels of risk are perceptions, and a judgement about an acceptable 
level of risk should be a joint decision. 
(ICR, p.11) 
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Here decision making is presented as the cause of any risk taking. Risk is to be 
managed and controlled via a kind of thinking machinery and iterative deliberation. 
Actions are the measured outcomes of these deliberations, therefore any actual risk 
taking is not – or should not be -  a spontaneous act, or indicative of a chaotic 
situation, but the result of informed decision making and so a deliberate and 
meaningful act. Thus even risk is caused not by individuals doing, but by individuals 
thinking: 
 
The possibility of risk is an inevitable consequence of empowered 
people taking decisions about their own lives. 
(ICR, p.8) 
 
In reaction to this Miller (2009) claims that ‘action is not reducible to thinking’ (p. 165), 
instead pointing to the ‘particularity, social embeddedness and evolution of situated 
practices’ (2009, p.165).This complex understanding of action accepts a multitude of 
factors as relevant to the manifestation of an act, and so consequently suggests an 
action does not have a single source, as is implied by the idea of the cause-effect 
relationship that decision equals action. Thus rather than imagining an act to be the 
end result of an individual will, action is disengaged from the individual as a primary 
source, and therefore also disengaged from the effects of cognition. This is contrary to 
the techniques in the policies that intend to govern individual lifestyles through 
emphasising the relationship between current choices and future consequences: 
 
 Help people understand their responsibilities and the 
implications of their choices, including any risks 
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People need to be fully informed about the potential consequences of 
the choices open to them, so that they can take into account any risks 
involved and manage them. 
(ICR, p.5) 
 
Furthermore, a duty of government and individual practitioners is to ensure individuals 
approach their lives in relation to an understanding of themselves as a responsible 
decision maker: 
 
They may need help to do this, so practitioners need to ensure that 
people have accurate and appropriate information in a form that they 
genuinely understand, in order to make their best decisions. 
(ICR, p.5) 
 
Whilst it is indeed possible to make an ‘illegitimate’ decision, this leads to the warning 
that it is ‘impossible to over-emphasise the importance of keeping accurate records of 
discussions that take place about areas of choice’ (ICR, p.19). This is a reminder that 
decision making leads to accountability, bringing with it a value-judgement on the 
character of the individual: their lack of wisdom, care or judgement, failure to take 
advice, and so on. 
Despite such warnings individual decision making is something greatly 
encouraged in the policy documents analysed. ICR explains itself as:    
 
a means of raising the debate about risk and shifting the balance away 
from risk-aversion towards supported decision making. 
(ICR, p.5) 
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The focus on supported decision making is framed within the context of a re-
evaluation of risk. In particular an appraisal of the tendency to assume risk is best 
avoided, mainly because: 
 
avoiding risk altogether would constrain the choices people can make. 
(ICR, p.1) 
 
Decision making and risk taking   
 Two key strategies in the policies appear to collide – the desire for responsible 
risk management, and the need for individuals to be exposed to various choices, 
coupled with the willingness to grasp the opportunities this brings. Governance 
therefore turns into a delicate balancing act of providing a proliferation of choice and 
options through encouraging innovative services and relying on the logic of the market 
to fulfil needs, whilst maintaining a risk management strategy based on regulation and 
standardisation. The task of the individual to create their future through the selection 
of these innovative services turns the individual into a risk taker whilst the state 
remains a risk manager: 
 
There is an important distinction between putting people at risk and 
enabling them to choose to take reasonable risk. 
(ICR, p.22) 
 
Whilst still in need of management, risk is to a large extent essential for enabling self-
management and providing the possibility of a successful old age. 
Innovation and fulfilling need  
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 Local Authorities are set with the task of commissioning and encouraging 
innovation to ensure there are enough services to allow for individual choice, and that 
these services reflect the needs of their local population: 
 
As people begin to have greater choice over the care they receive, they 
will need to have a range of services to choose from. . . . local 
authorities are best placed to make sure that there is a wide range of 
services available in their area and to encourage new services. 
(SFC, p.12) 
 
Local authorities must be able to innovate at the local level to ensure 
that the right services are available in their local area. 
(SFC, p.32) 
 
Individual budgets epitomise this ideal of choice provided by the marketization of 
services, assuming individuals can pick and choose those to best fulfil their needs.  
More than this, service users become accredited with a ‘consumer power’ through 
which they not only influence, but are responsible for the strength and quality of the 
services provided: 
 
The more people have the right to choose, the more their preferences 
will improve services. 
(OHOCOS, p.17) 
 
Thus government may be considered to have a duty to create the space and conditions 
for different services to appear, but the quality and appropriateness of these services 
191 
 
is related to the choice of individuals: individuals are expected to use their consumer 
power to ensure that the services they support through their custom are those that 
fulfil their needs. This strategy of service provision demonstrates the extension of the 
market as a solution not just to economic problems, but also to personal, social care 
and health needs74. 
Presenting social and health care needs as in need of the market in order for 
them to be met relates the successful provision of need with the ability to be self-
determinate: consumables ‘seem to put us in control. It is we, the consumers, who 
draw the line between the useful and the waste’ (Bauman, 2004, p.95). Applying  free 
market principles to social and health care needs suggests their solution is merely a 
matter of good decision making; this acts to oversimplify complex personal and social 
issues, and places responsibilities onto individuals without also giving them the ability 
to control outcomes. For example: 
Whilst the social work of direct payment may have intended to promote 
self-determination and transformation of care, such decisions are both 
structurally and organisationally constrained, giving ‘poor people 
constrained choices’ but ‘nevertheless requiring them to make wise 
choices with the limited resources they have’ (Gray, 2008, p.185). 
(Kemshall, 2010, p.1253) 
 Smart (2003) suggests that, ‘through the cultivation of needs and the provision of 
means for their satisfaction, consumption comes to constitute a significant means of 
social control’ (p.48). Although the notion of social control may underplay the subtlety 
of the power relations at work here, Smart does bring attention to the issue that what 
is conceived of as ‘need’ is not itself freely chosen by individuals. Despite being 
presented as an unproblematic and obvious reality, what is considered as ‘need’ 
relates specifically to issues of social and political value, thus as has been seen, the 
notion of need in these policies relates to the issue and problematization of 
dependency and social exclusion. Leading from this, the choices available to older 
people - in terms of policy strategies, services, and forms of information and advice - 
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are derived from this particular understanding of need and the related aim of 
independence. It is therefore the ‘need’ to be and remain independent and included 
that prioritises preventative and participatory services across the life course. This could 
be turned on its head however, and instead it could be asked whether it is the ‘need’ 
for people to participate in the economy that brought about strategies of inclusion and 
the related ‘risk’ of exclusion.  
Creating choices for the fulfilment of this specific understanding of ‘need’ 
demonstrates the limited nature of choice. There is not freedom to choose anything at 
all (exclusion is not a legitimate choice75), rather choice is selecting between similar 
preventative services with the aim of social inclusion. Jameson (1991, cited in Smart, 
2003) therefore questions whether we can be thought of as choosing at all: 
market as a concept rarely has anything to do with choice or freedom, 
since those are all determined for us in advance, whether we are talking 
about new model cars, toys or television programs: we select among 
these, no doubt, but we can scarcely be said to have a say in actually 
choosing any of them. 
(p.87)    
This distinction between selecting between, and freely choosing highlights the 
necessary place for the ‘individual’ in the policies, in contrast to the networks and 
collectivities that make up rationalities of risk and need, and the associated strategies 
of choice. From this it can be queried why is it so necessary to relate a choice to a 
specific individual when judgments regarding risk are deemed best dealt with in terms 
of consensus and standardisation? 
Whilst individuals are charged with the task of making decisions relating to 
personal risk assessments and risk management strategies, this must be set within the 
context of some form of consensus regarding both what risk is,  to what extent it is 
acceptable, and how it is best managed:  
 
                                                          
75
 The possibility of making an unwise decision will be discussed later.  
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the Better Regulation Commission’s report on risk calls for a redefinition 
of society’s approach to risk management to recognise that, within the 
right circumstances, risk can be beneficial, balancing necessary levels of 
protection with preserving reasonable levels of choice and control. In 
response, the government is setting up a citizen’s forum to debate what 
should be the right balance between rights and responsibilities. 
(ICR, p.1)  
 
This requirement for a collective approach to risk management (and the claim that one 
already exists) is coupled with a belief that individuals should not be left alone to 
manage their risk: 
 
There were concerns that some of the proposals, principally those 
relating to direct payments and individual budgets, might expose people 
in some situations to unmanageable levels of risk via potentially 
unregulated and under-trained workforce . . . There is now a need for 
standardised procedures for identification of risk and appropriate 
responses among team members. 
(OHOCOS, p.85) 
 
Turner (1997) refers to this standardisation of services as a form of risk management in 
terms of the ‘McDonaldisation of society’: ‘McDonaldisation reduces uncertainty and 
unpredictability . . . [it] removes surprises from everyday life by an extension of 
instrumental rationality to production, distribution and consumption’ (p.xviii). Thus 
whilst the individual may be conceived as a risk taker, the state remains a risk 
manager, affirming the rationality that the role of services may at times be to help 
people put themselves at risk, but never to put people at risk – remaining at all times a 
step away from the choice. 
194 
 
However, the need for a consensus regarding acceptable risk, and for 
standardising and regulating services is posited here not as a way of avoiding risk, but 
rather as a way of encouraging and enabling risk taking behaviour. Thus risk is not 
something to always be avoided, but instead something that is necessary to live a 
fulfilled life as an independent subject. 
Responsible risk takers 
Risk minimisation, through its tendency towards encouraging inactivity, brings 
with it risks of its own: 
 
‘The focus on keeping everything safe results in a huge waste of 
people’s potential’ 
(ICR, p.10) 
 
not making the most of opportunities can result in inactivity and 
loneliness, reducing an individual’s well-being. 
(BSFA, p.17) 
 
Accepting a certain amount of risk is therefore necessary to enable individuals to 
maximise their potential and well-being. Here risk is related to the risks associated 
with activity and being productive, rather than the risk of inactivity which, as will be 
seen, is not an acceptable risk. 
O’Malley (2006) discusses the creative force of uncertainty, demonstrating that 
navigating an unknown future brings with it not only the possibility of harm, but also 
many potential benefits: 
We may take for granted that uncertainty focuses on avoiding or 
minimising harms, as in the taking of precautions on the basis of 
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‘common sense’. But equally, as in the case of speculative investment, 
uncertainty may be creative, generating profit and wealth. 
(O’Malley, 2006, p.19) 
 The example of speculative profit highlights that instances exist where it is the ‘not 
knowing’ that provides the potential for beneficial outcomes. In this sense an 
individual’s potential is presented as an unknown future that needs to be discovered 
through a speculative attitude to risk taking in daily life: 
 
‘Life is about risk, we take risks every minute of the day. We must not 
let it inhibit us, we must use it to guide us and make us think, but it 
should not restrict our ability to lead our lives to the full.’ 
(ICR, p.10) 
 
Risk is here presented as something to be exploited and manipulated, as a tool for 
managing the future. Through this O’Malley (2006) demonstrates that discourses of 
uncertainty reject attitudes and policies where risks are abhorred and instead, ‘regards 
the future as waiting to be formed by the power of will and imagination. In such ways, 
uncertainty is made to appear as a technology of liberation’ (O’Malley, 2006, p.71). 
This equation of risk-taking with choice, and leading from this, personal independence 
and fulfilment and consequently social stability, once again requires the individual to 
take on the characteristics and values of the entrepreneur: ‘flexibility, imagination, 
acuity and inventiveness’ (O’Malley, 2006, p.59). As was discussed in Chapter 5, it is by 
having flexibility of both mind and identity that an individual will be able to keep on 
top of their changing needs, and thereby ensure they do not waste their potential. 
The acceptance of uncertainty and its ability to maximise individual potential 
does not legitimate any risky decision or future however. In accordance with the 
supremacy of the individual to decide it is stated: 
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a person’s wishes should not necessarily be over-ruled by someone who 
thinks they are making an unwise decision 
(ICR, p.19) 
 
However it is clear that unwise decisions will remain unsupported decisions: 
 
the local authority remains accountable for the proper use of its public 
funds, and whilst the individual is entitled to live with a degree of risk, 
the local authority is not obliged to fund it. 
(ICR, p.22) 
 
Along with pointing to the ultimate prioritisation of safety over speculation – risk 
taking being encouraged only if it coincides with certain aims, rather than as a good in 
itself – it is clear that even the entrepreneur must adhere to the regulation of the state 
and the collective consensus regarding ‘acceptable’ and ‘reasonable’ risk, as the 
theoretical right to make decisions is thwarted by the actual inability to act on them.  
The alternative is to choose to be outcast from the system and ‘go it alone’, taking full 
responsibility for the consequences of the decision (assuming the capacity to act on 
the decision): however the hope is that the weight of the responsibility of isolated 
decision making, and the threat of violence in the form of withdrawal of services 
(Dean, 2007), is enough to stop any ‘unwise’ decisions from being acted on.   
The role of the entrepreneur and the associated acceptance of risks is therefore 
only an appropriate subjectivity and lifestyle if it produces a certain future(s).  In 
keeping with this O’Malley (2006) positions the rise of the entrepreneur within the 
neo-liberal state as a reaction to the ‘risk-free’ welfare state, and the desire to move 
away from welfare ‘dependency’  towards self-reliance through exposure to market 
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forces, suggesting that the move away from risk aversion is due to an association of 
safety with inactivity and dependency.  Therefore although the neo-liberal figure of the 
entrepreneur epitomises the type of subjectivity individuals are required to take up in 
order to manage their uncertain futures – characterised by adaptability, innovation 
and ambition - it is clear that individuals must use their enterprising skills to adapt in 
certain ways, and strive for certain aims: 
when we are invited to reinvent ourselves, and to embrace uncertainty, 
there is a certain paradox invoked. The future is certain to be uncertain 
in specific ways . . . the shape of the future is given to us by government. 
Our inventiveness can only be judged in a positive light to the extent 
that we adapt to it; and so the limits of this new freedom are revealed. 
(O’Malley, 2006, p.177)  
Whilst individuals are to approach their future later life as something in need of 
personal preparation and creation, the success of this creation will be judged against 
the avoidance of the various forms of social exclusion – meaning that successful risk 
management will result in an independent and active self, where any needs are met 
with effective strategies of self-care and enterprise. Thus the fluidity of this subjectivity 
must first of all fit within the more rigid boundaries of the active aged.  
Conclusion 
 In conclusion, problems are therefore set out within these policies, and 
solutions presented, using rationalities of risk that expect decisions and behaviours to 
focus on future-orientated planning for later life. It has been shown in this chapter that 
within this the individual is presented as, or expected to be, necessarily adaptable and 
innovative due to both the inherent uncertainty within which this planning must occur, 
and the need to optimise this uncertainty through a speculative approach to lifestyle. 
The successful navigation of this uncertain future therefore requires a self-determinate 
individual and a sovereign decision-maker that is willing to demonstrate her or his 
rational approach to life planning by making use of the nexus of consensus on risk 
management and expert information. The assumptions that life unfolds in line with 
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this linear cause-effect relationship, and that people’s behaviours can best be 
understood as based upon rational action, means that an investigation within the 
policies into the possibility or suitability of these strategies of intervention are non-
existent. Thus whilst ensuring each individual is alone responsible for their successful 
future (later) life (and therefore by implication the collective strength and happiness of 
the population), the actual possibility of this demand is less clear. The following 
chapter will explore community as a space within which these expectations occur, 
through utilising statements of belonging and obligation. It is within the discourses of 
community and citizenship that management and care of the self become intimately 
tied to the strength and prosperity of the state, blurring the distinction between the 
technologies of self and apparatus of domination. Within these, individual lives begin 
to alone bear the weight of global problems and injustices. 
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Chapter 7 
Participatory citizens and the discourse of community 
 
Introduction   
As discussed in Chapter 1 on Foucault’s archaeological method, discourse is not 
limited to linguistics and language. Alongside other inscription devices, such as charts 
and tables, as examples of statements, understanding discourse as more than 
language allows it to be recognised topographically as something both temporal and 
spatial: physical or non-physical boundaries, timescales and time tables, town, road or 
housing planning can all potentially be statements that make up a discursive formation 
as they shape, structure and organise the space within which it is possible to live, to 
act, and therefore also to govern the conduct of people. In the case of community 
these may include boundaries that mark out a neighbourhood, or the physical 
centrality or dispersion of community and local services (the Link-Age Plus pilot project 
that focuses on grouping services together in a physically accessible – that is central - 
position is an example of this (SS, p.9)). This Foucauldian conception of a discursive 
formation as a spatial and temporal structuring or organisation, enables an 
understanding of community as a physical surface upon which certain subjects and 
strategies become possible. This does not mean that community is inert: the 
simultaneous function of community as a discursive and governmental strategy acts as 
a reminder that discourse be treated not as theory, but as a practice. 
 Community is a recurrent theme throughout the policies analysed in the thesis, 
reflecting the belief in community as a key value in Third Way modern rhetoric. 
Despite this reliance in the policies on the notion of community as essential to social 
governance, it is not explicitly stated within them what community is. Delanty (2003) 
sets out the diversity of worldviews, value systems, and lifestyles that exist within the 
notion of community, which acts as a reminder that a reference or appeal to 
community does little on its own to indicate the values, ideals and expectations it is 
intended to encompass. For example, a closed community, such as the Amish 
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community, may actively stifle attempts of individuality and creativity (Delanty, 2003), 
whereas other versions – community as set out within the policies investigated here as 
an example – attempt to turn these into social values. Therefore, whilst not explicitly 
described or argued for, the implicit characteristics attributed to community within the 
policies reveals a particular and specific space within which individual subjects are 
required to conduct themselves, and through which it is possible to legitimate certain 
forms of governmentality. Community can therefore be analysed as a governmental 
space (Flint, 2003) – a place within which it becomes possible and acceptable to govern 
a certain population. 
As will be demonstrated, community is used in the policies as a device through 
which certain social behaviours and social relationships become desirable and 
rationalised, and therefore promoted; whereby particular forms of citizenship are able 
to manifest, and others become problematized. Concurrently, community becomes a 
technology of governance – providing the techniques and devices through which 
individual citizens can be directly acted upon: through the creation of community 
groups and projects, the structuring of community based and locally commissioned 
services, or via the claim to be taking action in the name of community, for the benefit 
of community.  
Community is spoken of in the policies as both currently existing, yet also in 
need of creation and development. An important question in view of this, raised by 
Rose (1999b), is: ‘if community, in so many guises and forms, is proposed as a solution, 
what is it in our welfare democracies that it is seen as a solution to?’ (p.173). This 
chapter will attempt to answer this question through an exploration of how and why 
community receives such an important status. Beyond this, the chapter will turn to 
explore the construction of participatory citizens – a subject position vital for the 
functioning of community as set out in the policies. It will be demonstrated that a 
significant requirement of the participatory citizen is the duty to act on the self, 
causing actions of self care and social action to become indistinguishable. Through this 
it will be seen that notions of the individual, and the values of independence and self-
determination, far from becoming diluted within an ideal of community life, become 
necessary for the citizen to fully contribute to society.  
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Community as a space of government 
The local 
 Despite virtual and non-spatial communities becoming more prevalent, it is 
clear that in discussing community the policies are concerned with the more 
traditional notion of neighbourhoods or ‘the local’ as embedded geographical space: 
 
We want to build inclusive communities that meet local needs 
(SS, p.8) 
 
 This emphasis on local community is used to suggest that older people have an 
increased interest in community matters. For example, the statement that:  
 
Older people are likely to have spent much of their lives within the 
same community. 
(SS, p.85) 
 
is based on knowledge that older people tend to move less, and are therefore more 
likely to spend their lives in the same geographical area.  What is not acknowledged is 
that this does not in itself indicate that an older person has a long membership to a 
community, as even if the person remains static the ‘community’ around them may 
not. As Phillipson (2007) recognises, whereas some people may relocate as a way of 
electing to belong to a particular community, others who lack the ability to make this 
choice may become alienated as the community changes around them. Thus although 
a person may spend the majority of their life in the same place, they may not feel 
themselves to be a long term member of the local community, and so the community 
may not hold any significance for them.  
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Beyond this, whilst there is an assumption that local neighbourhoods naturally 
turn into communities, there is no indication as to what will hold the community 
together at a local level, therefore it is not fully explained why the local is significant 
over and above national government. Any justification that individuals should belong 
to and contribute to their local community is grounded in a national social duty: 
 
Our society is based on the belief that everyone has a contribution to 
make 
(OHOCOS, p.204) 
 
Local communities are relevant only to the extent that resources are often available on 
a local rather than national level. The argument is that: 
 
Services need to be designed locally, so that they can respond to what 
people need in an area, reflect local circumstances and encourage 
innovative approaches to service delivery. 
(SFC, p.122)  
 
This way of organising social services and community resources is based on the 
assumption that it makes sense to understand individuals within their geographical 
locality, rather than through other markers. Structuring society and social welfare by 
placing significance on the local does not lead to a greater focus on the individual 
however, rather it carves out a space within which the individual can become 
actualised, and so through which it becomes possible for them to act, and be acted 
upon. There are not thought to be any overriding differences between the people that 
live in one community or locality, than another: difference lies only in the make-up of 
the local population: how many of each ‘type’ of individual does the local area need to 
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cater for. In fact despite the desire for local flexibility, and belief that local solutions 
will be the most effective, there is at the same time an anxiety regarding the need to 
recognise sameness, and from this the need for national fairness. This concern with 
fairness is expressed through endorsing national consistency, as is demonstrated and 
addressed in the proposed UK National Care Service: 
 
For the first time, there will be nationally consistent eligibility criteria 
for social care, enshrined in law . . . If someone moves to another part 
of England, their assessment will be portable, meaning they will be able 
to take the results of their assessment with them. 
(BNCS, p.71) 
 
 Community, as it is presented within the policies, is not therefore used to represent 
specific ideals or values, nor of a particular way of life – all of which are justified on a 
wider national basis and used to argue for the need for this national consistency. Local 
community instead creates a space within which it is possible to act with authority in 
order to govern mundane, every-day activities. For example, ‘the community’ is 
deemed to have a vested interest in the level of socialising in the over 65s: 
 
sectors of society are not capitalising on the potential of longer lives . . .  
In an average day more volunteering and socialising is currently done by 
people aged 45-64 than by people over 65, there is a huge potential for 
communities to benefit from increasing this. 
(BSFA, p.15) 
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The requirement for individuals to work on their selves as a form of community 
contribution will be discussed later76. What it is important to initially highlight is how 
the notion of community acts as both a reason and a means for governing the 
mundane and traditionally private aspects of living, such as socialising and leisure 
activities.  
 According to Amin (2005), the social has come to be redefined as community 
by New Labour. He notes 25 years ago policymakers would not have considered that 
issues such as local poverty could be dealt with locally, they instead would have been 
seen necessarily as an issue for central government. As has been demonstrated, 
maintaining a role for central government remains an important strategy in the 
policies, expressed as the need to ensure all social citizens are treated equally, and so 
fairly. However, the need to maintain this national element is explained as enabling 
further flexibility. The problem caused by localisation is explained thus: 
 
Existing local authority boundaries create geographical barriers for 
people receiving care and support. Eligibility for care and support differs 
between authorities and care is not easily ‘portable’ 
(SFC, p.54) 
 
Standardised assessment will solve this: 
 
Once they have an agreement about their level of need, they will be 
able to take it with them wherever they go in England (it will be 
‘portable’). They will not need to be reassessed unless their needs 
change. 
(SFC, p.54) 
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The influence of central government is maintained to ensure the individual is 
positioned as in control of their lifestyle and future life-course. Yet whilst the 
assessment of needs become standardised in order to make them portable, how these 
needs are met are still subject to local decision making: the assessment may remain 
the same but the services available will be variable. 
 Neo-liberal agendas therefore challenge the assumption that it is necessary to 
govern centrally, criticising this style of thinking for stifling entrepreneurship and 
growth (Amin, 2005). In contrast, local governing is deemed imperative for enabling 
the entrepreneurial spirit: 
 
Local authorities must be able to innovate at the local level to ensure 
that the right services are available in their local area 
(SFC, p.32) 
 
Due to this reliance on the local for dealing with social welfare issues, Amin (2005) 
argues that ‘the local has been re-imagined as the cause, consequence, and remedy of 
social and spatial inequality’ (p.614).  
The emergence of community as a discursive space within which citizens can be 
governed can therefore be contrasted to previous welfarist policy; for example, Jenson 
and Saint-Martin (2003) note that one function of the old welfare state was to protect 
people from the market, whereas the current social investment state (a term coined by 
Giddens and taken up by Third Way politics (Jenson and Saint-Martin, 2003)) aims to 
facilitate the integration of people into the market as part of its social policy. This 
highlights a radical break in the tradition of social policy that marks the construction of 
new forms of citizenship and social relations, and the creation of new technologies and 
strategies through which these can be governed. Rose (1999b) describes community, 
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as it is spoken of within Third Way political strategies, as the ‘third space’. He claims 
that the different versions of this third space have one paradoxical feature in common:  
On the one hand, the third space they [Third Way strategies] identify 
appears as a kind of natural, extra-political zone of human relations . . . 
On the other, this zone is identified as a crucial element in particular 
styles of political government, for it is on its properties and on activities 
within it that success of such political aspirations and programmes 
depend. This third space must, thus, become the object and target for 
the exercise of political power whilst remaining, somehow external to 
politics and a counterweight to it. 
(Rose, 1999b, p.167-8) 
The post-political presentation of communities as both natural and beyond politics is 
utilised in the policies to the extent that their existence is unquestioned: 
neighbourhoods exist, and individuals and social problems can be understood and 
solved best by utilising this local knowledge. A leap occurs when the physical reality of 
a geographical space ‘neighbourhood’ becomes spoken about as an entity in its own 
right that has the ability to act: 
 
Families and communities need to look out for, and lend a hand to, their 
relatives and neighbours. 
(SFC, p.82) 
 
effective cultural change must come from communities themselves 
(SS, p.6) 
 
These quotes are common examples of how community is described within the 
policies: as a self reliant collective will that can act with a single intention. Presenting 
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community as an agent means it can be not only the site, but also the subject of 
government.  
Rose’s (1999b) claim that community has become an extra-political zone whilst 
simultaneously being a target for political power highlights the extension of legitimate 
governance into all areas of private, family and social life. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
Dean (2007) describes how this is possible through the double movement of the 
unfolding of the political sphere into civil society, and the enfolding of civil society into 
the political sphere. Through these simultaneous movements what was previously 
contained in the political sphere - traditionally the public sphere of centralised 
government – has been extended to all other sectors of society: the ‘third sector’ being 
a prime example, but this is also demonstrated through all aspects of general lifestyle 
management: 
 
For many older people participation in community and civic life are part 
and parcel of everyday life. 
Older people may be involved in the community in a variety of ways – 
participating in leisure, learning and volunteering activities. 
(SS, p.64) 
 
The dispersion of political power into local areas, coupled with the expectation of 
participation, allows the political to spill over into all aspects of life: for example, 
political concern is no longer confined to matters of compulsory level education, but 
now includes learning in its entirety including the post retirement years; not only work 
and employment but also leisure time is a subject of policy intervention, and therefore 
considered a matter of social strategical importance.  
Boundaries of belonging 
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 Cohen (1985) notes that ‘community’ generally implies its members have 
something in common which distinguishes them significantly from any outside group, 
therefore community encompasses both similarity and difference at the same time. 
Whilst this is a logical definition of community and fits well with traditional 
conceptions, it does not fit with how communities are spoken about within these 
policy documents. As has been demonstrated above, community is not 
comprehensively separated from society, it is instead understood to be a facet of, or 
extension of ‘the social’. Thus whilst there is an ‘inside’, there is no –legitimate - 
outside: the outside is not a cohesive group (an alternative community), but a 
fragmentation of community itself, and therefore a threat to common social values. 
Belonging to your community means being a social citizen. Thus as previously 
discussed (in Chapter 2, p.60), a governmental society seeks to implement unity and 
order rather than division. 
 It is within this notion of community that the policy emphasis on inclusion can 
be understood, for example: 
 
All adults and their carers should be included in the life of the 
community 
(SFC, p.60) 
 
The Sure Start approach . . . is part of building inclusive communities 
where older people themselves are leading the change. 
(SS, p.9) 
 
Community is used here not to signify difference from others, but to provide an 
integrated model of social life: to encourage individuals to be active, participatory, and 
209 
 
promote a sense of civic responsibility. Community inclusion then, focuses not so 
much on who you are, but on what you do: 
 
Services should support people to take greater control over their own 
lives and should allow everyone to enjoy a good quality of life, so that 
they are able to contribute fully to our communities. 
(OHOCOS, p.111) 
 
The needs to be met by services are here revealed to relate not to an internal 
psychological understanding of the person, but rather must strive to meet what is 
‘needed’ for social participation and interaction. To not ‘do’ is itself a sign of social 
exclusion, and it is precisely those individuals who become a target for policy 
intervention: 
 
Although the majority of older people lead socially engaged lives, our 
concern is with those older people excluded through barriers to 
participation. 
(SS, p.62) 
 
Rose (2001b) describes this opposition of social exclusion and inclusion as a new 
technology of welfare, using the example of poverty to demonstrate how this 
approach understands, and so attempts to remedy, social problems: 
This transforms the problem of poverty into one that has less to do with 
material or cultural resources than with a lack of belongingness and of 
the responsibility and duty to others generated through connections to 
the responsibilizing circuits of moral community. 
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(p.12) 
This suggests that the emphasis on community is used not to single out similarities 
within the group in contrast to the differences of others outside, but is rather an 
attempt to instil a sense of civic obligation into all individuals. For example, the ‘vision’ 
of community based care set out in OHOCOS is based precisely on the value of making 
individuals responsible: 
 
There is solid evidence that care is less effective if people feel they are 
not in control. A fundamental aim is to make the actions and choices of 
people who use services the drivers of improvement. They will be given 
more control over – and will take on greater responsibility for – their 
own health and well-being. 
(OHOCOS, p.13) 
 
Thus community is used within the context of the policies as a governmental device 
that obliges individuals to take responsibility for social issues, and therefore 
consequently implies individual lives are accountable for the quality and rigour of 
social security. 
 Rose (2001b) claims this sense of responsibility is fostered through 
‘ethopolitics’, which denotes the space of political strategy and technique that acts on 
an individual’s responsible self-management in combination with the management of 
their obligation to others. He further explains: 
Although contemporary proposals for governing behaviour through 
ethics differ, each seeks a way of acting on the ethical formation and 
self-management of individuals to promote their engagement in their 
collective destiny, in the interests of economic advancement, social 
stability, and even justice and happiness . . . The stake has to be 
generated in the community-based ethic that shapes the values that 
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guide each individual. This is to be accomplished through building a new 
relation between ethical citizenship and responsible community 
fostered, but not administered, by the state. 
(Rose, 2001b, p.4) 
Rose (2001b) therefore argues that contemporary community constitutes a moral 
field, whose members are treated as ethical creatures: individuals that become 
regulated through bonds and relationships forged from an understanding of how one’s 
own self management affects the fate of the collective. This aids the answer 
concerning what problems community is presented as a solution to: the maintenance 
of social security and prosperity, more specifically presented as the social problems of 
dependence and inactivity. 
Active ageing, social participation and self care   
Social engagement and active citizenship 
 The creation of the active citizen is necessary if community is to provide a 
viable solution to the perceived social problems of dependency, non-production and 
inactivity. Of primary importance in the move from a national centralised, to a 
localised and dispersed power is the requirement for citizens to take control: 
 
Social care and primary health care services are embedded in our 
communities. They are part of the pattern of our daily lives. We will 
shift the whole system towards the active, engaged citizen in his or her 
local community and away from monolithic, top-down paternalism. 
(OHOCOS, p.19) 
   
Rather than seeing people as passive recipients of care and support, our 
vision sees them as citizens who are involved in designing the services 
that will help them live their everyday lives. 
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(SFC, p.32) 
 
Instead of being mere recipients, a great importance is placed on individuals becoming 
citizens within the policies, by being responsible for the design and delivery of 
community and social care services alongside actively using and consuming them. 
Being active in the process, it is claimed, will bring the individual citizen more control 
and choice over their lifestyle. Individual budgets are a clear example of this, as it is 
argued they have the ability to: 
 
extend to some of the most vulnerable the benefits of choice and 
control over their own lives that the rest of us take for granted. 
(OA, p.v)    
 
Whilst presented within the language of choice and control, and therefore assumed to 
provide only benefits and a higher quality lifestyle to the individual, Scourfield (2007) 
exposes the policy of direct payments as an ethopolitical governmental device, that 
works precisely through the linking of the freedom of the individual to create their 
own lifestyle, with the responsibility they owe to society to manage this well. 
Scourfield (2007) describes this as the managerialization of the self, where functions 
and responsibilities previously performed by the state become increasingly taken on 
by the individual. He argues this process: 
requires that the service user not only manages themselves but that 
they also become the manager of public funds, they agree to present 
their records for inspection and audit and, with the inputs they have 
been allocated, they assume responsibility for achieving agreed 
outcomes. 
(Scourfield, 2007, p.116) 
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Thus, whilst based on a rhetoric of freedom, choice and control, eligibility for individual 
budgets or direct payments is based on a contractual market relationship where, 
whilst offering the user of care services the ability to employ their own services, they 
are at the same time constrained by the need to provide proof that they are fulfilling 
the needs decided upon by state services. Rather than being in a position to control 
their own life, the role played by the service user of direct payments is perhaps more 
akin to middle management. This leads Scourfield (2007) to claim that in direct 
payment policy:  
There is no shift in political power; what direct payments can do though, 
is release in people who would not otherwise have the opportunity, the 
‘inner manager’ or awaken the latent entrepreneur. 
(p.116) 
 Alongside questioning the extent to which individual budgets and direct 
payments provide a ‘better’ more ‘progressive’ form of social care provision, this 
critique demonstrates how the organisation of social care, and the roles it provides for 
citizens, acts as a governmental strategy. Cruickshank (1999) argues that whilst 
democratic citizenship is often put forward as a solution to political and social 
problems, this assumption obscures any awareness of how citizens are brought into 
being; she argues citizenship is less a solution and more a strategy of government: ‘To 
govern, then, means first to stir up the desire, the interest, and the will to participate 
or act politically’ (Cruickshank, 1999, p.82). The emphasis on encouraging and 
increasing social engagement in the policies is clear, and is linked directly to the issues 
surrounding old age and an ageing population to the extent that old age is no longer 
viewed as a reason for lack of engagement, and the growing elderly population is 
treated as an untapped social resource (as discussed in Chapter 4). Hence the role 
taken up by central government focuses on ensuring participation is feasible: 
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Our vision is to encourage, at a local level, informal structures that 
enable older people to participate and take on roles where they are 
valued. 
(SS, p.54) 
 
Individuals become a resource in their own right, and thus social care services are 
framed in terms of investment: services are not justified on the basis of a duty of care 
and kindness to each other, but rather in economic terms of investment and 
contribution (Becker, 1981). Understanding human and social relations as a form of 
capital or investment has become a dominant view within social policy globally since 
the 1990s. Example of this include The World Bank’s (1995) ‘Investing in People’, which 
argues that investing in people must happen in conjunction with economic policies, 
giving examples from countries including Bangladesh, Hungary, Mexico and Tanzania; 
and Midgley’s (1995) discussion of social development that argues economic and social 
objectives must be integrated for social development. Within this he argues social 
development is not concerned with individual need, but with the well-being of the 
population. Policies that aim to invest in human capital therefore focus on three 
strategies: i) learning as vital for future economies and societies (with a focus on 
preschool and early years’ development); ii) assuring the future rather than attempting 
to alleviate current problems – as an attempt to break the ‘cycle of poverty’; iii) a 
belief that successful individuals enrich our collective future and thus investing in 
individual success is beneficial for the whole community (Jenson and Saint-Martin, 
2006, in Gray, 2013). This conflation of economic investment and social care is evident 
in the policies. For example, under the heading ‘The case for social care reform – the 
wider economic and social benefits’ (BNCS, p.52), investment in social care is seen as 
vital in order to: 
 
Provide support to those in need so they can contribute fully as active 
citizens, for example through participation in the labour market, 
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volunteering and/or caring for others. People using services work, vote, 
volunteer, care for family members and children and contribute to 
society and to social capital in myriad ways – and greater investment 
might enable them to do so to an even greater extent. 
(BNCS, p.52) 
 
Engagement and participation in communities and society therefore translates into the 
achievement of citizenship, and it is this participatory citizenship that is positioned as 
the goal of social care: whilst it is argued that a benefit of participation is that it leads 
to good health (SS, p.32 for example), the requirement of good health is grounded on 
this expectation to remain socially active. For example: 
 
  Our aims for promoting health and well-being in old age are: 
 to promote higher levels of physical activity in the older 
population; 
 to reduce barriers to increased levels of physical activity, mental 
well-being and social engagement among excluded groups of 
older people 
(OHOCOS, p.30) 
 
Whilst life course events associated with old age, such as a decline in health, 
retirement, family moving away and death of a partner, are listed as reasons for poor 
social participation (SS, p.58), it is argued that poor participation for older people is not 
inevitable (SS, p.61). As was demonstrated in Chapter 4, it is the reality of poor social 
engagement and participation amongst some of the older population that requires the 
need for policy intervention, as this falls short of what is required for a successful old 
age. 
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 The expectation for all individuals to participate, regardless of social status, has 
been pinpointed as a particular feature of contemporary society. In discussing the 
‘active society’, Walters (1997) suggests that the reordering of social space post-
welfare, has caused the fight for rights to participate – often initiated by marginalized 
groups – to be turned into obligations to participate, bringing with it not so much 
increased social freedoms than further mechanisms of control. His focus on the labour 
market highlights how groups previously within the welfare state held outside the role 
of paid worker, such as mothers of young children and the retired, have since been 
integrated into it through a general expectation of employment. Hence the welfare 
categories of the unemployed and the non-employed (those who would not be 
expected to look for work) have made way for the categories of the active and 
inactive: we are now all potential employees.  The constant references to flexible 
retirement and the value of older people in the work force are a reminder of this: 
 
Our long term aim is to consign fixed retirement ages to the past. 
(OA, p.20) 
 
Older people and disabled people in employment make a significant 
contribution and are often highly skilled and experienced members of 
the workforce. We want to make sure that there are no barriers to 
them remaining in employment if they so choose. 
(SFC, p.60-61) 
 
Whilst increased flexibility appears to present the chance of a better life, this is not 
necessarily the case. Walters (1997) suggests that the initial victories of, for example, 
the women’s movements regarding the demonstration of masculinised norms in 
employment and welfare, quickly turned into obligations that often did little to help 
their social circumstances: 
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The demand for a right to meaningful work is translated [in the ‘active 
society’] into the obligation to search for, and accept what is often low-
paid employment, or participate on public training schemes. 
(p.226)   
Remaining socially active and engaged extends beyond paid employment to 
include other forms of contribution however. Volunteering and caring for family and 
friends are common examples of the existing contributions of the older population, 
often backed up with a monetary equivalent of these human relations of care (SS, 
p.61) to demonstrate their economic worth. Biggs (2001) claims these work-like 
activities are presented as a form of social therapy – seen as providing as many 
benefits to the individual involved as to society at large, whilst ‘simultaneously 
draw[ing] older people back into the mainstream’ (Biggs, 2001, p.311). The re-branding 
of human activities, such as caring, into forms of social contribution, rather than 
intimate personal relationships, indicates the need for these everyday personal and 
traditionally private activities to be understood within the rationality of productive 
activity and social contribution. The Nobel Laureate for economics Heckman (2000), 
writing in the US on ‘Policies to foster human capital’, concludes that the most sensible 
policy – if concerned with acquiring the greatest return from the initial investment – 
should aim to increase non-cognitive skills (as opposed to IQ type intelligence) and 
social attachments as early as possible. Personal skills, including self-discipline and self-
motivation, are therefore positioned as forms of social investment that should be 
cultivated, and so have value, only when there is an economic interest to do so: 
The best evidence supports the policy prescription: invest in the very 
young and improve basic learning and socialisation skills; subsidize the 
old and the severely disadvantaged to attach them to the economy and 
the society at large. 
(Heckman, 2000, p.8)  
Whilst thought in this field has taken different routes in Europe and the US, common 
elements emerge from the positioning of human lives as a social investment that are 
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evident in the UK policies analysed here: markedly the concern with social exclusion 
over and above social justice; the focus on the future over the present – aiming to 
prevent future ills rather than solve current problems; and the belief that investment 
in personal development is the best form of security (Jenson and Saint-Martin, 2003). 
As discussed previously (Chapter 5) this demonstrates a significant shift in the intended 
aims of social care: no longer is it concerned with the protection of individuals, but 
rather with their enablement. Thus the welfare of the subject becomes not a reason 
for the existence of social care, but a resource used by social care for the protection 
and advancement of society. 
 In light of the expectation for all citizens to demonstrate their inclusion in 
society through some form of contribution, the role of consumer has taken on a status 
equal to that of the worker. Hence creating the need for a market is an important form 
of social activity:  
 
One of the most obvious ways in which older people are involved in 
their communities and neighbourhoods is through the use of local 
services and amenities. 
(SS, p.89) 
 
Service users are by default consumers, and are therefore seen to hold some form of 
social power or influence:  
 
older people are still often treated as passive recipients rather than 
active consumers with their own views about need. 
(OA, p.iv) 
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Lie and colleagues (2009) refer to the ‘consumer-citizen’, a conception of citizenship 
where citizenship is achieved through partaking in various forms of economic activity 
beyond the traditional worker role. Activities may include, for example ‘purchasing 
power’ or consuming leisure resources. This is developed further by Flint (2003) who 
emphasises that within this: ‘Conduct is rationalized as the ability of subjects to create 
the means for their own consumption’ (p.614). Ensuring financial security would be an 
important aspect of this – either through employment or suitable financial planning for 
retirement years - but just as vital is for the older person to ensure they are physically 
capable, and that they have access to the necessary resources. 
Active ageing 
 The policy of active ageing is used throughout the policies as a strategy for the 
prevention of the social exclusion of older people, by ensuring their continued 
engagement. In this sense, as discussed in Chapter 4, ‘activity’ is used to encompass an 
array of self-care behaviours from physical exercise to political involvement. There is a 
great deal of discussion regarding the types of activity deemed most useful 
(participative and collective regarded the most beneficial (SS, p.63)); as well as the 
reasons active ageing ought to be a major policy concern. These include a citizens’ 
right to participate, and the argument that activity, including physical activity along 
with all forms of social engagement, brings only benefits to the individual concerned 
and so also society at large (as discussed in Chapter 4). Furthermore it is claimed that 
this right to participate is indeed desired by older people: 
 
Repeatedly throughout our consultation older people have told us that 
they want to contribute, to be part of society, and to have a role. 
(SS, p.68) 
 
That active ageing is indeed desired by older people, or even beneficial for them, has 
however been contested. 
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 Clarke and Warren (2007) conducted in-depth biographical interviews with 23 
people, aged between 60-93, in order to research their attitude to age and ageing; 
they considered this against active ageing policy. They concluded that the rich diversity 
of the responses deeply contrasted with the overly materialistic frameworks of 
productivity found in much public policy for older people. They found from the 
responses that, ‘disengagement and dependency are not necessarily the negative and 
passively experienced states that are commonly described’ (Clarke and Warren, 2007, 
p.481-2). Thus whilst the older people in the study remained active in their own eyes, 
this was often within individual activities that do not necessarily require engagement 
with others: reading, completing a crossword, listening to music or cooking. Whilst 
these activities pass the time for the older people interviewed in a way that enabled 
them to enjoy their lives, they are a world away from achieving the levels of 
productivity and sense of collective duty built into the policy agenda of active ageing, 
where the goal is not merely individual happiness, but the utilisation of individual 
happiness to further the stability of society (as discussed in Chapter 5). Thus whilst 
Clarke and Warren (2007) conclude: 
The current emphasis in policy encourages older people to engage as 
citizens in local communities and wider society (DWP 2005 [OA]; WHO 
2002). Engagement need not, however, be so ambitious. 
(p.483)    
they are treating policy as something designed to further the best interest of the 
individual alone, rather than recognising the role policy plays in setting up contractual 
social relationships (for example, SFC, p.104).  
 An understanding of policy as setting up social relationships is demonstrated by 
the link made between the need to be active for both continued self-responsibility and 
self-management: 
 
longer life is a blessing where the extra years are fulfilling and active. 
They should not be years of inaction and exclusion. A personal 
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responsibility rests on each one of us to plan and provide for a different 
life-course that is also better. 
(OA, p.v) 
 
As noted earlier, for an individual to ensure they do not become socially excluded they 
must acquire the resources necessary for social activity, insurance and contribution. 
Hence to age actively implies the individual will have these resources in place, or that 
they will at least have the ability to access them. This need is based upon the 
overarching aim of constituting independent citizens:   
 
we now need truly to embed in all policies directed towards older 
people the values of active independence, quality and choice that we 
have championed in other areas. 
(OA, p.iv) 
 
The policy desire for active ageing, in terms of how this fits with the desired values and 
structure of society, as has been demonstrated, does not, however, mean that active 
ageing is actually achievable for all older people. 
  Ranzijn (2010) also recognises that active ageing does not refer to any activity, 
but specifically implies participation. Using Aboriginal elders as a case study he asks 
whether it is possible for all older people to live up to the expectations of active ageing 
policy77. His critique rests on the lack of diversity within this view of ageing: 
Active ageing policy as currently conceived is problematic because of its 
narrow focus on only a few aspects of the ageing experience – physical 
                                                          
77
 Despite this research being conducted in Australia, and critiquing active ageing policy against a unique 
native Australian culture, Ranzijn (2010) demonstrates the transferability of his debate through 
highlighting both the pervasiveness and consistency of active ageing policy across Western countries, as 
well as suggesting the values and worldview of Aboriginal people are not so dissimilar from those of 
other cultures that make up the UK population.  
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health, independence, and productivity. In this conception, the process 
of ageing is defined on only two dimensions: (ill)health and 
(in)dependence 
(p.717) 
This policy strategy is problematic for those who do not understand their life, and 
therefore their ageing, within these values of good health and independence. This is 
the position Ranzijn (2010) claims Aboriginal elders find themselves in, as their culture 
jars with the individualistic foundations of ‘active ageing’ which values independence, 
autonomy and self-reliance above and beyond anything else; Aboriginal culture instead 
focuses on interdependence, mutual reliance, kinship and reciprocity. Beyond this, he 
argues that the biological process of ageing itself, and death, are important aspects of 
the life-cycle and therefore not treated as problems to be solved. Thus the productive 
elements of active ageing are often alien and therefore unachievable for Aboriginal 
elders if they are to ‘age well’ – that is, age according to the traditions set out by their 
own culture. The paradox of active ageing policy then, is that it has been developed as 
a solution to the ever present problem of ‘white’ social exclusion, yet its very 
implementation risks marginalizing those unable or unwilling to take up these values 
as their own. Thus as Ranzijn (2010) highlights, whilst active ageing policy goes to great 
lengths to recognise the diversity of old people, diversity of ageing is not considered.    
Self-care as social participation 
 The value of independence, achieved through responsible self-management, is 
therefore currently an unavoidable requirement of active ageing, and consequently of 
fully contributing to society and so fulfilling the expectations of a social citizen. It is 
clear in the policies that older people are expected to be responsible for themselves 
and that this specifically refers to responsibility for their own self-care and reliance: 
 
The challenge is also for each of us as individuals to take responsibility 
for our own lifestyles and aim for a healthy and fulfilling old age. 
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(OHOCOS, p.17) 
 
Older people have the responsibility to look after themselves, often 
with the help of their families, and to choose healthy and active 
lifestyles that reduce the risk of disease and harm wherever possible. 
(OA, p.55) 
 
Cruickshank (1996; 1999) describes self-help as a typically liberal form of government 
that works through the maximisation of citizenship. Whilst the language used in the 
policies refers to self-care and self responsibility the essence of self-help and self-care 
are similar: both an expectation of self- reliance alongside an assumption that the 
individual is fully responsible for their life course. The power thought to be held by the 
individual for shaping their life course is demonstrated here:  
 
There are clear links between choosing to live a healthy lifestyle and 
minimising the chances of certain types of care need arising. Physical 
and mental wellbeing are key to reducing the risk of some conditions, 
including dementia and mobility problems later in life. 
(BNCS, p.79) 
 
The focus on choice and lifestyle implies that individuals are –at least mostly – in 
control of what happens to them during their lifetime, as well as the quality of their 
life: physical and mental well-being are positioned as primarily dependent on making 
the right choices, and not social circumstances beyond the control of the individual. It 
is due to this that individuals can be held responsible for their (ill)health: even the 
onset of dementia is linked to unwise lifestyle choices, for example. Whilst links may 
have been found between certain lifestyles and the probability of developing 
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dementia, it cannot be assumed that lifestyle is a product of personal choice. Biggs 
(2001) notes that an understanding of older people as able to choose between leisured 
lifestyles is a particular Third Way notion that specifically acts to make the older 
person into a participant of civil society. As discussed in Chapter 5, the assumption of a 
reflexive self able and required to make constant lifestyle choices, has the function of 
positioning the subject as an individual in control of her or his future. However whilst 
the focus remains on an individual’s influence over their life, important social factors 
not immediately within the individual’s control, or factors that require a collective or 
structural response, remain undiagnosed and ignored. Leading from this, McNay 
(2009) argues that neo-liberal conceptions of the entrepreneurial self erodes the 
notion of the public domain. This results in the instillation of a paradoxical compulsion 
of responsibility, where individuals are forced to assume responsibility for affairs which 
not only are they not responsible for but within which, have extremely limited powers 
to affect changes. Presenting the social effects of global events as related to personal 
belongingness through the discourses of social inclusion and exclusion (Rose, 2001) 
places the cause and solution firmly with the local and/or individual. This, however, 
severely misrepresents the scope of insecurity faced by many individuals: for example  
recent changes in standard employment - where zero hour, part-time, or fixed-term 
contracts are the norm – highlight that it is perhaps unrealistic to expect individuals to 
be solely responsible for their financial security throughout retirement years.   
 This focus on lifestyle as choice related to an individual’s attention to self-care, 
emphasises the connection forged between acting on the self through strategies of 
self-care and self-development, and the collective interest or ‘social good’. This 
connection turns the maintenance of good self-care from a personal matter into a 
social duty:    
 
As well as rights, older people are citizens and as such have 
responsibilities like the rest of us to contribute to society. They can do 
this in many ways, not least by taking sensible steps to look after their 
health 
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(OA, p.xvii)  
 
By encouraging certain behaviours that require the individual to monitor and alter 
their self in order to fit with the social roles open to them78, Cruickshank (1999) argues 
that the self is made into a terrain of political action: 
a terrain that carries new political possibilities for self-government. In 
that case, acting upon the self is also a manner of acting politically 
(p.6) 
Thus social participation and acting in the interest of the collective is not hindered by 
self-interest and an overriding concern with individuality, but actually depends on it. 
Hence the tension is that participatory discourses are preoccupied with those who fail 
to act in their own self-interest (Cruickshank, 1999), and who therefore fail to 
maximise their self for the benefit of all. 
Conclusion 
 Contemporary Western democratic life has been suggested as a time and place 
of increasing connections and networked flows (Amin, 2005), where boundaries give 
way to globalisations. It is within this that Amin (2005) questions why we still think of 
certain places as spatially enclosed? The utilisation of ‘community’ in the policies to 
refer to a local neighbourhood or a certain geographical space is an example of this, 
yet, as has been argued, this severely underplays and ignores, the multiple and 
complex consequences global and national events have on local and individual issues. 
The focus on the supremacy of individual action as something all powerful: providing 
the solution to social problems, allows the conflation of the values of mutual care and 
belonging, traditionally associated with communitarianism, with those of self-reliant 
individuality, self-determination, and self-interest. This enables policy to act as a form 
of social contract, where both self-care and social strength and security become 
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 Examples of such behaviours have been discussed throughout Chapters 4-7, and include obtaining 
knowledge of the self through various forms of assessment or knowledge of population trends; 
expectations and interventions based upon planning for future life concerning finances or health; and 
being responsible for living actively.  
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dependent on appropriate participative behaviour. This intricate relationship between 
self-care and social participation becomes epitomised in strategies of Active Ageing in 
the policies, which, whilst presented as nothing but positive for the older person 
through promoting mental, physical, and financial well-being (and thus can only be 
beneficial to society as well), has the effect of narrowing and limiting possibilities open 
to subjectivity (who is it possible to be?), as well as ageing and the life-course more 
generally (how is it possible to live?) Discourses of community and participative 
citizenship, by aiming to organise limited spaces of social inclusion, also then make up 
the spaces of social exclusion: versions of life presented as dangerous (to social 
security and so to all individuals as members of the population) due to nothing other 
than their non-compliance with the underlying values of human utility and 
independent self-reliance.     
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Conclusion 
Plotting the parameters and future directions 
Introduction 
A significant and defining purpose of this thesis is its aim of rethinking the subject. 
Rather than accepting as obvious or necessary the subject that is spoken of, and to, in 
the policy documents, I have attempted to demonstrate where this subject must begin 
and end, to mark out the space it can occupy, and from this expose the limitations and 
restrictions imposed, by the discourses found within the policies, on ways of living, 
ageing and understanding the temporal self. The dominant discourse that has emerged 
within this study is that of the ‘active’ subject: an independent individual required to 
participate in society for the good of society, containing an undercurrent assumption 
that this simultaneously amounts to a person’s own good. Of corresponding 
importance is what Lessenich (2011) terms the subjectivation of the social, where 
social responsibility is handed over from the collective – such as public institutions – to 
the individual, through the creation of an ethical relationship that moves individuals 
into a position where they become responsible for society as a whole. 
 According to Lessenich (2011), analyses of the contemporary Western welfare 
state have not been a popular theme within the governmentality approach, and where 
analyses of the ‘active’ society do exist, they have primarily focused on how the 
subject becomes activated through an economic rationality, neglecting the equally 
prevalent social rationality: a logic that requires self-management for the sake of 
society. The analysis undertaken here hopefully goes some way to redress this 
imbalance by considering the subject presented within the selected social care policies 
from multiple angles. Furthermore the thesis has taken an innovative approach by 
combining two aspects of Foucauldian theory that are not often brought together: an 
archaeological understanding of discourse and governmentality, to provide a novel 
contribution to the analyses of ageing and social care policies and the impact these 
may have on our lives and our selves. One important insight this perspective has 
offered is how the apparently singular policy issue of old age and later life becomes 
multiplied to encompass the government of everyday living across all life stages: the 
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government of old age is thus more appropriately conceived of as the governance of 
the population through ageing.  
  As was promised in the Introduction to this thesis, the analysis as it has 
progressed therefore leads to ethical and political questions: Who should we be? How 
ought we to live? Whilst I have not attempted to provide comprehensive alternative 
answers to these questions, I have attempted to ask and began to answer: What are 
the justifications given for the normative discourses that answer these questions (how 
are they rationalised)? And what are the consequences? I have not sought to reveal 
some kind of ultimate aim of these discourses, but have instead attempted to pinpoint 
the crux of what they do and how they lead to restrictions. But equally, using the 
analysis as a form of criticism and counter-conduct, I have sought to find spaces and 
travel along other lines, where the above questions might reveal different, but not 
exclusive, answers. 
 This concluding chapter will, firstly, discuss the main themes that have emerged 
within the thesis. I will then turn to explore some developments within current 
governmentality literature and how they relate to this study. Finally I will suggest some 
areas of possible future development and exploration. 
Recurrent themes 
 Whilst the Chapters 4 to 7 each discussed a different theme, several concepts 
and processes have cut through the entire thesis. These may be grouped into three 
strands: i) the subject as active and independent; ii) the self as singular, linear and 
future orientated; iii) the relations between individuals and the collective and 
connected to this, responsibilization. I will briefly discuss and summarise each strand 
below. 
 Activity and independence 
The thesis has demonstrated that independence is an overriding concern within 
the policies, thought to be necessary for successful ageing, ensuring the continued 
security of an ageing population, and it is therefore the primary value upon which 
social care is based. Although not overtly defined in the policies, independence 
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assumes or implies activity both as a description of the self and as an ethos of life. 
Independence and activity, pursued as fundamental aims, therefore become concepts 
with which the worth and success of our lives and the lives of those around us can be 
measured.  
Activity refers to a specific set of activities. Whilst in some ways its reach is 
broad and encompassing, demonstrated by WHOs definition of active ageing as 
including concern for physical, social and emotional well-being (Walker, 2009), the 
type of activities desired and encouraged are restricted to those that are socially 
participative, ideally collective (SS, p.63), and measurable through some form of 
outward value or product: volunteering, consumer related activities, community 
involvement or group activities, and so on79. Activity must therefore have a purpose 
beyond the individual: it must be socially useful. 
Activity is discussed in only positive terms in the policies, presented as 
necessary for both personal well-being and social strength (as expressed by the 
activity-inactivity ratio for example, OA). Thus the diverse self-care behaviours 
required within the policy documents to be conducted by the active subject – from 
physical exercise, to engaging in leisure activities, to political involvement – are only 
problematized in regards to how they can become achievable for all citizens, couched 
in the language of social exclusion. The alienating effects of these strategies have been 
discussed elsewhere, including the paucity of ways of living/ageing when ageing must 
be active (Biggs, 2001), and the fundamental incompatibility of active ageing with 
certain cultural worldviews (Ranzijn, 2010), as a couple of examples.   
This aim of promoting independence and participative activity determines the 
forms of social care services on offer. Those geared towards maintaining 
independence: prevention, early assessment and life planning; and continuing 
independent living when care or health needs arise: the push towards individual 
budgets for example, denoting a movement in social care from concern with 
protection to one of enablement (enabling continued activity and social contribution). 
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 Levitas (1998) claims there is a hierarchy of activity evident in New Labour policy with paid 
employment the most desirable and valued, followed by unpaid voluntary community involvement, with 
unpaid domestic work and ‘private’ family activities the least valued. 
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It also however, acts to govern the parameters within which individuals must make 
sense of themselves and their lives. Thus activity – understood as useful participation 
in the collective – is not intended to merely describe what we do, but more 
importantly to connote who we are: what our future lives look like has already been 
mapped out, but this future must be forcibly brought into being by oneself. We are not 
therefore constructed as beings active within a collective, but active beings required to 
manipulate our potential for the stability of the collective. 
So, my argument has been that the focus on independence, achieved through 
outward activities as an expression of this active self, arises due to the value placed on 
agency and self-determination used to signify a singular sovereign unit that is able to 
orchestrate their own life with minimal outside influence.  
A singular, linear and future orientated self 
 I argued in Chapter 5 that the policies’ portrayal of the self as reflexive - 
mutable, transient, and so in need of management - did not translate to an ability to 
become anything. Instead the possibilities of the self are constrained by the 
assumption that it is essentially singular, linear and future focused. The potential of a 
flexible self is therefore cut short by the requirement, expectation or assumption that 
it is the present actions of an individual that construct their future, and furthermore, 
that a successful future is created through rational decision making and action. 
Therefore despite the future being prioritised over current concerns (with social care 
strategies focusing on the prevention of future ills rather than solving current 
problems for example), the future is used as a vehicle for the governance of the 
present. This concern with the future acts to moderate and modify what we do today. 
Still more significantly, it organises our relationship to our own life-course, by ensuring 
we are accountable for present and future problems. This creates a governmental 
strategy with two interrelated strands. Firstly, our current conduct is managed through 
both the expectation that it has a direct effect on any future situation and the 
responsibilizing pressure of achieving a good life. Secondly, current problems are 
marked as a sign of a previous failure of self-management, necessitating and justifying 
intervention to help bring about the changes required. Thus as explored in various 
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places in this thesis, social problems appear as malfunctions of individual life 
management that become ‘social’ problems only due to the impact individual lives 
have on society as a whole: a problem for society, not of society. 
 Constructing people as individuals, as unique from and separated from those 
around them, whose life has coherency only within an isolated, forward focused life-
course, is vital for these future orientated governmental strategies to operate. 
Constituting subjectivity as a narrativity personalises this, linking the intricacies of a 
personal life to the social advantage, or conversely its insecurity. I have argued in the 
thesis that, contrary to its presentation in the policies, understanding or experiencing 
the self as a narrativity is not essential: it may feel natural or make sense to some, but 
this does not make it a necessary element of humanity, nor a helpful one. A problem 
following from this version of the self is the inadequacy with which it can respond to 
uncertainties, and its disregard for the impact external events and global forces have 
on the life-course and personal futures. The influence of global economics on daily 
lives is an example of this: recent global economic activities, outside of local or 
individual control, have had wide-reaching and disastrous effects on, for example, 
private pensions, job security, health and social care services and government benefits. 
Individual action, rational decision making, even measured risk-taking, could not have 
protected or prepared an individual from having their life redrawn by these events. Yet 
the self that is constructed within these policy documents - built upon an ability to 
plan, prepare and have the power to bring about a certain future - is not designed to 
make sense of, or counter events of which they can have no control and limited 
knowledge, yet are capable of rending their lives apart. 
 Furthermore this focus on the individual self coincides with an expectation that 
personal development is the most effective form of social security. Thus despite 
personal lives and futures being inseparably woven in with events of which individuals 
themselves are often not part and have no knowledge, the insistence (and myriad 
strategies based upon the notion) that working on the self to reveal its potential will 
create a safe personal and collective future, is severely inadequate in its conception 
and response to the interplay of factors that contribute both to social ills and personal 
needs.  
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Responsibilizing relations between the individual and the collective   
The dynamic and complex relationship between an individual and the population 
has recurred as a primary issue through the thesis. Initially I demonstrated how the 
traditionally personal concerns of later life and being old translate into both a reason 
for and a strategy of population governance, and that furthermore, the construction of 
old age – who an old person is thought to be – cannot be detached from the perceived 
needs of society. This mutually constitutive relationship highlights the impossible 
position of a subject as a sovereign singular unit. Since an individual is required to 
understand and act upon itself by gaining knowledge of the collective, the individual 
cannot be known in its isolation but conversely only through its measurement against 
mass data. This is suggestive of a causal connection between individual and collective 
fates: the welfare of individuals and society is taken to be circular as individual 
behaviour and well-being are presented as having a direct impact on the overall 
welfare of the population, which in turn impacts upon (and is used as a sign of) 
individual happiness. Thus whilst dependent on the appropriate behaviour and life 
management of others for their own well-being, individuals are simultaneously 
positioned as solely responsible for their own successful ageing.    
Some of the consequences arising from this understanding of individuals as 
concurrently self-determining and responsible for the fate and fortune of the collective 
population (of which they are inevitably a part) have already been noted in this 
concluding discussion, including a significant ethical shift from a collective 
responsibility to an individual responsibility for social problems. These strategies that 
act to responsibilise individual life management have, then, the effect of containing 
and constraining ways of living, ways of understanding the life-course, and how it is 
possible to develop a sense of self.     
I have argued throughout the thesis that whilst many of the governmental 
strategies and policy interventions claim to promote and respect diversity and 
difference, they act instead to homogenise, demonstrated through the emphasis on 
standardisation. Limiting ways of ageing, being old and managing life will inevitably 
lead to the alienation of many: those unable or unwilling to live their later life in line 
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with active independence, or unable to view themselves or their lives as a linear 
narrative, unfolding toward an ideal future. Alongside the possibility of making services 
both inappropriate and inaccessible, this results in personal and public relationships – 
those between family members, neighbours, citizens – being structured and evaluated 
primarily in terms of their social and economic utility. That is, the only subjectivity 
open to people within the policies is one that understands relationships in regards to 
what they (can) produce. The inability or unwillingness to participate and develop 
personal and social relations in line with the policies’ complex subjectivity of an 
‘individual within a collective’, leads to the moralisation of an individual’s role in 
contributing to a failure of society: an individual is not merely socially passive but 
inconsiderate, selfish, awkward, incapable, irrational, a burden. Thus the bending or 
breaking of the boundaries set within these policies by an individual ageing, being old, 
or conducting their life in ways that do not adhere to the underlying normative 
rationalities, becomes reconfigured as an individual imposing limits on others by 
contributing to social insecurity. 
This is troubling because difference becomes associated with dangerousness - 
dangerous to social stability and security for example: living according to alternative 
values and standards that conflict with normative rationalities is problematized on the 
grounds of their difference and incompatibility. Despite the claims in the policies to 
value difference, and to demonstrate this through aiming to deliver person-centred 
and needs-led care, the thesis has shown that this is possible only within a very limited 
framework, where diversity means selecting amongst practices that stem from the 
same rationalities and value base. As I argued in Chapter 2, however, genuine 
respecting difference must allow difference of values, rationalities and goals – a 
different foundation and aim, not merely multiple ways of achieving the same end. 
Without this, discourses of individuality and governmental strategies that utilise 
diversity, in effect pare down and impoverish life. 
Developments in governmentality: biopolitics and the study of life    
Biopolitics has taken on an increasing prominence both within and alongside 
governmentality literature. It has been taken up and advanced in a variety of ways, 
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opening new developments in the possible directions of governmentality analyses, 
whilst also generating some criticisms concerning its analytical limitations80. Of prime 
concern is the way ‘life’ has been used and conceptualised by governmentality studies, 
including the apparent neglect of both existence and non-human relations and nature. 
Lemke (2011) claims two strands of how biopolitics has been utilised can be 
distinguished: i) focused on as a mode of politics, where the central questions are: how 
does the object of enquiry function and what counter forces does it mobilize?, and ii) 
as an interest in the substance of life, concerned with enquiries into the meaning of 
life within the current, or a particular, political technical network. This thesis is clearly 
situated within the first of these strands where, similarly to Foucault (Lemke, 2011), 
biopolitics has been understood as a facet of governmentality and therefore focused 
upon human individuals and populations. Lemke (2011) accuses this approach of being 
short-sighted to the realities of contemporary lives as it ignores problematizations of 
nature and the environment (and arguably also technology) and the role these have in 
the production of the human species. Furthermore, Lemke argues the emphasis on 
human bodies and associated conduct of human behaviour, paints an overly simplistic 
understanding of the boundaries between the human and non-human. He elaborates: 
A new biopolitical level is clearly present both beyond and beneath the 
levels of the individual and the populace; it is grounded in an expanded 
knowledge of the body and biological processes. Within this altered 
representational regime, the body is less a physical substrate or 
anatomical machine than an informational network. 
(2011, p.172) 
Whilst there are places in the thesis, including for example the discussion of dividuals 
in Chapter 5, that have analysed how the person is reconstructed and known through 
data, this was considered within the analytical perspective suggested by the first 
strand delineated by Lemke above, and so did not take the opportunity to explore the 
relationship between human and non-human. Instead, the analytical perspective was 
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 Lemke (2011) details the wide spectrum within which biopolitics has been utilised, discussing the 
different approaches of Agamben (1998), Esposito (2008) and Hardt and Negri (2000). 
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used to extend an understanding of the function of this reconfiguration and its political 
effects. This approach is wholly in line with my stated aims and intentions for the 
thesis, but it does expose a gap in the scope of the analysis with important questions 
concerning this type of ‘life’ – how it enables a person to live and impacts upon social 
care relations and practices – left as yet unexplored. 
This simultaneously highlights an avenue worthy of future investigation in 
social care policy and practice analysis, and one that is perhaps urgently needed if we 
agree with Parton’s (2008) representation of the movement of social work and social 
care away from the ‘social’ and towards the ‘informational’. Parton argues that social 
work now operates primarily on the terrain of the ‘informational’, where social 
workers are expected to think and operate in ways similar to (and also by utilising) the 
database: gathering, generating, storing and monitoring information about individuals. 
He argues the significance of this shift lies in how it structures what it is possible to 
know; he claims that it is causing the embodied subject to disappear leaving in its place 
only ‘a variety of surface information’ (2008, p.263), leading to what Haggerty and 
Ericson (2000, in Parton, 2008) have termed the ‘decorporealized body’. At the very 
least, Parton suggests, this demands that the interrelationship between the social and 
the technological is rethought within social work and social care policy and practice, as 
the ‘actor’ and ‘network’ can no longer be considered as separate. 
This focus on life – specifically questioning what exactly is this life that is being 
governed or analysed - is thought by Fassin (2011) to be missing from the 
governmentality approach. He argues that governmentality is not about life at all, only 
populations, but that the question of life – of existence and being alive - cannot be 
side-lined when studying and analysing dominant rationalities detailing how we can 
and ought to be living. Firstly, Fassin notes, questions of life cannot be separated from 
questions of inequality. The question of inequality was not explicitly broached in this 
thesis but I endeavoured to provide a sound argument exposing how the discourses 
within the policy documents work against the establishment of a diverse range of ways 
of living, and act to both problematize and attribute blame to the individual for being 
‘in need’, ‘at risk’, ‘a risk’, or in some form of distress. Fassin goes on to draw on 
Canguilhem to demonstrate that the question of life goes beyond the issue of multiple 
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lifestyles, to the very question of existence: he gives the example that the average life 
span is not a biological norm but an example of how collective choices – various 
decisions made within health and social care, employment and social security, or 
humanitarian aid – allow some people to live less long than others. He continues: 
Within this new problematization, the issue is not to grasp how life is 
fashioned, regulated and normalized – what governmentality is about. It 
is to comprehend, through a very different and almost inverse 
approach, the complex, uncertain and ambiguous articulation of life at 
the heart of our systems of values and actions, of our moral and political 
economies. 
(2011, p.196)  
For Fassin this requires a focus on ‘being alive’ rather than on ‘living beings’ (p.197), 
leading to an investigation into the sort of life that is being taken for granted in the 
governing process81. 
These developments and criticisms highlight significant areas in need of further 
exploration in order to gain an understanding of the lives and relations at the heart of 
current social care policies and practices. The recent configurations of biopolitics have 
indicated a need to take a step back to analyse the very substances we assume 
ourselves to be dealing with in social care. This may be vital considering that social 
work and social care are at their most basic, concerned with life and the living, and 
especially in light of current directions within the field as explored by Parton (2008). It 
might well be suggested that whilst the ‘embodied person’ is thought to be paramount 
within social care and social work, the technologies and strategies of care employed do 
not reflect this.  
Future research directions 
Alongside the issues of life itself, discussed above, two further areas outside 
the scope of this study, or following on from it, suggest themselves as both interesting 
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 Fassin (2011) discusses two pieces of his own research regarding the administration of refugees in 
France and the management of AIDs in South Africa, to argue that currently physical existence or ‘being 
alive’ has the optimal value in these societies. 
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and worthwhile to investigate. Firstly, researching over a period of years policy that 
was in place at the start of this study, necessarily means that I am researching the past: 
New Labour are now in opposition to the Coalition Government of Conservatives and 
Liberal Democrats. A health and social care White Paper Caring for our future (DH, 
2012) has already been published by the Coalition proposing changes to the care and 
support system. Its opening paragraph of the Foreword states: 
We all want to live a full and active life, to live independently and to 
play an active part in local communities. Supporting people to live this 
way is a central ambition of the Coalition Government 
(DH, 2012, p.3) 
This preliminary glance suggests that the Coalition Government has not brought with it 
a radical shift in the discourses or governmental strategies discussed in this thesis. 
Reading on, strategies similar to those found in the New Labour policies are put 
forward in the White Paper including a focus on information and advice, concentration 
on care markets to fulfil care and support needs, expanding the take up of personal 
budgets and Direct Payments, and a focus on well-being and independence as a 
preventative strategy. But of course a thoroughgoing and nuanced analysis would be 
needed in order to explore any changes. Charting the implementation, developments 
and changes in this policy arena would provide an interesting comparison to, and 
extension of, the thread of this thesis.   
 The second area of interest, related but beyond the scope of this thesis, would 
be to study from a governmentality perspective, the form and nature of relationships 
of care (both formal and informal) within social care interventions, strategies and 
technologies. As was briefly discussed in the Introduction82, this thesis partly stemmed 
from an interest in what happened to ‘caring relationships’ when they became part of 
technologies of social care. Primarily this was based upon a premise that caring 
relationships, understood within social care policies and practices, are rationalised 
through a utility ethic and not an ethic of care. There are many implications for social 
work and social care services if this is the case, regarding what services are being, or 
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should be, provided: who should be helped and how? The questions raised in the 
discussion on biopolitics above concerning the substance of ‘life’, seem to be 
particularly prominent for this issue: what ‘life’ is being assumed? what forms of ‘being 
alive’ are prioritised? and who or what is, in turn, sacrificed- allowed to live less long or 
in an impoverished state? Such a study could be conducted as a discourse analysis of 
policy or other key documents. But it would also provide a fruitful opportunity to apply 
governmentality analysis to an empirical study, examining the vital face-to-face micro-
technologies within daily social care practices such as assessment, the provision of 
information and advice, and procedures of record-keeping.  
Concluding reflections on the contribution of this study  
Governmentality has provided a rich and useful form of analysis enabling the 
function and consequences of policy processes and strategies concerned with ageing 
and later life, to be explored in a revealing, original and useful manner. Furthermore, 
distinctively combining governmentality with an archaeological discursive approach 
has allowed this thesis to demonstrate and emphasise the practical nature and 
application of this form of analysis of power relations.  
There is much that this thesis does not do. In particular, for example, it might 
fall prey to McKee’s (2009) criticism that governmentality analyses rely too heavily on 
discursive analysis of key documents, creating a disconnection between the study of 
specific mentalities of rule and the social relations in which they are embedded. 
Certainly, approaching non-textually based forms of research using an analytics of 
governmentality would be an interesting and worthwhile endeavour: there are many 
levels and points of access to studying the conduct of conduct, and applying this to a 
micro-politics of individual or group relations, or social care practices and 
interventions, would provide another dimension both to understanding the uses and 
scope of governmentality as a form of analysis, alongside the processes and functions 
of the relations under analysis.  
However, whilst recognising a textual analysis can only offer knowledge on a 
facet of life, specifically related to the form and area of analysis (much in the same way 
as an empirical study would be limited), social relations do not exist in isolation from 
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the mentalities of rule under analysis, and furthermore, a discursive approach allows 
their connections to be studied. 
 Drawing on these aspects of Foucauldian theory has enabled a distinctive and 
fresh contribution to the analyses of the impact social care policies, related to ageing, 
have on everyday lives. Significantly this study has demonstrated the scope and reach 
of this form of government: extending beyond those entering or living in old age, and 
also beyond those who already in some way ‘use’ the care system. Concurrently, 
ageing policies cause us to be judged and governed not only by our current situation 
but, significantly, as constantly potential sources of non-production and inactivity.  The 
governmental technologies found within the policies therefore succeed in their aim to 
be inclusive, universal and continuous. But they also indicate a need for future 
exploration, to determine whether the rationalities on which they rest are able to 
provide a tenable ethical foundation for social work and social care practices.   
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Appendix 1 
Policies 
The eight key policy documents analysed in this thesis were all published by the New 
Labour government between the years 2001-2010. They were produced by a variety of 
Departments and take different problems and audiences as their target. Below I have 
set out a synopsis of these policy documents to provide some background details of 
their self-stated purpose and aims. Within this I will demonstrate their heterogeneity 
regarding their origin and intentions alongside highlighting their points of connection 
arising from the shared rationalities from which the various strategies emerge. 
National service framework for older people (2001) (NSF) 
Produced by the Department of Health, NSF is the first policy of the New Labour 
government directed specifically at services for older people. It focuses on services 
within both the NHS and social care, so whilst much of the policy discusses health 
related issues such as hospital care, falls and strokes, it also introduces significant 
directions for social care including person-centred care, active living and a focus on the 
local in terms of service delivery. It sets out to support independence, promote good 
health and start a culture change to abolish discrimination in older people’s services 
(p.i), primarily by claiming to place the needs of older people at the centre of services. 
The need for a new and comprehensive strategy for older people’s services is situated 
within a vision of a mobile society that needs to keep up with new concepts of old age 
and demographic change (p.2).   
 
Opportunity age: Meeting the challenges of the 21st century, volume 1 (OA) and 
Opportunity age: A social portrait of ageing in the UK: A snapshot of key trends and 
evidence, volume 2 (2005) ( OA vol. 2) 
Produced by the Department of Work and Pensions, OA constitutes the first 
interdepartmental social policy focused on dealing with the ageing population as a 
social and economic problem. Its scale and remit therefore extends beyond issues of 
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social care, to include the related areas of work and finances, public services, housing 
and so on, as areas of concern and consequence. As an example of how it views the 
issue of ageing as affecting all aspects of personal and social life, its major government 
partners include (but are not limited to) the Departments of: Culture, Media and Sport; 
Education and Skills; Health; Environment, Food and Rural Affairs; Transport; Trade 
and Industry; Home Office; Social Exclusion Unit. It aims to set out a ‘coherent 
strategy’ (p.xiii) focused on dealing with the changing demographic across society, and 
is therefore directed at businesses and individuals alongside the public sector, and 
future policy-makers. Two of the three priorities it sets out focus upon changing the 
roles and responsibilities of the older population: higher employment rates by 
changing the workplace to make it more accessible for older workers, and strategies to 
enable older people to play a ‘full and active role in society’, (p.xiii), termed ‘Active 
Ageing’. Significantly the third priority relates to enabling everyone to maintain 
independence and control over their lives, alluding to its preventative ethos. 
Volume two uses a variety of research and statistics to determine what life is like for 
the current generation of old people, and suggests future trends to predict what life 
may be like for the next generation. 
OA positions itself as an important keystone not only for older people or older people’s 
services, but for identifying the direction we, as a whole society, should be heading: 
namely the promotion of activity (participation) and independence. The scale and 
scope of the policy is therefore wide reaching both in the domains it attempts to 
govern, as well as the audience it aims to influence. 
 
Our health, our care, our say: a new direction for community services (2006) 
(OHOCOS) 
Produced by the Department of Health, this policy presents a reform of health and 
social care for the whole nation, specifically developing the use of community services 
and setting out the need for this change. Whilst not focused solely on old age or later 
life, it positions itself as a response to current demographic changes (p.1). An ageing 
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population is linked with health problems such as obesity to demonstrate the new 
challenges that arise specifically for health and social care that will need to be met 
with ‘profound change’ (p.4).  
Whilst the scope of the policy is therefore smaller and has a narrower area of reform 
than OA, the strategies and values devised to achieve these are perhaps unsurprisingly 
similar: to promote health and independence; to increase choice and accessibility 
(allowing individuals control over their lives); and a focus on prevention and support to 
enable this. 
 
A sure start to later life: ending inequalities for older people (2006) (SS) 
A report by the Social Exclusion Unit (ODPM), SS focuses on the older person in 
society. Unlike OA which looks at the effects an ageing population has on society, SS 
details the problems encountered by older people in society, leading to their 
‘exclusion’, and contains strategies to combat these. Tackling material aspects such as 
poverty and housing, as well as relational and emotional issues such as cultural 
attitudes to ageing and isolation, the main strategies of SS are focused on the 
individual: promoting opportunity and increasing well-being, again through centralising 
activity and independence. 
 
Independence, choice and risk: a guide to best practice in supported decision making 
(2007) (ICR) 
Produced by the Department of Health, the scope of this document differs from the 
others detailed here as ICR is a practice guide for those involved in supporting adults 
using health and social care services. ICR therefore has a narrow intended audience 
and purpose, and its content reflects this. It has been included as it responds directly 
to the claims in OHOCOS that people want choice and control in their lives, by giving 
advice regarding how this can and should occur in social care services. Alongside this it 
touches upon the tension inherent in social care between self-determination and care 
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framed in terms of protection. This document sets out expectations of the individual, 
of lifestyle(s), and of social relations within social care services.    
 
Shaping the future of care together (2009) (SFC) 
Produced by the Department of Health, this Green Paper focuses on the provision of 
care and support, in particular suggesting the formation of a National Care Service 
(NCS). Again, whilst SFC is not solely interested in old age, the need for a reform of 
care and support services is attributed to longer lives and demographic change, 
coupled with an expectation for more choice in later life. Thus the values the NCS 
would be based upon coincide with those found in the other policies detailed here: 
support to remain independent and increase well-being; strategies to 
encourage/enable activity; emphasis on preventative, support-based care.  
 
Building a society for all ages (2009) (BSFA) 
A follow-up from OA, BSFA is produced by the Department for Work and Pensions, and 
so similarly aims to set out changes that need to be made in/by society to ensure its 
security and prosperity against the challenges brought by an ageing population. The 
scope of the policy is equally as wide as OA, including economy, public services, 
community, and redefining ageing; and its strategies similarly focused on prevention 
and future planning. 
 
Building the National Care Service (2010) (BNCS) 
BNCS, a White Paper following on from SFC produced by the Department of Health, 
details how a National Care Service could be possible, and why it is a necessary reform. 
Central to the argument for the need for a NCS is the ageing population. BNCS is set 
out as the product of a National debate regarding how ‘we’, as its members, want 
society to be organised in light of the social and economic challenges longer lives bring 
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and the expectation of comprehensive welfare and expanded choice based upon 
market principles. This policy therefore details how (in this case the primarily 
economic) issues of old age become folded back onto the population as a whole. 
Expectations of civic responsibility are therefore emphasised in this policy.  
